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Abstract 1 
 2 
The efficient and effective management-led implementation of change is often required for 3 
successful performance across a host of organisational domains (By, 2005; du Gay & 4 
Vikkelsø, 2012; Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004).  However, while a major modern-day 5 
industry, elite sport organisations have seen limited development of their change management 6 
practices; particularly those deployed in the department responsible their core product: on-7 
field performance.  Reflecting growing awareness of the need for elite sport performance 8 
team managers to rapidly create and sustain high performing cultures when taking over at a 9 
new team (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a; Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; League Managers 10 
Association, 2012; Lee, Shaw, & Chesterfield, 2009), the aim of this thesis was to therefore 11 
provide the first exploration of this specific culture change process.  Accordingly, interviews 12 
were undertaken with performance team managers in professional then Olympic sport as part 13 
of a grounded theory approach for developing domain-specific models of culture change best 14 
practice.  Illuminating the criticality of the manger’s initial programme integration phase, 15 
both models primarily depicted a holistic, dynamic, and 360-degree process which was rooted 16 
to the manager’s power- and political-based interactions with key internal and external 17 
stakeholders.  To further understanding of these features and their effective management, a 18 
case study of a successful change programme in a professional sport performance team was 19 
undertaken.  This time examining multi-stakeholder perspectives (i.e., team management, 20 
players, support staff, and CEO) through a decentred theory lens, successful change was 21 
shown to have been facilitated by the team managers’ deployment of processes which 22 
proactively encouraged a “to and fro” of social power.  Additionally, and falling out from the 23 
analysed data across the grounded theory and case studies, a unique change-mechanism plus 24 
a range of novel and previously overlooked leadership styles and management skills were 25 
also found to underpin optimal change in all settings.  Overall, this thesis represented a long 26 
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overdue study of the challenges faced by newly appointed elite sport performance team 1 
managers and, most significantly, provided the first sports team-specific, evidence-based 2 
implications on which these may be surmounted to enable consistent success. 3 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Change Management and its Relevance to Elite Sport Performance Teams 
Organisational change and change management have moved centre stage within the 
field of organisation studies . . . . Because change is regarded both as omnipresent and 
omnipotent, the ability of organisations to adapt to its imperatives is deemed pivotal.  
Managing change is therefore seen as a, if not the, crucial feature of the business of 
organising (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012, p. 121). 
As proposed by du Gay and Vikkelsø (2012), the effective management of change is arguably 
the most critical marker of peak organisational functioning and performance.  Consistently 
implicated across the spectrum of organisational studies, interest in organisational change is 
inextricably linked to its abiding “real world” pervasiveness and significance.  Indeed, with 
businesses continuing to compete in highly dynamic environments (By, 2005), the practice of 
change management (hereafter CM) has received much attention in organisational literature.  
Defined as “the process of continually renewing an organisation’s direction, structure, and 
capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of external and internal customers” (Moran & 
Brightman, 2001, p.111), the CM construct has also been studied and applied across a variety 
of other domains such as health services (e.g., Bamford & Daniel, 2005), education services 
(By, Diefenbach & Klarner, 2008), and the military (Ruvolo & Bullis, 2003).  While a major 
modern-day industry, elite sport organisations have, in contrast, seen limited theoretical and 
practical development of their CM practices; particularly those in the department responsible 
for these organisations’ core product: on-field performance. 
Resonating with the above definition of organisational CM, most contemporary elite 
sport organisations must provide a constantly “marketable” product (e.g., results, entertaining 
performances, star performers) to a group of highly demanding internal (e.g., support staff, 
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performers) and external stakeholders (e.g., funders, sponsors, fans, media: Mielke, 2007) if 
they are to achieve their short- and long-term goals.  Accordingly, it is imperative that these 
organisations are sensitive to the oscillating requirements of the system which delivers such 
prosperity-supporting outcomes, namely the on-field performance team.  However, while 
sport-based research has recently began to study processes of change, enquiry to date has 
primarily focused on business/administrative elements or whole organisations rather than on-
field team performance (Bloyce, Smith, Mead, & Morris, 2008; Frontiera, 2010; Thibault and 
Babiak, 2005; Wagstaff, Fletcher, & Hanton, 2012a; Zakus & Skinner, 2008).  With on-field 
success strongly influenced by the performance of the supporting business (Guzmán, 2006; 
Smith & Stewart, 2010), this off-field/holistic focus is of course merited.  Nonetheless, 
recognising that it is the on-field team which ultimately delivers the sport organisation’s most 
decisive product - and accordingly governs the longevity of off-field systems (Benkraiem, 
Louhichi, & Marques, 2009; Lewis, 2004) - there is a need for research which develops 
theoretical and practical understanding of CM in this performance context. 
Indeed, as well as a conceptually valid pursuit, study of elite sport performance team 
CM also represents a highly pertinent applied agenda.  Specifically, and contrasting with the 
time which CEOs may be afforded to reinvigorate underperforming organisational elements, 
when elite sport organisation top management (i.e., Boards of Directors) view the functioning 
and/or performance of the “front-line” workforce (i.e., team performers) to be insufficient for 
delivering set targets, a “hiring and firing” policy is often employed in relation to the on-field 
performance team manager.  For instance, in pursuit of a manager who can engender beliefs, 
expectations, and behaviours across the performance department to enable consistent success 
(in short, a high performing culture: see below), some European, North American, and South 
American sports now grant team managers less than 1.5 seasons to achieve this goal (Flores, 
Forrest, & Tena, 2012; League Managers Association, 2010; Zinser, 2008a).  As a specific 
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exemplar, the life-expectancy of English league football managers’ now stands at a record 
low of 1.4 years.  Moreover, if sacked from a first position, 49% of these figures are never 
then entrusted with another (League Managers Association, 2010).  Nor is this purely a UK 
challenge. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel (2003) have reported a turnover of 125 managers in the 
highest professional Dutch football league between 1988 and 2000, an average of seven 
managers for each of the division’s 18 clubs. While not suffering to quite the same general 
extent, the turnover of Olympic sport Performance Directors is also increasingly prevalent; 
particularly in higher profile sports (e.g., Hart, 2012).  Although such statistics and trends are 
concerning in their own right, these are further compounded by the now sizable body of work 
showing management turnover to regularly fail in eliciting either lasting or instant gains 
(Andersen, 2011; Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 2002; Audas, Goddard & Rowe, 2006; 
Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, & Guermat, 2010).  Further recognising that CM aimed at culture 
optimisation is a lengthy process (Price & Chahal, 2006) - taking up to ten years (Kotter, 
1996) - alongside the inherently stressful task of leading sports teams (Olusoga, Butt, Hays, 
& Maynard, 2009; Thelwell, Weston, Greenlees, & Hutchings, 2008), the applied importance 
of assessing how culture change is best delivered in such pressurised conditions has arguably, 
therefore, never been greater.  Indeed, elite sport performance team managers are now 
explicitly requesting the provision of training courses which address how team culture can be 
changed (League Managers Association, 2012). 
Reflecting the recent identification of culture change services as a key function of 
contemporary applied sport psychologists (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a; Fletcher & Arnold, 
2011) and my own status as an in-training sport and exercise psychologist, this thesis 
examined manager-led culture change in elite sport performance teams from a sport 
psychology perspective.  The rest of this chapter consequently defines some key terms used 
throughout the thesis, identifies the benefits of culture change study in elite sport 
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performance teams, details the objectives of inquiry, and provides an overview of the work 
programme designed to meet these intentions. 
1.2. The Management-led Creation and Regulation of High Performing Cultures within 
the On-Field Elite Sport Performance Team Environment: Defining the Change 
Management Challenge 
Recognising the semantic challenges that “manager/management” and “culture” have 
faced in sport/social psychology literature (cf. Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; Shteynberg, 2010) 
and the novelty of the CM construct in on-field elite sport performance team environments, it 
is important to define these key terms to best frame the objectives and scope of this thesis. 
1.2.1. Manager/Management 
Resonating with the views of Northouse (2010) and Fletcher and Arnold (2011) that 
managers lead and leaders manage, “manager” and “management” are used as general labels 
for positions such as manager, head coach, and performance director.  Although conceptual 
and operational differences exist across each position (as shown by the results of this thesis), 
any instance of “manager” and “management” without further specific qualification therefore 
refers to any individual with direct responsibility for the vision, organisation, preparation and 
performance of an on-field elite sport performance team (NB. “leader/leadership” could 
equally have been deployed). 
1.2.2. High Performing Cultures 
Although “team culture” is well established in the sport psychology lexicon (cf. San-
Fu & Bor-Shiuan, 2005) “culture” remains one of the most vaguely deployed terms in social 
science (Shteynberg, 2010).  Based on an integration of recent assertions in sport psychology, 
social psychology, and organisational studies (where the topic has received greater attention) 
(Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; San-Fu & Bor-Shiuan, 2005; Schein, 2004; Shteynberg, 2010; Zou 
et al., 2009), this thesis will adopt my own developed definition and consider culture to be “a 
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dynamic process characterised by the shared values, beliefs, expectations and practices across 
the members and generations of a defined group” (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a, p. 340).  
Further drawing on my work, high performing cultures are thereby actualised when group 
members’ shared values, beliefs, expectations, and practices “a) support sustained optimal 
performance; b) persist across time in the face of variable results (i.e., wins, losses, ties); and, 
most importantly, c) lead to consistent high performance” (p. 340).  As such, high performing 
cultures primarily contain members who: a) make day-to-day, moment-to-moment decisions 
which support the continued search for and attainment of peak performance; and b) self-
regulate performance-optimising perceptions and behaviours within and across generations of 
the group.  Operationalised in this manner, accordance is found with Hartmann and 
Khademian’s (2010, p. 848) pragmatic approach to culture in that this definition alludes to a 
process which is “purposeful”, holds an ability to be influenced,  and “is continuously 
practiced or enacted.” 
As a vital appendage, the reader should note the subtle yet significant difference 
between high performing and high performance.  Specifically, although by definition elite 
teams operate in high performance sport and may even achieve reasonable levels of objective 
success, this does not necessarily make them high performing (i.e., they represent those who 
consistently underperform relative to their resources). 
1.2.3. The On-Field Elite Sport Performance Team Environment 
As asserted by Fletcher and Wagstaff (2009), the interaction of an elite on-field sports 
team with its wider organisation is a key performance factor as on- and off-field elements do 
not operate entirely separately.  Indeed, the impact of organisational features on sporting 
success has been well documented (e.g., Gilmore & Gilson, 2007; Gould, Guinan, Greenleaf 
& Chung, 2002; Fletcher, Hanton, Mellalieu & Neil, 2012).  Nonetheless, the culture of the 
on-field elite sport performance team (encompassing team management, support staff, and 
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performers: Gilmore & Gilson, 2007) merits treatment as a distinct construct.  Specifically, 
and beyond earlier comments on the dependence of the whole organisation on its on-field 
product, the practical relevance of focusing on the performance department “sub-culture” is 
further reinforced when acknowledging: (a) the bespoke goals and roles of 
management/support staff/performers in relation to their office-based, strategic/administrative 
equivalents; (b) the time members spend in each others’ company; (c) the extent of members’ 
emotional ties through their shared involvement in sport performance. 
1.3. Identifying Benefits of Culture Change Research in Elite Sport Performance Teams 
Study into the management-led creation and maintenance of high performing cultures 
in elite sport performance team environments carries three potentially important implications.  
First and second is bespoke knowledge development of and for this key CM activity; in short, 
establishing theoretical understanding into how change is driven and sustained in elite sport 
performance teams (the of) and then applying these results to enhance actual team manager 
performance (the for).  Reinforcing benefits for applied practice, Fletcher and Arnold (2011, 
p. 236), recently acknowledge that “the potential [for sport psychologists] to affect change is 
far greater working through performance leaders and managers, rather than . . . counselling 
athletes . . . [through] creating an environment where high performance becomes sustainable 
across the team”.  With sport psychologists currently advertising their culture change skills 
but from an apparently organisational evidence-base (e.g., www.lane4performance.com; 
www.stevensylvester.com), developing sport-specific understanding is a pressing issue for 
not only elite sport performance team managers but also the consultants who support them. 
Reflecting prior use of sports teams as “laboratories” to test a range of organisational 
constructs (e.g., Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Dawson & Dobson, 2002; Giambatista, Rowe, 
& Riaz, 2005; Goosby Smith, 2009), reported similarities between sports team managers and 
their business equivalents (e.g., middle managers; executives; senior operating officers: Beck, 
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Brüderl, & Woywode, 2008; Hughes et al., 2010; Weinberg & McDermott, 2002), reciprocal 
knowledge transfer between sport and business (cf. Aoyagi, Cox, & McGuire, 2008; Cope, 
Eys, Schinke, & Bosselut, 2007; Dohmen, 2008; Fletcher & Wagstaff, 2009; Jones, 2008; 
Wagstaff, Fletcher, & Hanton, 2012b), and calls for a trans-discipline approach in advancing 
organisational change theory and practice (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004), the third 
possible implication of elite sport performance team CM study is knowledge development 
through this domain. In short, using elite sport teams as a testing location from which more 
potentially generic organisational theory and practice can be critically explored and informed. 
Certainly, as a consequence of CM’s roots in organisational settings, the majority of 
work to date has focused on larger scale businesses (Bamford and Forrester, 2003; Wissema, 
2001) resulting in theory and prescription shaped by the characteristics of organisational life.  
However, elite sport offers a unique environment in which to investigate the implications of 
the decisions and actions of change leaders at a more detailed, micro-level; a focus which has 
been advocated by other CM researchers (e.g., Cunningham, 2006a, 2006b).  Specifically, in 
contrast to change in sizable organisations where employees commonly have limited shared 
interests and minimal interactions with strategic management (Driscoll & Morris, 2001), elite 
sport performance team managers normally lead far smaller groups and are, therefore, highly 
dependent on their subordinates (i.e., support staff and performers) to achieve success (Jones 
& Wallace, 2005).  As the measures and mechanisms of change are likely to be experienced 
and interpreted in a particularly personal manner by the targets of change (i.e., performers 
and support staff), elite sport offers a useful natural environment in which to assess the 
impact and interplay of change processes.  Moreover, the value of the elite sport performance 
team laboratory is further underpinned by the environment’s unique internal and external 
power relations (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a; Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b). 
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Considering internal power relations first; as elite sports team performers (particularly 
those with a history of achievement) are often held in high peer and public regard (including 
notable media attention), receive huge salaries (and/or private sponsorships), and deliver the 
organisation’s product in wide public settings (i.e., in stadiums/on television), the private and 
public power they hold in relation to their management is comparatively greater than most 
organisations’ “front line” employees.  Furthermore, while most business-based organisations 
are made up of interdependent sub-departments, elite sport performance team support staff 
contain practitioners (e.g., physiotherapists, conditioners, psychologists) bound by the legal 
and ethical standards and mores of their profession – not the organisation per se (cf. Collins, 
Moore, Mitchell, & Alpress, 1999).  As such, all support staff are (at least partly) driven by 
their own unalterable interests and, in some cases, gripped by a need to justify personal worth 
against the predominantly unquantifiable nature of proportional contribution to sports team 
performance (Reid, Stewart, & Thorne, 2004). 
In terms of external influences, top management, fans, and the media play a major and 
unique role in shaping professional sports team settings.  Specifically, as professional teams 
usually play weekly, a team manager’s product (i.e., on-field performance) can be constantly 
monitored by top management.  Unlike most businesses, however, top management groups 
are rarely experts in the field in which the organisation primarily operates (i.e., performance 
sport: Gilmore & Gilson, 2007).  Additionally, while business executives are accountable to a 
range of stakeholders, a sports team’s fans present another bespoke challenge to professional 
sports team managers due to their: (a) direct impact on the organisation’s product (e.g., via 
support, or lack thereof, at matches); (b) opportunities to acquire information and provide 
opinion on the running and performance of the team and wider organisation (e.g., via radio, 
television, internet); and (c) notable power in impacting top-management decisions (e.g., via 
withheld support/active protests: Flores et al., 2012).  Finally, and mediating both fan and 
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top-management perceptions (amongst many others), the media’s ubiquitous involvement in 
professional sport provide another significant challenge; particularly as their interactions are 
often motivated by personal and sensationalist-oriented agendas (Carter, 2007). 
Based on the type and nature of these internal power relations and external influences, 
elite sport performance teams carry particular potential for critically advancing the theory and 
practice of organisational CM.  Of course, this is not to suggest that businesses do not face 
internal/external stakeholder challenges; they clearly do (e.g., Hope, 2010; Tatlı & Ӧzbilgin, 
2009; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).  Rather, it is the regularity and intensity 
of these challenges – as fuelled by the high stakes1, the uncertainty of results, inflated egos, 
power imbalances, wide public interest, and high emotions - which make professional sports 
teams “special” and thereby a unique natural laboratory in which to explore how management 
can optimally negotiate the personal, political, and contested features which characterise any 
change environment. 
1.4. Objectives of the Thesis 
Reflecting the lack of theoretical understanding of manager-led culture change in elite 
sport performance teams, alongside the construct’s practical relevance and potential to feed 
back into organisational CM understanding, the main objectives of this thesis were: 
1. To explore perceptions of culture change across pertinent performance management 
levels in a British elite sport context (specifically professional and Olympic sport 
environments), develop models of best practice, and evaluate their congruence 
with/divergence from current business-based knowledge. 
2. To explore the potential for generality of culture change best practice across British 
professional and Olympic sport performance team environments. 
                                                 
1
 As an example, the playoff match to gain entry to English soccer’s Premier League has been reported to now 
be worth £90 million for the winner (www.deloitte.com) 
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3. To analyse and explain successful elite sport performance team culture change 
through multiple stakeholder perspectives. 
4. To examine the power of an imported theoretical lens for explaining culture change in 
an elite sport performance team. 
5. To identify common mechanisms of elite sport performance team culture change. 
6. To identify common leadership/management skills for delivering elite sport 
performance team culture change. 
7. To prescribe effective guidance for management seeking to efficiently establish and 
sustain high performing cultures in their team environments. 
Driven by these objectives, the intended outcomes of this thesis were to: (a) establish the first 
models of optimal manager-led culture change in professional and Olympic sport 
performance teams; (b) offer the first assessment of an imported theoretical approach’s utility 
for explaining successful culture change in an elite sport performance team; (c) provide initial 
understanding on how culture change is best delivered in elite sport performance teams (i.e., 
through what mechanisms and leadership/management skills do the models best operate); (d) 
identify implications for advancing the practice and training of elite sport performance team 
managers (and their supporting consultants); and (e) provide a platform through which broad 
organisational theory and practice may be critically informed. 
1.5. Overview of the Work Programme 
In Chapter 2, an indicative review and critique of relevant CM and sport management 
literature is presented, with particular focus on the methodological and theoretical limitations 
of these bodies of knowledge.  Additionally, after further evaluation of the unique features of 
elite sport performance teams, a similar review and critique of sport psychology knowledge is 
also presented; as underpinned by the discipline’s breadth of literature on team dynamics and 
recent consideration of culture change (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a).  Emphasising a need 
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for sport-specific study, the key messages from these analyses are used to define the direction 
of the thesis and its guiding philosophy and methodology (Chapter 3).  More specifically, the 
thesis sought to identify the chronology, nature, mechanisms, and leadership/management 
skills of optimal culture change in elite sport performance teams via a pragmatic approach 
which provided recommendations and lessons for both theory and applied practice. 
To address the thesis’ first objective, Chapter 4 presents a study of professional sport 
performance team managers’ (hereafter PM) perceptions on the culture change process, 
comparing and contrasting experiences to date across managed teams.  Applying grounded 
theory methodology, analyses of detailed, temporally-grounded, case-based data leads to the 
development of a model of culture change best practice.  More explicitly, this chapter 
explores and elucidates the chronology and nature of optimal culture change in professional 
sport performance teams and evaluates this process against current organisational knowledge. 
Following this first exploration, Chapter 5 also addresses Objective 1 and moves to 
meet Objective 2.  Applying the same methodology as in Chapter 4, this study specifically 
describes a parallel investigation of Olympic sport performance directors’ (hereafter PD) 
perceptions and reflections on their culture change practice.  Beyond providing initial insight 
on the culture change process in Britain’s other major strand of elite sport, this study provides 
a contrast with Chapter 4 via its consideration of: (a) culture change “from distance” (with 
respect to most Olympic sports’ distributed, multi-site networks); (b) the interaction of and 
challenges with public rather than private funding; and (c) the implications of working in a 
quadrennial as opposed to a season-on-season cycle.  Unearthing the chronology and nature 
of optimal culture change in this specific performance team environment, the results reinforce 
many messages from the PM study and concurrently offer a number of bespoke findings. 
 Although the grounded theory models produced in Chapters 4 and 5 provide the first 
theoretical accounts of culture change in elite sport performance teams, these studies are also 
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constrained by shortcomings which have afflicted prior organisational CM investigation.  In 
addressing Objective 3, Chapter 6 therefore adopted a 360 degree approach to explore multi-
stakeholder perceptions of successful management-led culture change in a professional sports 
team (encompassing: team management, support staff, players, and CEO).  Deploying a case 
study design and interview guide framed by each participant’s bespoke experience, the focus 
of this chapter centred on (perceived) management action and its effectiveness over a two-
year change process.  Additionally, this study also attended to Objective 4 by exploring the 
utility of decentred theory, an imported perspective from political science, for explaining the 
CM programme’s evolution and success.  Via inductive then “recentred” analyses, the results 
substantiated much of the management team’s approach, illuminated notable points of 
divergence across multi-stakeholder perceptions, supported the fundamental structure and 
features of the models developed in Chapters 4 and 5, and offered initial support of decentred 
theory’s value as an framework for explicating elite sport performance team culture change. 
 With preceding chapters focused predominantly on understanding the chronology and 
nature of culture change best practice, Chapter 7 addresses Objective 5 by exploring how the 
developed models are best delivered.  Expressly, from analyses conducted over Chapters 4 to 
6, a discrete change mechanism found across all of these studies is identified and described.  
Extending this focus on how the culture change models are optimally delivered, Chapter 8 
addresses Objective 6 and provides initial insight on some particularly important leadership 
and management skills which were also prevalent across the three investigations undertaken 
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
Synthesising the mechanism- and leadership-based findings with the two grounded 
theory models, the implications for elite sport performance team culture change theory and 
practice are presented in Chapter 9.  Attending to the final objective of the thesis, this chapter 
also includes a description of a training workshop delivered for the Rugby Football Union’s 
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Elite Coach Development programme.  Based on the implications derived from Chapters 4 to 
8, this project sees the thesis “come full circle” from identifying a pertinent applied challenge 
to providing guidance on its successful negotiation.  Conducted as part of an ongoing action-
research investigation, participant feedback on the utility of this first intervention is provided.  
In Chapter 10, conclusions are drawn on the thesis with a particular emphasis on its unique 
contributions to elite sport performance team culture change literature and practice alongside 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CULTURE CHANGE IN ELITE SPORT PERFORMANCE TEAMS: 
CONTEXTUALISING AND PARAMETERISING THE CONSTRUCT 
2.1. Introduction 
As identified in Chapter 1, the development of theoretical and practical knowledge in 
management-led culture change in elite sport performance teams represents a highly relevant 
and important pursuit.  However, to identify a research agenda from which the objectives and 
outcomes of this thesis can be met, it is vital to first examine the contexts against which such 
work takes place and parameterise the sport-specific culture change construct.  Further used 
to determine the extent to which bespoke understanding is required and therefore define the 
most suitable starting point and approach for study, this chapter is structured around critical 
indicative reviews of current pertinent knowledge in business/non-sport organisation, sport 
management, and sport psychology literature.  More specifically, these reviews are packaged 
as four key challenges which this thesis must address if effective knowledge development of, 
for, and through elite sport performance team culture change is to be generated. 
2.2. Challenge I: Methodological Shortcomings of the CM Literature 
2.2.1. Business/Non-Sport Organisation CM Literature 
Acknowledging that organisation management are routinely required to drive change 
initiatives when an improvement in functioning and/or performance is sought, and that the 
process via which management implement change is as, if not more important than what the 
change is (Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer, 2002; Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004), business-
based CM researchers have produced an abundance of applied frameworks (e.g., Hartmann & 
Khademian, 2010; Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 2003; Mento et al., 2002; Price & Chahal, 2006; 
Ruvolo & Bullis, 2003; Wissema, 2001).  Generally taking a linear form, involving stages of 
planning, initiation, implementation, and evaluation, CM scholars and consultants have also 
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disseminated a variety of measures by which effective change is considered to occur.  Such 
measures, among many others, include creating a shared vision/expectations (Luecke, 2003; 
Kotter, 1996), empowering staff (Ruvolo & Bullis, 2003), managing resistance (Erwin & 
Garman, 2009), and self-reflection (Mento et al., 2002).  However, while significant efforts 
have been devoted to illuminating and explaining applied CM models, Balogun and Hope 
Hailey (2004) reported that around 70% of CM programs failed to deliver on their intentions.  
As noted by By (2005), and further echoed in Cruickshank and Collins’ (2012b) later sport-
specific review, this concerning and often reported occurrence may be a direct consequence 
of the methodological limitations which plague business CM literature. 
As a first example, business-based CM study has historically adopted a subjective 
approach toward developing and testing frameworks.  Indeed, anecdotal prescriptions prevail, 
often derived from subjective experience (Ruvolo & Bullis, 2003) or arbitrary amalgamations 
of prior accounts (Price & Chahal, 2006; Mento et al., 2002), thereby raising doubt over the 
validity of garnered advice.  For instance, while Ruvolo and Bullis (2003) offer (apparently) 
logical and face-valid recommendations from a failed culture change programme at a U.S. 
military academy, no qualitative or quantitative analyses were used to arrive at their 
conclusions.  Thus, many frameworks appear to have obtained relative dominance in the field 
through unchallenged acceptance rather than any confirmation of their robustness (By, 2005). 
A second area of methodological contention is the predominant theoretical focus on 
process.  Underpinned by universal management hypes and fashions which promote a need 
for constant change (Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004), this macro-level approach has reflected a 
rationalistic perspective for uncovering tangible change procedures; although it is significant 
that very few enquiries have tracked change programmes in real time (Bamford & Forrester, 
2003).  Consider, for example, the work of Mento et al. (2002) who, from merging lessons 
from previous change models filtered through practical experience, offer a definitive 12 step 
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process for implementing change.  The work of Luecke (2003) seems to offer an ‘even better’ 
plan, with nirvana accomplished in only “seven steps”.  Such prescriptions intuitively appeal 
to the needs of managers across the organisational environment, offering CM “insights and 
recipes that are punchy, succinct, explicit and plausible” (Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004, p. 
1207).  The lack of testing and monitoring, however, prevents us knowing which, if any, are 
the most accurate or useful (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004). 
Moreover, it is both surprising and counterintuitive that little focus has been devoted 
to assessing the perceptions of employees as the targets of change and how new processes 
impact upon them (Cunningham, 2006b; Devos, Buelens & Bouckenooghe, 2007; Driscoll & 
Morris, 2001; Neves & Caetano, 2006).  Indeed, due to many CM consultants’ focus on 
devising well-marketed “brand solutions” rather than lucid, evidence-based recommendations 
- in doing so, exploiting the tendency for business managers to outsource external specialists 
as change facilitators or “commercial reducers of complexity” (Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004, 
p. 1207) - simplistic, leader-centric, step-by-step methods are often offered without critical 
evaluation of the mechanisms by which they operate.  For example, while the Lane4 Change 
Framework claims to be “a scientifically rigorous platform from which . . . successful change 
can be designed and implemented” (Warriner, 2008, p. 19), no evidence can be sourced on its 
analytic emergence.  While a need to protect product IPR and market edge is understandable, 
the failure to submit such tools to peer review should be seen as a weakness.  Contrast this 
with the England and Wales Cricket Board’s use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, a well 
researched and publicly-derived instrument (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Vaughan, 2011).   
The third methodological shortcoming of business-based CM literature is the 
widespread failure to uncover and evaluate actual change mechanisms: For example, how do 
managers “instil trust” or “create a shared vision” (both common central pillars of any of the 
proposed systems)?  The question of “how” appears to have been considered at a somewhat 
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superficial level, often only through the prescription of broad directives (Devos et al., 2007).  
Indeed, as a solution to resistance, Price and Chahal (2006) stipulate that resistors should be 
made part of the project: However their guideline to achieve this states that “if done with 
enough skill and with good employees, the implementation team can successfully use the 
doubters to improve the change process” (p. 249).  The actual means by which resistors may 
be included remains unspecified, although recent research suggests that leaders may require a 
range of mechanistic abilities to manage change effectively, such as political bargaining 
(Hope, 2010; Potrac & Jones, 2009) and the utilisation of pivotal “tipping points” to enforce 
strategies (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Taylor & Ford, 2008).  Unfortunately, leader succession 
literature also offers limited insight as this domain’s traditional positivist underpinnings have 
channelled focus onto the correlates of succession rather than what it is successors do, how 
they do it, when they do it, who with, where, and why. (Giambatista, 2005; Hutzschenreuter, 
Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012).  Conversely, how, when and why CM methods are chosen and 
deployed to optimally interact with the cognitive-affective interpretations of the programme’s 
targets seems important for any framework to hold real theoretical and applied value, as well 
as greater market worth.  Indeed, this point has been echoed in the recent work of du Gay and 
Vikkelsø (2012, p. 133): 
While it is clear that such [under-described] discourses have some intuitive rhetorical 
appeal – offering, for instance, a powerful set of generalisations that can act as a 
catalyst for ‘transformation’ – it is not at all obvious how such abstract injunctions are 
to be acted upon practically . . . . It may well be the case that their lack of precision 
and specificity has some serious implications for the appropriateness of particular 
changes in different organisational settings. 
While employee/targets’ psychological wellbeing is a significantly underrepresented 
line of enquiry, it should also not be forgotten that the ultimate purpose for initiating change 
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is to enhance performance.  Surprisingly, although business-based prescriptions have been 
widely distributed, the relationship between change processes, their psychological impact on 
change targets and performance outcomes has been largely ignored (cf. Pettigrew, Woodman, 
& Cameron, 2001; Wischnevsky & Damanpour, 2006).  Recognising that the ultimate goal 
for programs in the applied setting is to enhance, or certainly maintain, performance and 
outcome success, failure to comprehensively consider the change-performance association is 
therefore another notable methodological limitation of business CM research. 
2.2.2. Sport Management Literature 
  As a result of elite sport teams’ status as businesses (e.g., Gilmore & Gilson, 2007), 
the process of change has become a topic of notable interest in sports company management.  
Similar to the bulk of guidance from business-based work, successful evolution is considered 
to be underpinned by, among other aspects, the creation and acceptance of shared goals 
(Cunningham, 2009), relationships of trust (Smart & Wolfe, 2000), and empowerment of 
change targets (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004).  While rarely utilising or testing specific CM 
prescription, these commonalities nonetheless reinforce the conjecture in Chapter 1 that the 
CM construct is both highly applicable and pertinent to the elite sport environment, where 
such process aims (i.e., shared goals, management-support staff-performer trust, performer 
empowerment) are common (cf. Collins, Button, & Richards, 2011). 
  In a notable step toward developing sport-specific CM knowledge, Frontiera (2010) 
recently studied the delivery of culture change in US professional sport organisations.  From 
interviews with the owners and general managers of successful American football, basketball, 
and baseball teams, this author presented a five-step change framework, involving: assessing 
the symptoms of a negative culture, implementing a new way of doing things, emphasising 
and reinforcing new values, embedding the new culture, and crystallising the new culture.  
Beyond uncertainty over the extent to which this (and others’) organisational-derived work 
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can be directly applied for research and practice in on-field sports team environments (NB. 
this point is covered in greater detail in Challenges II, III and IV below), Frontiera’s research 
is limited by: (a) interviewing successful owners/general managers only (overlooking learned 
lessons from unsuccessful owners/general managers and the perceptions of change-targets); 
(b) the short interview duration (the shortest being 31 minutes); (c) the use of closed 
questions in the interview guide (e.g., “How did you communicate that change was 
necessary?”); (d) incoherence between the organisational theory-driven guide and 
(apparently) purely inductive data analysis; and (e) the consequent provision of partial, 
abstract, and simplistic advice as to when and how each of the five steps should be addressed. 
Indeed, while comparable CM guidance has been offered from work across both non-
sport and sport organisation research, other sport management-based study has been similarly 
and significantly afflicted by limitations in design and methodology, thereby diminishing its 
value for application in the elite sport performance team (and arguably the sports company 
itself).  Firstly, research has again primarily focused on macro, system-level changes 
(Skinner, Stewart, & Edwards, 1999; Zakus & Skinner, 2008) which have often been 
triggered through changes in the external environment (Bloyce et al., 2008; Hanstad, 2008) 
rather than management-led initiatives focusing on team performance.  Second, there has 
been a widespread failure to consider how change is both successfully and unsuccessfully 
delivered at the individual level (cf. Cunningham, 2006a).  Finally, and in stark contrast to 
the thrust of business-based CM investigation, study has often been occupied with theoretical 
explanations of previous change processes (e.g., Morrow & Idle, 2008; Thibault & Babiak, 
2005) rather than the development of frameworks which can direct and inform practice.  For 
example, while Kelly (2008) illuminated the multifaceted nature of professional football 
management and some mechanisms for optimal effectiveness, such as the appointment of 
trusted staff, focus was on explaining these processes through the writing of Max Weber 
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rather than offering guidance to individuals appointed into such demonstrably precarious 
positions. 
2.3. Challenge II: The Theoretical Ambivalence of CM Research 
Although a number of methodological contentions have been aimed at the nature and 
value of much CM research to date, perhaps the most concerning aspect of this work in both 
business and sports company management lies in the failure to be guided by robust theory.  
For example, it is unclear from which theoretical framework (and epistemological position) 
many business-derived CM frameworks are developed, while some work appears to prescribe 
advice based upon no evident theoretical position at all (e.g., Mento et al., 2002; Oakland & 
Tanner, 2007).  Alternatively, in sports company management research, while research has 
been historically atheoretical (cf. Waddington & Skirstad, 2008), more recently a number of 
approaches have been adopted in attempt to best explain change processes (e.g., stakeholder 
theory: Morrow & Idle, 2008; institutional theory: Kikulis, 2000); sometimes even within the 
same work (Cunningham 2009; Slack & Hinings, 1992, Morrow & Idle, 2008).  As noted 
above, however, little work in this particular domain has explored and explained unfolding 
management-led programmes. 
Recognising that regardless of the reason for change there must always be a strategy 
for delivering it (Neves & Caetano, 2006; Price & Chahal, 2006), and the significant applied 
demand for efficient and effective CM practices (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004), research 
focussing on CM processes has been traditionally dominated by two overarching approaches; 
namely the planned approach and the emergent approach (By, 2005).  Both focused on the 
process of how change comes about, the planned approach is grounded in the work of Kurt 
Lewin and maintains that current behaviours, processes, and cultures can be abandoned and 
new states achieved via a pre-planned, three-step method of: unfreezing the current culture, 
structure, processes, or behaviour; changing to new culture, structure, processes, or 
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behaviour; and refreezing the new culture, structure, processes, or behaviour (cf. By, 2005).  
While providing a broad basis from which a host of planned models have been developed (cf. 
Bamford & Forrester, 2003), this umbrella perspective has nonetheless has faced many 
challenges.  Indeed, as summarised by By (2005), this perspective has been highly criticised 
for its: (a) rigidity (or inability to deal with and adjust to dynamic environments: Bamford & 
Forrester, 2003); (b) shortcomings in accounting for open-ended/continuous change 
processes; (c) encouragement of managers to remain fixed on the programme rather than 
tailoring action to initial and evolving feedback; (d) dependency on effective top-down 
action; (e) dependency on pan-stakeholder buy-in (thereby ignoring the inherent CM-based 
politics, conflict and interpersonal challenges); and (e) shortcomings in accounting for 
situations which require directive, rapid, or transformational action. 
In stark contrast to the planned perspective’s key tenets, the emergent approach to CM 
places less significance on detailed top-management plans and instead promotes organisation-
wide sensitivity to environmental complexity and the identification of a variety of potential 
change strategies.  The process of emergent change is not therefore a linear, sequential, time-
locked activity but rather via a continuous, adaptation- and learning-based approach which 
encourages optimal responses to changes in the organisation’s surrounding circumstances and 
conditions.  In this manner, change is driven through “bottom-up” as opposed to “top-down” 
action, with managers considered facilitators rather than controllers of organisational systems 
and structures (Bamford & Forrester, 2003).  Guided by the assumption that environmental 
contexts change at too fast a pace and rate for top-managers to control responses via well-
developed strategies, the emergent approach is therefore also characterised by decentralised 
power and responsibility; involving a shift from “managerial hierarchies” to “spontaneously 
forming centres of innovation” (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012, p. 127). 
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Although receiving greater support than the planned approach through its treatment of 
complexity (a feature which organisational change theorists have paid increasing attention to: 
Anderson, 1999; Cilliers, 2000; Smith, 2004; Theodoridis & Bennison, 2009), specific theory 
under the emergent umbrella has not been forthcoming.  With this approach considered to be 
“more concerned with change readiness and facilitating for change” (By, 2005, p. 375), much 
work in this area therefore offers universal yet vague advice.  Indeed, the “one size fits all” 
approach again prevails over more context-specific advice (i.e., a “one size fits each”) with 
even the more explicit applied models (with typically “marketable” titles: e.g., Kanter, Stein, 
& Jick’s Ten Commandments for Executing Change, 1992; Kotter’s Eight Stage Process for 
Successful Organisational Transformation, 1996; Luecke’s Seven Steps, 2003) still highly 
abstract.  For example, take CM steps such as: separate from the past (Kanter et al., 1992); 
anchor new approaches in the culture (Kotter, 1996); and start the change at the periphery 
(Luecke, 2003).  Furthermore, it is uncertain how the emergent approach’s bottom-up thrust 
can explain scenarios whereby: (a) change is instantly required; (b) middle/lower managers 
and employees do not hold the knowledge, interests, motivations, and skills to drive 
performance-optimising change; and (c) top managers are placed under pressure by their 
superiors to first and foremost deliver results.  Also underplayed is the role of choice, 
whereby organisational leaders may stick with (rather than constantly altering) practices 
which, while contributing to temporary underperformance, fit with the organisation’s ideal 
state.  As a result of the limitations in the planned and emergent approaches (as well as the 
lack of clear and coherent messages from other perspectives such as contingency theory and 
choice theory: By, 2005), deeper debate over the future of CM theory has recently arisen. 
Most pertinently, in a recent insightful review by Du Gay and Vikkelsø (2012) on the 
current state of CM theory and knowledge, these authors emphasise how “cases of change are 
routinely introduced and analysed as examples of abstract theoretical or historical axioms, 
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rather than as specific, concrete instances of reorganisation from situation A to situation B” 
(p. 122).  Extending earlier commentaries relating to the decontextualised and oversimplified 
nature of organisational change literature (e.g., By, 2005; Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004), du 
Gay and Vikkelsø describe how the treatment of change as a ubiquitous and generic entity 
has led to “the growing oblivion of classic concerns” (e.g., change design parameters, 
structures, control mechanisms).  Certainly, while CM was originally addressed by scholars 
as a highly applied activity - in that it focused on the process of improving and/or adjusting 
an organisation’s core systems, structures, and processes – contemporary theoretical accounts 
have tended to focus on individual-level experiences/interpretations (or “people approaches”: 
Du Gay & Vikkelsø, p. 126).  Accordingly, these authors argue that “by depicting change as 
instituting a promising yet ambiguous moment . . . [the emergent change] literature works to 
divert the attention of scholars and practitioners from the specific and practical to the abstract 
and ethereal dimensions of organisational life” (p. 127).  Perhaps accounting for part of this 
abstraction, it is significant that organisational approaches to CM have rarely considered the 
fundamental differences which exist between businesses of varying sizes, orientations, and 
core functions.  On the premise that optimal CM frameworks should be built on specification 
and detailed description, du Gay & Vikkelsø thereby encourage CM scholars to adopt a more 
contextually-specific, practically meaningful approach and undertake study which is founded 
on an exploration of the content, purpose, and elements of CM. 
2.4. Challenge III: The Unique Features of Elite Sport Performance Team 
Environments 
As suggested by the preceding reviews, an accurate depiction and prescription of elite 
sport performance team CM is dependent on investigation which considers and addresses the 
frailties and limitations of prior organisational-based research.  Similarly and further, beyond 
accepting culture change as a relevant and important construct for the managers of elite sport 
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performance teams, a second equally pivotal caveat is that it recognises and responds to the 
unique features of this highly complex and idiosyncratic environment. 
Acknowledging contemporary elite sport’s multidimensional focus on “performance, 
entertainment and financial profit” (Relvas, Littlewood, Nesti, Gilbourne, & Richardson, 
2010, p. 166), fundamental to the appeal for bespoke understanding is the argument that “for 
a coach to last, they must please the owner, management, players, fans, media, and be 
impermeable to the criticism that will occur when they fail” (Mielke, 2007, p. 107).  
Certainly, Potrac and Jones (2009, p. 223) describe leading sports teams as a “power-ridden” 
activity whereby impression management is crucial for acquiring the necessary time and 
support necessary to deliver change.  As could be justifiably argued, the management of key 
internal and external stakeholders represents a crucial task in the effective delivery of change 
in any domain (Kihl, Leberman, & Schull, 2010).  However, while the stakeholders 
highlighted by Mielke may also be implicated within organisational-level change (more so in 
sports companies), it is the nature and extent to which the leader of elite sport performance 
teams must manage these power-based relations which challenges the applied utility of 
current CM frameworks’ application in the domain.  For example, and extending points made 
in Chapter 1, with some professional football, baseball and basketball teams paying their 
performers more than £3.5 million on average per year (Harris, 2011) and high profile 
Olympic performers earning hundreds of thousands of pounds in sponsorship on top of 
significant prize money (Goodley, 2012) it is clear that most of these individuals hold 
significantly more power than many business’ employees in shaping the success or failure of 
change programmes2.  As such, how performer needs, preferences and aspirations shape and 
align with an incoming manager’s values and practices must be astutely evaluated (Greenleaf, 
Gould & Dieffenbach, 2001).  Similarly, concerted efforts from a range of support disciplines 
                                                 
2
 A recent example of this power has been seen in the decision of many high profile British athletes’ decisions 
not to relocate to Loughborough as part of UK Sport’s drive for the centralisation of World Class Performance 
Programmes (http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/nov/27/dave-brailsford-uk-athletics-loughborough) 
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are required for organising and preparing the team (e.g., coaching, strength and conditioning, 
physiotherapy, nutrition, sport psychology, scouting).  However, with each profession guided 
by its distinct codes and interests (as noted in Chapter 1), the potential for program-derailing 
conflict always looms (Collins et al., 1999).  Indeed, Reid et al. (2004) have noted that 
interpersonal, individual-group (e.g., one coach-all coaches) and group-group (e.g., coaches-
physiotherapists) conflict can swiftly spiral to detrimental impasse, rogue alliances, and the 
perishing of a cooperated and collaborated approach. 
As noted above and in Chapter 1, the role, perceptions, and actions of external groups 
with a significant “stake” in team success may also impact upon the creation and maintenance 
of high performing cultures; particularly Boards of Directors, fans, and the media.  Indeed, 
the bespoke interactions emanating from these groups further reinforce the suggestion that 
present CM models are not suitable for direct application in elite sport performance teams. 
2.4.1. Pressure from the Board 
Reflecting their ability to shape the conditions in which change is conducted through 
the extent of their facilitative support (e.g., resource provision), the perception of the Board is 
logically pivotal for culture change success3.  Indeed, reflecting on the high rate of sackings 
in U.S. professional team sports, including his own from the NHL’s Tampa Bay Lightening 
(where he won the Stanley Cup), John Tortorella noted: “It's the owners’ call. I'm not the one 
who has invested millions in the team . . . You work through the bumps and become a tighter 
team. But some owners are not willing to go through that, and the coach is out the door” 
(Zinser, 2008b).  Complicating the issue of manager-Board coherence for the leaders of elite 
sport performance teams, many competitive sports are distinct from business domains with 
respect to the (apparently) direct and regular opportunities for boards of directors to monitor 
and assess the activity and outputs of the performance team manager’s programme.  Indeed, 
                                                 
3
 In some professional sport cases, however, oligarch team owners (rather than a number of Board members) 
may hold all the power in determining the level and extent of resource provision, carrying bespoke implications 
for the manager’s efforts to ensure compatibility between their perceptions and those ‘above’. 
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with  Dawson and Dobson (2002) revealing how variations in managerial performance can 
arise from owners’ inability to appropriately examine activity due to its costly nature, and 
that objectively measuring performance in business has been a long-standing problem, sport 
is matchless in this regard as top directors or owners are able to observe and evaluate the 
product derived from the management of all pertinent inputs in the form of competitive 
performances (Gould et al., 2002), which in sports such as football, rugby and basketball 
occurs weekly, if not even more frequently.  The down side of this apparently ‘informed’ 
viewpoint is that these individuals are normally business people, and relatively naive on the 
mechanisms of the sport setting (Gilmore & Gilson, 2007).  Thus, while culture change is not 
a swift process (Price & Chahal, 2006), the pressure on performance team managers to 
achieve instant and regular success against a context of constant evaluation provides a unique 
and conflicting circumstance.  Tactical management of the board’s perceptions of the team’s 
strengths, shortcomings and requirements, particularly in the face of initially inconsistent 
results may therefore be a critical factor for ensuring both success and longevity.   
2.4.2. Pressure from the Fans 
The psychology of fans’ commitment to specific teams has received notable attention 
in the sport literature (Bee & Havitz, 2010; de Groot & Robinson, 2008) and may account in 
part for the pressure placed on managers to create and maintain a successful team.  Indeed, 
Vallerand et al. (2003) have suggested that the enjoyable activities which constitute fandom 
become internalised into individuals’ identities, and develop into a personal passion which is 
worthy of time and energy investment.  As a consequence of this psychological commitment, 
the activities, decisions, and performances of the team will have a significant impact on fans 
(Wann & Schrader, 2000).  For example, notable coverage has been given to the resistance of 
many English Premier League fan groups toward the influxes of foreign capital into clubs 
(Bainbridge & Vulliamy, 2010; Hutchins, Rowe, & Ruddock, 2009), while Nash (2001) has 
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revealed that supporter groups have been formed in direct reaction to the attitude and playing 
style of a manager; ultimately contributing to their eventual dismissal.  Fan opinion therefore 
appears to be of crucial importance to the level and nature of support given to a manager, and 
gaining a favourable interpretation by this group - which can generate vital financial, social 
and psychological capital - may be a central mechanism for creating optimal environments in 
which to deliver a program of change. 
2.4.3. Pressure from the Media 
The media’s involvement and interest in elite sport has grown exponentially in recent 
times as the volume and depth of coverage continues to push new boundaries.  For example, 
in considering these requirements in relation to elite sport team management, Carter (2007) 
provides a valuable account of the media’s growing participation in English Premier League 
football; specifically detailing how managers’ time is increasingly spent attending to media 
responsibilities.  Significantly, Carter notes how Sir Alex Ferguson, long-term manager of 
Manchester United FC, contests that such appearances have lost a sense of their original 
purpose, instead becoming an exercise of character assassination.  As noted earlier, time does 
not appear to be a commodity offered to managers of elite sport performance teams (League 
Managers Association, 2010; Mielke, 2007) and, as a consequence, the media’s consumption 
of this resource (alongside the nature of their apparent intentions: see below) may provide a 
significant challenge to efforts to guide and drive through change.   
Significantly, it is also appears necessary to consider the media as not only a direct 
source of pressure but also as a mediator of pressure from other sources; specifically from the 
board and the fans.  Regarding the former, Sisjord and Kristiansen (2008) have discussed 
how a positive media representation can assist with attracting sponsorship, a vital source of 
income for the boards of elite sport organisations.  In similar fashion, Carter (2007) revealed 
how directors of football clubs have increasingly felt the need to have a manager in place that 
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transmits a certain “promotional” image of their club.  Perhaps more importantly, however, 
may be the relationship between the media and the fans.  As discussed, fan dissatisfaction can 
cost a manager their position (Nash, 2001) and facilitating positive perceptions through the 
media’s portrayal appears a necessary measure for creating optimal environments in which to 
conduct change.  However, as a consequence of the shift from traditional objective accounts 
to sensationalist reporting (Carter, 2007), in which certain journalists are considered to thrive 
on “ammunition” (Reid, 2008, p. 67) from publicly stated comments in their pursuit of 
attention-grabbing headlines/stories, achieving such a positive portrayal of one’s character 
and competence may not appear as straight forward as it seems.  With much contemporary 
journalism considering readers as consumers who desire entertainment (Knoppers & Elling, 
2004), media outlets do not merely report news but actively frame and construct it (Sisjord & 
Kristiansen, 2008; Reid, 2008).  Interestingly, Sir Clive Woodward has also commented that 
coaches often refrain from deviating from coaching norms due to a fear of the media reaction 
(Lee, Shaw, & Chesterfield, 2009).  Reflecting these trends, Pedersen, Miloch and Cothran 
(2006) have highlighted that the effective handling of the media and subsequent positive 
coverage can be of vital importance for achieving success, and of particular importance to 
leaders in their attempts to enforce their intended programs. 
 2.5. Challenge IV: The Lack of Parallel Knowledge in Applied Sport Psychology 
Recognising that the unique features of elite sport present a further major 
consideration for the development of bespoke performance-team specific culture change 
knowledge, what can sport psychology offer in guiding a research agenda with this focus?  
With ever-expanding knowledge in group dynamics, applied sport psychologists are in a 
strong position to identify an array of process markers which may enable the creation and 
maintenance of high performing cultures.  Indeed, and among others, role clarity (Holt & 
Sparkes, 2001), sound coach-athlete relationships (Olympiou, Jowett & Duda, 2008), optimal 
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achievement goals (Heuzé, Sarrazin, Masiero, Raimbault & Thomas, 2006), performance 
feedback (Noblet & Gifford, 2002) and goal setting (Sénecal, Loughead & Bloom, 2008) all 
appear to be logical areas for analysis and action.  However, after determining the extent to 
which each of these processes may be required or enhanced (a change of or in culture: Scott, 
Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 2003), the more testing task, if culture change is the goal, is 
determining from the literature: (a) how and when they should be operationalised; and (b) 
how they can be efficiently internalised and governed by the group. 
Certainly, and challenging sport psychologists’ abilities in packaging and deploying 
high performing processes, almost all prior research has examined these markers’ correlations 
with other pertinent variables rather than the process of their delivery and regulation (e.g., 
Bray, Beauchamp, Eys & Carron, 2005; Jowett & Chaundy, 2004).  For instance, a sizable 
body of work has investigated the link between a range of processes and cohesion (e.g., 
Heuzé et al., 2006; Sénecal et al., 2008).  Accordingly, while practitioners are acutely aware 
of the general importance of specific processes, awareness of how they are optimised is 
limited (cf., Smith, Fry, Ethington & Li 2005).  Furthermore, of the few ecologically-valid, 
practically-relevant studies conducted to date, none have considered these factors’ 
enhancement as part of a new manager’s CM program.  For example, in their delivery of a 
season-long team building intervention with adolescent netball teams, Sénecal et al. (2008) 
did not discriminate between the tenure status of each team’s coach (e.g., recent appointment 
or long-standing leader).  Accordingly, although theoretically sound, the murkiness of applied 
implications leaves practitioners tasked with delivering culture change faced with educated 
guesswork rather than solid, evidence-based consultancy.  However, sport psychologists can 
at least take a small degree of comfort in having a recognisable literature base upon which to 
ground such speculation. 
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Indeed, only Schroeder (2010) has assessed how new values have been internalised in 
team performers and staff as part of a management-led culture change programme.  However, 
as the perceptions of the coaches alone were examined and not the targets of change 
themselves, the work is still limited.  Perhaps because of this shortcoming, culture change 
was portrayed as a largely top-down process and the extent to which prescribed values were 
actually internalised by change-targets or perceived to lie at the heart of enhanced 
performance remains unknown.  Further highlighting the challenges of direct CM knowledge 
transfer between business and sport (and/or the limits of organisational change theory), 
Schroeder also found that Schein’s (2004) model of organisational culture change did not 
fully account for the process as delivered in a performance sport environment.  Notably, the 
study by Frontiera (2010) described earlier in this chapter also revealed that Schein’s culture 
change approach did not accurately depict his sport-specific results.  Finally, as participants 
in Schroeder’s investigation led teams in NCAA competition, the deployed tools’ value for 
elite domains is restricted.  For example, it seems reasonable to consider that an elite sport 
performance team manager’s provision of written assignments (op cit, p. 74) could be met 
with much contempt and/or derision from many multi-millionaire performers.  So, what other 
knowledge sources can sport psychologists draw upon? 
Due to their reported ability to shape the way in which group members perceive and 
behave (Romand & Pantaléon, 2007; Windsor, Barker & McCarthy, 2011), other related 
areas of sport psychology knowledge appear to be leadership and team building.  Importantly, 
this inference is based on both processes’ reported association with cohesion (Bloom, Stevens 
& Wickwire, 2003; Callow, Smith, Hardy, Arthur & Hardy, 2009), arguably the most 
familiar covariate of high performing teams (albeit questionable: cf. the importance of 
healthy conflict/uncomfortable debate; Bowman, 1998; Reid et al., 2004).  Moreover, with a 
focus on socially-aggregate constructs (Fletcher & Wagstaff, 2009) and prior implication of 
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culture within its texts (e.g., Wagstaff et al., 2012b), organisational sport psychology seems 
to offer another face valid resource for informing performance team culture change practice.  
Beyond domain-specific literature, and as suggested in Chapter 1, sport psychologists would 
also appear to be drawing on organisational works to aid their culture change services.  On 
deeper evaluation, however, the focus and applied credentials of leadership, team building, 
and organisational sport psychology leaves culture change consultants asking more questions 
than providing answers4.   
2.5.1. The (In)Utility of Leadership Knowledge 
Reflecting the client group in question and the nature of the task, leadership literature 
holds obvious appeal for the culture change practitioner.  Indeed, there is now burgeoning 
evidence supporting transformational leadership’s value for creating environments conducive 
to success (e.g. Callow et al., 2009; Vallée & Bloom, 2005; Zacharatos, Barling & Kelloway, 
2000).  By empowering performers to reach their full potential through “personal, emotional 
and inspirational exchanges” (Callow et al., p. 396) the approach offers much promise for 
harbouring a group which is highly motivated to maximise its potential.  However, while 
providing a set of principles which the practitioner may be wise to engender in the elite team 
manager (e.g., individual consideration; intellectual stimulation), this body of work and, 
arguably, leadership research as a whole is limited in its failure to provide extensive guidance 
on the situation-specific employment, deployment and monitoring of such behaviours (cf. the 
situation specific nature of leadership shown by earlier research and as commented on below: 
e.g. Chelladurai, 1980). 
Indeed, without an appreciation of their interplay in the context of a new manager’s 
program, generalised implications support generalised practice.  For example, from a study of 
                                                 
4
 As neither leadership, team building and organisational sport psychology has expressly identified culture 
optimisation as a core research intention, the reader is reminded that the following critique is presented from the 
perspective of practitioners currently attempting to make decisions on their culture change practice based upon 
the most face valid, currently available knowledge. 
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transformational leadership in low and high performing ultimate Frisbee players, Callow et 
al. (2009) report that as “high performance expectation predicted task cohesion irrespective 
of performance level [this] leads to the suggestion that this specific leadership behaviour 
could be encouraged irrespective of performance level”.  However, assuming the guise of 
elite sport culture change practitioner, what about a manager taking over a team which 
underperformed in the previous season and has lost its most influential players?  Will 
immediate and generic deployment of this behaviour promote beneficial perceptions amongst 
performers and support staff and establish the credibility and trust required for immediate 
success?  If contextually appropriate, how should it evolve or be individually tailored?  
Finally, if apparent in both high and low performing teams, is this factor actually playing a 
role in ‘causing’ performance at all?  Recognising that moment-to-moment actions may have 
vast implications in change of this scale (e.g., tipping points: Kim & Mauborgne, 2003), 
relying on advice from correlational findings is inherently problematic. 
In the only published study to examine leadership traits’ in specific contexts within 
the same team (certainly of which I am aware), Höigaard, Jones and Peters (2008) applied 
Chelladurai’s (1980) multidimensional model to assess Norwegian soccer players’ 
preferences for manager behaviour in periods of prolonged team/personal success or failure; a 
framework which combines performer preferences and environmental demands to propose 
that effective leader behaviour is a product of: (a) the actual behaviour of the leader; (b) the 
leader behaviour preferred by the performers; (c) the leader behaviour required by the 
situation.  Interestingly, while performer preferences were consistent across those regularly in 
the starting team, they were situation-dependent for those who were not.  Noting that culture 
is “continuously produced and reproduced in the dynamic interaction between individuals 
and their social and natural environments” (Kemmelmeier & Kühnen, 2011), the variance in 
these results highlights the necessity for methods and mechanisms through which multiple 
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needs, motivations and roles can be effectively negotiated and regulated to support sustained 
optimal performance.  However, due to the lack of longitudinal research, potentially useful 
applied tools such as Cope et al.’s (2007) identification of 360-degree feedback have emerged 
as tentative suggestions rather than derivatives of detailed evaluation.  Moreover, as research 
has primarily focused on performer-recipients (e.g., Callow et al., 2009; Höigaard et al.; 
Rowold, 2006), knowledge of which behaviours are optimally effective for promoting 
coherency and consistency in the beliefs and action of influential support staff members is 
also limited (Bloom et al., 2003).  Finally, and returning to the earlier point that culture is a 
group-level phenomenon, exclusively leader-centric approaches do not appear capable of 
comprehensively meeting the activity’s rudimentary intentions (i.e., that the group creates 
and regulates the principles of sustained high performance). 
2.5.2. The (In)Utility of Team Building Knowledge 
As asserted by Bloom et al. (2003, p. 129), “if cohesion is the desired final outcome, 
then team building is the process to facilitate its development.”  However, while considered a 
critical process in performance optimisation, significant shortcomings exist in the breadth, 
depth and contextual-sensitivity of its guidance (cf. Pain & Harwood, 2009).  For example, 
by predominantly focusing on pre-season social activities without examining their impact on 
performance (e.g., an army-administered training course with a professional soccer team: 
Martin & Davis, 1995), sport psychology’s understanding of in-season, performance-
relevant, outcome-determining processes and mechanisms is threadbare, particularly for elite 
team settings. 
Addressing some of these gaps, work in top-end sport has recently examined the 
utility of personal-disclosure mutual-sharing (PDMS) activities as a means of optimising 
performance through enhanced social cohesion and a shared knowledge of teammates (Holt 
& Dunn, 2006).  Interestingly, Windsor et al. (2011) have also indirectly suggested the 
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benefits of such interventions to team culture by reporting that shared perceptions between 
group members can emerge through the activity’s ability to unearth and amalgamate 
individual-level values and beliefs.  Such mutual sharing is clearly powerful and may play an 
important part in generating a team culture if used appropriately.  However, Windsor et al.’s 
guidelines also encourage practitioners to “select an appropriate ‘important’ match before 
which the PDMS session will be conducted” (p. 111).  Such sporadic intervention alone, 
especially when juxtaposed to critical moments, is clearly not suited to the day-to-day, 
power-ridden optimisation and regulation of enduring high performing cultures.  Indeed, 
given that pre/post-test measure of cohesion did not significantly change and performance 
worsened, it may not even be fit for enhancing its immediate targets.  Taken alongside other 
“firefighting” recommendations (e.g., after a loss of confidence: Bloom et al., 2003), the 
insufficient, inconsistent and short-term nature of elite-level team building knowledge 
seriously devalues its worth as a driver of culture change.  More importantly, at a conceptual 
level it is also fundamentally inappropriate.  Certainly, practitioners have already argued that 
management of group homogeneity-heterogeneity, relative to the phase of team development, 
is a more accurate predictor of sustained success than cohesion (cf. Reid et al., 2004).  In 
short, sport psychology doesn’t seem to know enough of the declarative underpinnings (the 
why, when and even why not) of team building packages to be able to optimise their 
deployment. 
In addition to timing, the need for use of such interventions as part of a targeted 
‘block’ of work is another important qualification. Indeed, while team building is an 
important process in shaping group culture, Hardy and Crace (1997) noted some time ago 
that group culture paradoxically shapes the success of team building.  For example, in Bloom 
et al.’s (2003) examination of such activities in elite University coaches, it was asserted that 
support staff “all have to be on the same wavelength for…success..[as]…[o]ne breakdown in 
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that machine could lead to a series of events that have an effect on the playing field” (p. 136).  
Furthermore, in their PDMS intervention guidelines, Holt and Dunn (2006) suggested that 
familiarity with the team’s culture is mandatory for successful consultancy.  In short, team 
building appears to operate as a function of culture to a greater extent than the reverse.  
Certainly, as cohesion (i.e., the common aim of team building) is a shared perception 
(Carron, Colman, Wheeler & Stevens, 2002) and derived from “member’s selective 
processing and personal integration of group-related information” (Heuzé et al., 2006, 
p.203), this is unsurprising given culture’s governance of both of these (italicised) processes 
(Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch & Widmeyer, 1999).  Consequently, without an understanding 
of mechanisms which can subtly shape these deeper-level occurrences, team building alone 
will only provide a variable, transient or superficial change.  Indeed, Carron, et al.’s assertion 
that cohesion and performance interact in a positive circular fashion (i.e., when performance 
decreases so does cohesion) supports this assertion.  Essentially, in an environment where 
performance outcomes are the most critical and sometimes only gauge of success, the utility 
of interventions which easily succumb to competitive losses and/or poor performances are 
insufficient for delivering an enduring high performing culture. 
2.5.3. The (In)Utility of Organisational Sport Psychology Knowledge 
As sport psychologists aim to optimise their impact in elite sports team environments, 
recent literature has provided impetus for an expansion of knowledge in the optimisation of 
pan-individual and pan-group performance; that is, in organisational structures and systems 
surrounding performers (cf. Fletcher & Wagstaff, 2009).  In contrast with sport psychology’s 
historical “bottom-up” progression from individual performer-focused enquiry against sport 
management’s “top-down” evolution from policy/administration-focused research, Fletcher 
and Wagstaff (2009) have suggested that the extensive impact which organisational, climatic, 
and cultural issues have on elite performance had, at the time of publication, been relatively 
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untouched.  Based upon their evaluation of the emergence and application of organisational 
psychology in elite sport research, Fletcher and Wagstaff have consequently asserted that 
organisational-based service delivery by sport psychologists should focus on four distinct yet 
interdependent levels.  Specifically, in order of their cascading influence on organisational 
functioning and performance, these were the: organisational level (e.g., overarching 
policies/strategies; socio-political and economic alignment), inter-group level (e.g., cross-
group dynamics and their alignment with organisation goals), intra-group level (e.g., 
effective/united sub-groups and support teams), and individual level (e.g., individual-level 
role clarity).  Importantly, a key caveat of this perspective is that consultancy is isomorphic; 
in short, intervention is aimed at impacting and permeating all levels of the schema: 
To change a sport organisation, consultants will need to target the beliefs and 
behaviour of individuals who operate at all layers of the organisation. While the role 
and responsibilities of the chief executive officer will be different to a head coach, 
which will in turn differ from the team captain, all members of the sport organisation 
will have an impact on its functioning and effectiveness. (Fletcher & Wagstaff, p. 
431) 
As outlined in Chapter 1 and above, elite performance team culture change is not focused on 
changing a whole sport organisation; to the contrary, elite team culture change is focused on 
changing part of the sport organisation; a change which may then impact on other elements.  
To convey this point, Figure 2.1 demonstrates the explicit focus (line arrow) and permeation 
of elite team culture change (block arrows) according to Fletcher and Wagstaff’s 
organisational service delivery theory. 
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Figure 2.1. 
The Focus and Permeation of the Elite Sport Performance Team Culture Change Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The focus (line arrow) and permeation (block arrows) of elite team culture change according to 
Fletcher and Wagstaff’s (2009) organisation service delivery theory:  clear block arrows indicate the 
construct’s cascading impact; shaded block arrows indicate the potential for reverberation throughout 
the whole organisation (as governed by attainment of consistent high performance/objective on-field 
success). 
Since publishing their organisation service delivery theory, Fletcher, Wagstaff and colleagues 
have since led the generation of a burgeoning organisational sport psychology literature (cf. 
Wagstaff et al., 2012a; Wagstaff et al., 2012b; Wagstaff, Hanton, & Fletcher, 2013).  
Presently, however, few inroads have been made into the culture element of the sport 
psychology-sport management “twilight zone” (Fletcher & Wagstaff, p. 428), especially that 
which envelopes the elite team performance department.  Certainly, even in work which 
draws explicit reference to culture change practice, the construct has received limited explicit 
treatment (e.g., Lee et al., 2009) and been primarily approached from an organisation-wide 
rather than performance team perspective (e.g., Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; Schroeder, 2010; 
Wagstaff et al., 2012b). 
ELITE TEAM 
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CHANGE 
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Regarding this latter point, while Wagstaff et al.’s (2012a) research on organisational 
functioning during a period of major change has begun to elucidate how peak organisational 
outcomes may be facilitated, the value of the findings for specific areas of the organisation, 
such as the performance department, are uncertain.  Indeed, perhaps dictated by the size and 
scale of modern elite organisations - and therefore the size and scale of research projects 
required to investigate them (Wagstaff et al. undertook a 9-month ethnography) - it is 
difficult to determine where optimal benefit may be delivered.  For instance, from assessing 
staff, volunteers, and performers at all levels, Wagstaff et al. “illustrate the pivotal 
importance of interpersonal relationships and highlight the emergence of emotion-related 
abilities as highly influential in successful person-organisation dynamics” (p. 26).  Expressly, 
a summary of the applied implications (p. 33) promote the need to: work hard at developing 
internal and external relationships; consider others’ emotional investment during conflict; 
deploy attention to and interpret the meaning of underlying emotions in transactions; develop 
the ability communicate with and about emotion; be aware of the expectations, norms, and 
routines of emotion expression; be aware of how emotional expressions and communication 
influence others; and develop the ability to reactively or proactively modify others’ emotions.  
While pointing to the salience of emotion-related abilities in large-scale change, as guidelines 
are described in relation to organisations or the organisation, practitioners are left to assume, 
rightly or wrongly, that every area and every individual may profit if these features were 
addressed.  This “all in” approach is also highlighted by the fact that this advice could easily 
apply to almost any organisation in any field of business; a feature which resonates with the 
decontextualised and oversimplified advice provided in organisational CM (By, 2005; du Gay 
& Vikkelsø, 2012; Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004).  However, acknowledging that many elite 
team performers possess high egos, multi-million bank balances, and media eminence, efforts 
to optimise these figures’ emotion-related skills may well be a fruitless pursuit. 
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Indeed, and in short, elite sport performance teams are special; albeit not in a nice 
way!  Of course, Wagstaff et al. (2012a) did not explicitly study the culture optimisation 
process.  As such, the point made is not that organisational sport psychology has not or 
cannot investigate culture change; instead, the point is that even if it does, this field’s 
underpinning orientation toward the multifaceted holistic organisation inevitably results in a 
lack of specificity and sensitivity – features which du Gay & Vikkelsø (2012) vehemently 
warn against – to the idiosyncratic contexts of its departments (in the case of this thesis, the 
performance department). Of final note, while organisational sport psychology has primarily 
utilised a positive psychology approach to study (Wagstaff et al., 2012a; Wagstaff et al., 
2013), the contested and political features of elite sport performance teams (as described in 
Challenge III) would indicate that such theoretical perspectives may be conceptually 
unsuitable for team-level culture change. 
2.6. Summary 
 As outlined above, the development of accurate theory and valuable practice for elite 
sport performance team culture change faces a number of specific and significant challenges.  
As suggested above, initial sport-specific investigation must acknowledge and respond to the 
methodological and theoretical limitations which have tarnished much of the organisational 
CM literature.  More specifically, research in elite sport performance teams must generate 
knowledge which straddles the theory-practice divide.  Indeed, while the abstraction of CM 
theory has impeded the development and refinement of effective applied prescription (du Gay 
& Vikkelsø, 2012), the non-evidence based, fad-driven practice of many CM consultants has 
equally contributed to the predominantly decontextulised and generic nature of CM 
understanding (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004).  Remaining sensitive to the fact that CM 
is an essentially applied topic, the lessons from organisational literature suggest that an 
approach which facilitates effective, context-specific practice underpinned by conceptually 
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and methodologically sound research is paramount.  Certainly, the unique features of elite 
sport performance teams depicted above reinforce this call for contextually appropriate 
investigation and simultaneously warns against the uncritical transfer of theory, concepts, and 
practices from organisational domains. 
With sport psychology’s only explicit study into culture change to date having been 
conducted in a US college setting, there is also a clear need for initial inquiry to work from an 
explorative rather than hypothetical-deductive/comparative stance.  Certainly, as well as the 
organisational/sport management literature offering few implications from which opening 
sport-specific research could profit, sport psychology too provides little direction for the elite 
team culture change agenda.  Expressly, the focus, nature, and applied credentials of its most 
relevant constructs/knowledge sources (i.e., leadership, team building, organisational sport 
psychology) provide limited guidance on how culture change in elite sport performance team 
settings should be addressed.  Indeed, of Mohammed and Dumville’s (2001) four areas of 
shared team knowledge (i.e., task-specific; task-related; teammate-related; attitudes/beliefs), 
no previous research has sought to explicitly optimise the coherency of members’ values and 
beliefs to aid sustained high performance.  Based on these key messages, Chapter 3 moves to 
select and define a research philosophy and methodology which can support the development 
of theoretically and practically meaningful knowledge in elite sport performance team culture 
change. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CULTURE CHANGE IN ELITE SPORT PERFORMANCE TEAMS: SELECTING 
AND DEFINING THE RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the chosen philosophy and methodology for 
meeting the research programme’s objectives and purposes.  Of late, much attention has been 
focused on the need for scholars to better understand and locate their research within specific 
paradigms (e.g., positivist, postpositivist, constructivist, interpretivist, poststructuralist) with 
equal sensitivity to these approaches’ philosophical foundations, primarily covering matters 
of ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Culver, Gilbert, & Sparkes, 2012; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008; Holt & Tamminen, 2010; Sparkes & Smith, 2009; Krane & Baird, 2005; 
Suddaby, 2006; Ponterotto, 2005).  Accordingly, my chosen research philosophy adheres to 
the recommendations made within contemporary discussions and frames all methodological 
decisions made within the undertaken research process. 
 Based upon (a) the applied orientation of this thesis (i.e., uncovering manager-led 
culture change practice in elite sport performance teams); (b) the issues which organisational 
CM has faced through its historically generic and abstract approach to study and theory 
building; (c) the unique features of elite sport performance team environments; and (d) the 
lack of parallel knowledge in applied sport psychology (cf. Chapter 2), a pragmatic research 
philosophy was selected as the lens through which to engage the work programme outlined in 
Chapter 1.  Although differences exist between various conceptualisations of pragmatism, 
this thesis follows the approach of Morgan (2007) and adheres to recent work which has 
illuminated and operationalised the key ideas of John Dewey, William James, and George 
Herbert Mead (Bryant, 2009; Morgan, 2007; Giacobbi, Poczwardowski, & Hager, 2005; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  To fully elucidate this philosophical perspective and its 
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implications for the thesis, an overview of the pragmatic approach to research is now offered 
with particular focus on its relevance and importance to the management-led culture change 
agenda in elite sport performance teams.  Second, details on the consequent methodologies 
used to generate knowledge on this topic are provided, as contextualised against this 
pragmatic philosophy and the principal objectives of the thesis (cf. Chapter 1). 
3.2. Defining the Research Philosophy: A Pragmatic Approach 
Recently identified as a perspective through which organisational culture change/CM 
research can be revived (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012; Hartmann & Khademian, 2010) and one 
which sport psychology could apply to bridge the gap between academic inquiry and practice 
(Giacobbi et al., 2005), the pragmatic research philosophy is fixed to the assumption that 
scholarly pursuits should ultimately “make a difference” to the groups and/or individuals 
which it studies.  Meaningful research endeavours are therefore characterised as those which 
attempt to uncover practical-level truths within specific contexts (Giacobbi et al., 2005) about 
issues which can’t typically be overcome by automatic or habitual action (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008); as the high turnover of team management suggests, this would appear to be the case 
with the contemporary culture change task in elite sport performance teams.  Knowledge 
from study under a pragmatic philosophy is therefore intended to help understand rather than 
mirror the world.  Additionally, theory and concepts derived from such oriented inquiry are at 
all times provisional and fallible in nature and therefore dependent on constant re-evaluation 
and adjustment to ensure their continued specificity (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Accordingly, 
rather than distinct entities, knowledge and action constantly feed into each other as applied 
environments evolve and present novel conditions (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Consistent with 
the power-ridden and contested nature of leading sports teams (Potrac & Jones, 2009), 
pragmatism therefore directs attention onto optimal processes due to the unremitting and 
temporally-grounded contingencies of applied settings (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
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Focused on the “experience of actions in the world, rather than the existence of either 
a world outside those experiences or experiences outside such a world [as per a metaphysical 
paradigm]” (Morgan, 2007, p. 68), pragmatism counters all other philosophical approaches to 
research by not prioritising ontological and epistemological issues (cf. Krane & Baird, 2005; 
Culver et al., 2012).  Indeed, for pragmatists there is no perceived gap between theory and 
practice: 
Knowledge is not a hierarchical structure, with science or philosophical insight at the 
top and . . . common-sense or practical wisdom [below] . . . .  [but rather] a web or a 
network of statements . . . [where] the value of any form of knowledge is its 
usefulness and applicability [emphasis added]” (Bryant, 2009, para. 46). 
In short, ontological and epistemological concerns do not carry the same critical, “top-down” 
influence in the pragmatic approach as they do in the other major research paradigms (e.g., 
positivism, postpositivism, constructivism, interpretivism, poststructuralism: Morgan, 2007).    
 Significantly, however, this does not mean that ontological and epistemological issues 
are uncritically discarded, “glossed over”, or avoided by pragmatists.  On the contrary, the 
approach explicitly rejects the foundational notion of a single, objective reality and rebuffs 
the ontological and epistemological premise that it is possible to elucidate whether one theory 
is closer to “the truth” than another (Bryant, 2009; Giacobbi et al., 2005; Morgan, 2007).  
Yet, in seeking solutions to pertinent applied problems, pragmatism does not fall under any 
one specific non-foundational ontological and epistemological position and is not concerned 
with understanding “reality”.  By rejecting the objective epistemology/realist ontology of 
pure positivism (i.e., based on a rigid belief in an observable world of generalisable truths) 
and the subjective/relativist equivalents of pure constructivism (i.e., based on a rigid belief 
that all knowledge is socially-constructed and contextually-bound: Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; 
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Krane & Baird, 2005), pragmatism instead views these polar perspectives as the ends of a 
continuum rather than categories in a strict dichotomy5 (Giacobbi et al., 2005). 
As such, while foundational models consider knowledge from different paradigms to 
be incommensurate (i.e., knowledge acquired under one cannot be compared/integrated with 
knowledge from another: Culver, 2012; Morgan, 2007), pragmatism instead places weight on 
the implications of thinking or acting in that way over another.  Specifically, focal concerns 
for pragmatists are: (a) the extent to which shared knowledge can be generated; and (b) what 
shared behaviours can be facilitated from this shared knowledge (Morgan, 2007).  Again, a 
belief in the complex and interactive nature of continual “knowing” (rather than a top-down, 
ontological-epistemological-methodological chain of “knowledge”) is central to this approach 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Morgan, 2007).  Indeed, as long as a study produces useful applied 
implications (i.e., those make a beneficial difference to practice: Bryant, 2009), meaningful 
communication and interaction across paradigms is promoted.  In the case of this thesis, 
support is therefore found for a research programme which examines both the leader-centric 
perceptions of elite team managers in isolation and the more socially-orientated exploration 
and contrast of multi-stakeholder perspectives. 
While not committed to any specific ontological or epistemological position or neatly 
fitting with the top-down organisation of other paradigms, a pragmatic philosophy still shapes 
all aspects of the research process; including, the goal of inquiry (i.e., practical solutions), the 
function of theory (i.e., an instrument/tool to support applied discoveries), data interpretation 
(i.e., a focus on process), the role of the researcher (i.e., a constructor of knowledge), and the 
criteria for evaluating research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Giacobbi 
et al., 2005; Gould, Collins, Lauer, & Chung, 2007; Krane & Baird, 2005; Morgan, 2007).  In 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, Bryant (2009) has recently written at length on pragmatism’s ability to clarify and resolve the 
issues and debates which have surrounded the philosophical underpinnings of grounded theory literature (cf. 
Holt & Tamminen, 2010) 
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contrast to tenets of other models, however, the primary focus of pragmatism lies with the 
research questions and the methods through which knowledge can be acquired (Morgan, 
2007).  Indeed, with the ultimate intention to identify new and effective ways of tackling a 
particular applied task, pragmatism prioritises methodological over philosophical issues.  As 
noted by Giacobbi et al. (2005, p. 21), “pragmatists opt for methods and theories that are 
more useful to us within specific contexts (e.g., answers to practical problems), not those that 
reveal underlying truths about the nature of reality.”  Critically, deployed methods and 
theories are also highly dependent on the stage of inquiry into the topic (Giacobbi et al.).  
This principle can be seen in the decision within this thesis to investigate multi-stakeholder 
perspectives through an imported theoretical framework (cf. Chapter 6), after uncovering 
initial understanding on the precise nature of elite sport performance team culture change 
across two different settings (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). 
Indeed, as well as applying a pragmatic approach to individual studies, the adopted 
research philosophy also permeated throughout the whole structure of this thesis.  Primarily, 
the work programme utilised diverse samples (i.e., comparing and contrasting perceptions of 
PMs, PDs, support staff, performers, top-management), addressed study limits (cf. progress 
from Chapters 4 and 5 to Chapter 6), and disseminated findings to pertinent individuals and 
groups (cf. Chapter 9) (Giacobbi et al., 2005).  This structure further bears the hallmarks of a 
pragmatic philosophy in that the research process used multiple methodologies in an iterative 
programme (Giacobbi et al., 2005) which focused on the evolution of thought and an 
accumulation of knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
 Noting that epistemological concerns are still pertinent to the pragmatic perspective, it 
is important to consider the relationship between the researcher and the topic and participants.  
Indeed, as noted by Morgan (2007, p. 69): 
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Research questions are not inherently ‘important’ and methods are not automatically 
‘appropriate’ . . . . It is we ourselves who make the choices about what is important 
and what is appropriate, and those choices inevitably involve aspects of our personal 
history, social background, and cultural assumptions. 
In this case, pragmatism maintains that researchers (and all humans) are not passive observers 
(or “spectators”) who approach matters with “empty vessel” minds (Bryant, 2009, para. 49).  
Indeed, the biases and prejudices inherent within the individual - acquired via socialisation in 
general and specific environments – are actually considered to facilitate novel and innovative 
insights (Bryant, 2009).  Significantly, while discoveries on a particular phenomenon cannot 
be separated from the lens of “the knower”, this does not confer an extreme relativist position 
(in which no interpretation can be considered more accurate that another); instead, pragmatic 
researchers embrace the existence of multiple realities but maintain that the knowledge they 
co-construct with participants corresponds to tangible applied artefacts (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005).  Reflecting growing consensus on the inevitability of such co-
construction and interaction of self, qualitative and pragmatic researchers have been 
encouraged to provide a more reflexive outlook on their chosen research topic, research 
questions, and methodology (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Culver et al., 2012; Morgan, 2007). 
Indeed, Morgan (2007, p. 70) has asserted that “our values and our politics are always 
a part of who we are and how we act [to the extent that] . . . . these aspects of our worldviews 
are at least as important as our beliefs about metaphysical issues”.  In my case, I approached 
this thesis with an outlook shaped by prior and current experiences and interests.  Regarding 
prior experiences, as a former professional football player who had been a target of incoming 
managers’ programmes, the research topic is one which I have been directly involved with.  
More generally, through my time in high performance sport, I also undertook this thesis with 
an acute awareness of the demanding, pressurised and outcome-oriented nature of elite teams.  
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Reflecting on the whole research process (Culver et al., 2012), this experience alongside my 
supervision by Dave enabled a critical level of credibility with participants – facilitating their 
provision of a breadth and depth of detailed information (including that on sensitive/socially 
undesirable topics) - which I seriously doubt would have been otherwise possible.  Indeed, as 
knowledge is, to an extent, co-constructed between researcher and participant(s), not having 
the credibility or understanding of/empathy with elite team challenges would have weakened 
my theoretical sensitivity (cf. Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and likely led to a potentially different 
(and potentially lesser quality) set of findings.  In this instance, I have found much agreement 
with other researchers who have pointed to the merits of familiarity with a research topic or 
participant group (Eklund, 1996; Sisjord & Kristiansen, 2008) 
Further shaped by prior coaching experience which offered insight into the leadership 
and management of elite-level performers - with a developed awareness on the unique power 
relationships which characterise sports teams – my recently completed training as a chartered 
sport and exercise psychologist (which ran simultaneously with this thesis) was, however, my 
greatest driver.  Unquestionably, the professional and theoretical philosophies which I have 
developed as an applied practitioner fed into the focus, direction and undertaking of this work 
programme.  Particularly, my focus on supporting client performance enhancement through 
the subtle application of contextually-specific, layered agendas guided my focus throughout 
this thesis to the covert as much as the overt processes and mechanisms of optimal culture 
change delivery.  Additionally, my prioritisation of practical solutions to applied problems in 
consultancy contexts both aligned with and supported the principles of a pragmatic research 
philosophy.  Finally, engagement with this thesis was also underpinned by a desire to provide 
theory-driven support to high performance teams/organisations in the future. 
3.3. Selecting and Defining the Research Strategies and Methods 
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Reflecting the importance of stakeholder perceptions as a measure and marker of CM 
(Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b; Stewart & Kringas, 2003), the thesis employed a qualitative 
methodology.  Specifically, and recognising that qualitative research is ideally suited to 
questions which are concerned with “how social experience is created” (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2008, p. 14), this approach was chosen due to its ability to generate “multiple maps of the 
world” (Strean, 1998, p. 344) and its idiographic focus on “the specifics of particular cases” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 16).  Consequently aimed at developing rich understanding of a 
construct’s processes and qualities rather than its outcomes and frequencies (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008), qualitative inquiry was therefore further aligned with: (a) requests for 
scholars to seek greater detail and specificity in CM research (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012); and 
(b) pragmatism’s focus on creating context-specific knowledge (Giacobbi et al., 2005).  
Moreover, further coherence with the pragmatic research philosophy is found in the shared 
premise of a close relationship between researcher and the topic (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).  
Indeed, as outlined by Denzin & Lincoln (2008, p. 28), qualitative researchers are 
“biographically-situated” in that they study within a bespoke “interpretative community” and 
from philosophical positions which interact with the research process and participants.  Of 
further overlap, qualitative inquiry is also not concerned with creating a “correct” map of the 
world but rather a useful one (Strean, 1998).  Importantly, while the pragmatic philosophy 
has often been used to underpin mixed methods study (Creswell & Plano Clarke, 2011; 
Giacobbi, Dietrich, Larson, & White, 2012; Gould et al., 2007), the combination of pragmatic 
and exclusively qualitative approaches was considered appropriate for the explorative nature 
of this thesis and supported by its prior application in sport psychology study examining the 
methods and strategies of high-level coaches (Gould et al., 2007). 
As pragmatists consider methodological decisions to be shaped by the practicalities of 
inquiry and select methods which are accepted within their community (in this case, via peer-
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review literature: Morgan, 2007), the following section details and rationalises the strategies 
applied in this thesis.  Adhering to the pragmatic principle of adopting methodologies which 
are optimally sensitive to the specific research question, information sought, and the phase of 
inquiry (Giacobbi et al., 2005), each section is contextualised against the particular objective 
(cf. Chapter 1) and research questions which it aims to address.  Moreover, the underpinning 
rationale of these choices is also made against the practical issues of the research process 
itself (e.g., access issues: Buchanan & Bryman, 2007). 
3.3.1. Exploring Management Perceptions of Culture Change Best Practice: 
Grounded Theory Methodology 
Research Objectives 
1. To explore perceptions of culture change across pertinent performance management 
levels in a British elite sport context (specifically professional and Olympic sport 
environments), develop models of best practice, and evaluate their congruence 
with/divergence from current business-based knowledge. 
2. To explore the potential for generality of culture change best practice across British 
professional and Olympic sport performance team environments. 
5. To identify common mechanisms of elite sport performance team culture change. 
6. To identify common leadership/management skills for delivering elite sport 
performance team culture change. 
Research Questions 
• What is the chronology and nature of optimal manager-led culture change practice in 
elite sport performance teams? 
• How does the process of optimal manager-led culture change compare and contrast 
across professional sports team managers and Olympic sport performance directors? 
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• How do processes of optimal manager-led culture change in elite sport performance 
teams compare and contrast with organisational CM models? 
• Via what mechanisms and leadership/management skills are models of culture change 
in elite sport performance teams best operated? 
Of particular value for applied disciplines which seek to generate theory to inform and 
advance practice (Bryant, 2009), grounded theory was designed as a methodology to “occupy 
a pragmatic middle ground” between extreme empiricism and relativism (Suddaby, 2006, p. 
638).  Devised by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in response to the prevalent quantitative writing 
of the time to “demonstrate how some forms of qualitative research could claim a robustness 
and authority equal to quantitative research” (Bryant, 2009), many versions of the approach 
have since been tailored by various scholars to fit different philosophical perspectives (e.g., 
Charmaz and Bryant’s constructivist-based approach: Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).  Reflecting 
its roots in philosophical pragmatism, and therefore alignment with my guiding belief system, 
Corbin and Strauss’ (2008, p. vii-17) most recent variant was selected for application in this 
thesis.  Crucially, with an explicit focus on generating practical insight, this choice also 
addressed Pettigrew et al.’s (2001, p. 697) view that “theories of change . . . must face the 
double hurdle of scholarly quality and practical relevance.” 
 Adhering to pragmatism’s primary focus on the methodology by which the identified 
applied issue and its linked research objectives/questions can be addressed, a grounded theory 
approach was chosen with respect to its focus on how complex social processes work within 
“particular contextual conditions” (Holt & Tamminen, 2010, p. 420) via multiple and varied 
perspectives (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  More specifically, with my intention to develop the 
first models of elite sport performance team CM, this methodology was considered especially 
apt with respect to its focus on generating context-specific (or substantive) theory.  Moreover, 
this selection was also made with respect to the lack of sport-specific theory and the inherent 
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shortcomings of business frameworks.  Indeed, the need for a flexible and open approach in 
any contemporary CM investigation is reinforced by this following passage from du Gay and 
Vikkelsø (2012, p. 133): 
It is a key maxim in classic organisation theory, that the nature of the management 
task, and the appropriateness of the management methods deployed, can be defined 
only in relationship to the particular purposes, or ‘core tasks’ of the organisation to be 
managed.  When it comes to ‘change’, the differences between organisations . . . are 
as vital as their similarities.  It is unlikely that they will experience ‘change’ in an 
identical manner – as an abstract phenomenon – but rather as a particular matter of 
concern, with distinctive characteristics and practical implications related to the 
conduct of concrete aspects of their activities. If this is indeed the case, then it is 
unlikely that a generalised set of ‘change’ injunctions or recipes would be appropriate 
to them all. Indeed . . . generalisations about and injunctions to ‘change’ are at best 
somewhat gestural or gratuitous, and at worst potentially quite destructive. 
Warning against “decontextualised importation of any general principle or recommendation” 
from generic and abstract CM frameworks (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012, p. 140), such as those 
described in Chapter 2, the implication for this thesis is that research cannot confidently rely 
on business literature to provide theory on which sport-specific study can be initially driven.  
Indeed, the commentary of du Gay and Vikkelsø suggests that even business scholars should 
apply methodologies which do not frame or force data and its interpretation through current 
abstract frameworks.  Notably, grounded theory methodology has also been proposed as a 
useful approach for advancing CM knowledge in business settings (cf. Bamford, 2008). 
 Aligning with a pragmatic research philosophy, grounded theories developed through 
Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) methodology are neither speculative nor universal explanations, 
but transient and fallible tools (cf. Bryant, 2009).  Additionally, and reflecting my intention to 
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develop models which are primarily specific to elite sport performance teams and of use as a 
critical mirror for organisational-based understanding, this approach produces theory which is 
substantive rather than formal. 
3.3.2. Exploring Multi-Stakeholder Perceptions of a Successful Culture Change 
Programme: Case Study Methodology 
Research Objectives 
3. To analyse and explain successful elite sport performance team culture change 
through multiple stakeholder perspectives. 
4. To examine the power of an imported theoretical lens for explaining culture change in 
an elite sport performance team. 
5. To identify common mechanisms of elite sport performance team culture change. 
6. To identify common leadership/management skills for delivering elite sport 
performance team culture change. 
Research Questions 
• What management systems, processes, and actions do support staff, performers and 
top management consider effective (and ineffective) for optimising team culture? 
• How and why were these management systems, processes, and actions successful (or 
unsuccessful)? 
• What insight can an imported theoretical framework provide in explaining successful 
culture change in an elite sport performance team? 
 
Reflecting the objectives and questions outlined above, a case study methodology was 
chosen for exploration of successful CM in an elite sport performance team with respect to its 
suitability for concentrated study of a specific and bounded system (Stake, 2008).  Of further 
pertinence with regards to the groups implicated in elite sport performance team settings (cf. 
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Chapters 1 and 2), case study methodology also recognises that such bounded systems (such 
as elite sport organisations’ performance departments) are characterised by dynamic internal 
interactions (i.e., within and across subsections/groups; such as support staff and performers) 
and activity patterns with external factors (e.g., top management).  Importantly, by focusing 
on the interplay of internal and external contexts (e.g., including social, political, historical), 
case study methodology also therefore matches calls for contextual specificity and sensitivity 
in CM study (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012). 
Aligning with a pragmatic philosophy, where research objective and question-specific 
methodology is prioritised ahead of epistemological or ontological matters, using case study 
methodology to examine the process of successful CM in an elite sport performance team is 
further supported through the strategy’s organisation around complex and situated research 
questions.  Indeed, although a distinctive qualitative research strategy, Stake (2008) notes that 
“case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied”.  With focus 
explicitly on the selected case and what can be learned from it, methods of inquiry are shaped 
by the researcher’s interests (i.e., research objectives/questions) and underpinning philosophy 
rather than “imposed” in the form of methodology-specific investigative/analytical processes 
(as in the many different versions of grounded theory).  As such, with the final products and 
presentation of inquiry shaped by the researcher’s objectives, questions and philosophy, the 
“case study” is both the process and product of inquiry (Stake, 2008).   Indeed, the same case 
could viably be studied and explained from polar philosophical perspectives. 
Applying the terminology of Stake (2008), the selected case study methodology for 
this thesis was instrumental; more specifically, study aimed to provide a contextually-bound 
account of the case and also wider insight into the culture change construct as applied to elite 
sport performance teams (the alternatives being an intrinsic case study, for understanding the 
full particularities of a specific; or collective case study, for understanding a series of cases).  
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Although any case study requires the researcher to focus on topic-relevant observations, 
interpret data patterns, and develop assertions on the case (Stake, 2008), the instrumental 
approach aims to enable knowledge development in more general constructs and therefore 
views the specific case of secondary interest.  As such, and while still examined in detail and 
against its specific contextual backdrop, the instrumental case is selected due to its ability to 
provide insight into particular (i.e., why was this CM programme successful?) and wider 
interests (i.e., what can it tell us about optimal CM processes?).  Importantly, this choice 
aligned with the intention of this thesis (and its pragmatic underpinnings) to create 
accumulated knowledge; indeed, case studies themselves cannot be understood without 
knowledge of other cases (Stake, 2008).  Extending this point, Stake (2008, p. 128) has 
asserted that: 
The methods of instrumental case study draw the researcher toward illustrating how 
the concerns of researchers and theorists are manifest in the case.  Because the critical 
issues are more likely to be known in advance and to follow disciplinary expectations, 
such a design can take greater advantage of already-developed instruments. 
With this thesis initially examining the perceptions of PMs and PDs and developing grounded 
theory models of best practice, knowledge had been accumulated on the nature and critical 
success factors of culture change and was therefore used to inform the research process and 
methodological decisions of Chapter 6.  Most pertinently, and with reference to the ability of 
researchers to “take . . . advantage of already-developed instruments” in instrumental case 
study designs (Stake, 2008, p. 128), the chosen methodology allowed for importation and use 
of decentred theory as a tool for explaining the reported CM process (as supported by the 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5).  In this case, a theoretical framework is used to frame the 
research findings based on the results from the two grounded theory studies.  Importantly, the 
suitability of case study methodology was also supported by its prior deployment in other 
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work using decentred theory as an explanatory framework (e.g., Durose, 2009; Lindsey & 
Grattan, 2012). 
3.4. Data Collection Method: Qualitative Interviews 
With a focus on how high performing cultures were created and sustained (rather than 
what such cultures looked like) via key stakeholder perspectives, semi-structured interviews 
were chosen to collect data.  As noted by Culver et al. (2012), interviews are the most popular 
method of qualitative data collection in sport psychology.  Guided by the assumption that 
methodological choices are made in direct response to the questions and practicalities of the 
research (Culver et al.; Gould et al., 2007), and recognition that qualitative inquiry does not 
privilege any particular method (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008), the decision to use qualitative 
semi-structured interviews was informed by their: 
• ability to explore and capture participant perceptions, experiences, and reflections and 
the social constraints under which they operate under (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008); 
• suitability for studies exploring processes which follow a temporal sequence (Culver 
et al., 2012); and 
• utility for examining previously unexplored topics and constructs (Creswell, 2003) 
Additionally, interviews were also chosen with regard to a number of pragmatic issues which 
surrounded the research process itself (cf. Buchanan & Bryman, 2007).  Specifically, through 
targeting high level participants – many still in employment and with limited time to 
contribute – the level of access to these figures’ meant that data collection in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 was considered to be best facilitated by one-shot interviews.  Reflecting a need to 
optimise contextual specificity and sensitivity (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012) and protect 
confidentiality - especially as interviewees held high profile positions and were the focus of 
(or potential focus of) significant media coverage - other methods such as focus groups were 
neither feasible nor appropriate.  Indeed, highlighting the concern with which managers treat 
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the media, one PM who was interviewed for this thesis has since requested that his 
anonymity-protected data not be quoted in any papers written for publication in academic 
journals. 
 The interview guide on which all interviews for this thesis (including grounded theory 
and case studies) were undertaken is provided in Appendix A.  Adhering to the advice that 
“time must be an essential part of investigations of change if processes are to be uncovered” 
(Pettigrew et al., 2001, p. 697), these questions followed a chronological sequence and 
focused on: program goals; pre-change steps; processes and actions for initiating change; 
processes and actions for sustaining change; important personal attributes/skills for carrying 
out changes; evaluation processes and actions; reflections on success and/or failure.  
Crucially, however, while all of these questions were posed to each participant6, discussion 
flowed naturally and issues were pursued as they were presented to ensure that this general 
structure did not restrict interviewees’ scope to freely describe their perceptions, experiences, 
and reflections (as can be the case with “more structured” semi-structured interviews: Culver 
et al., 2012).  Consequently, this guide facilitated information of “the hows” (i.e., how was it 
done) as well as “the whats” (i.e., what was done) of elite team culture change (Sparkes & 
Smith, 2009) and, adhering to the key tenets of a pragmatic philosophy, the essentially open-
ended and flexible guide was also therefore “sensitive to the social, historical, and political 
context from which inquiry begins” (Giacobbi et al., 2005). 
As an important qualification, while ethnographic methods are commonly utilised by 
researchers examining cultural elements of sports teams/organisations (e.g., Krane & Baird, 
2005; Wagstaff et al., 2012a), the research objectives and questions which underpin this 
thesis did not align with the intentions of ethnography.  Indeed, and to clarify, rather than 
trying to understand “culture . . . from the perspective of the group members . . . . [to] lend 
                                                 
6
 Please note that the wording of this guide was modified for the non-performance team management 
participants of the case study described in Chapter 6. 
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insight into . . . behaviours, values, emotions and mental states” (Krane & Baird, 2005, p. 87), 
this thesis was focused exclusively on exploring the chronology, processes, mechanisms, and 
leadership skills by which cultures were created and sustained rather than their outcomes.  
Moreover, as the case study was conducted retrospectively, observation-based methods 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Stake, 2008) were not deployed in this chapter.  Additionally, and 
aligning with the rationale provided above, focus groups were also again not viable due to the 
need to protect player confidentiality (to ensure their selection in the team was not 
compromised) and to optimise the likelihood of acquiring optimally critical perspectives. 
3.5. Evaluation of Research Quality 
Research Objective: 
7. To prescribe effective guidance for management seeking to efficiently establish and 
sustain high performing cultures in their team environments. 
As recently outlined by Sparkes and Smith (2009), the variety of methodologies and 
philosophical positions which researchers can operate from has led to much debate over the 
markers of “good” qualitative research.  Predominantly, qualitative study in sport psychology 
has adopted the parallel perspective to validity which, built on the notion that qualitative 
research is distinct from positivist and postpositivist paradigms (Sparkes, 1998), maintains 
that qualitative study can be evaluated against its own set of permanent and universal criteria.  
Commonly, qualitative investigators have drawn upon Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria of 
credibility (internal validity parallel), transferability (external validity parallel), dependability 
(reliability parallel), and confirmability (objectivity parallel).  Emanating from this approach, 
research quality is consequently conferred from the number of employed criteria-facilitating 
techniques.  In contrast, however, Sparkes and Smith support an approach to research quality 
judgements which do not invoke or succumb to such controlling features by highlighting how 
the rigid application of criteria fundamentally contradicts the non-foundational nature of 
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qualitative inquiry, limits research (i.e., if criteria are not met then the research cannot, by 
definition, be good), and discourages the development and delivery of novel and innovative 
approaches. 
Emphasising the importance of the products, outcomes, and negotiation of research as 
well as their methods, Sparkes and Smith (2009) consequently argue that research quality is 
best judged against contingent lists which consist of different markers according to a study’s 
specific contexts and internal meaning structures (i.e., philosophical orientation).  Built on the 
assumption that subject and object cannot be differentiated, and that captured social reality is 
always shaped by the interests and intentions of the researcher(s), these authors’ consequently 
promote the use of “characterising traits” rather than pre-defined, inflexible criteria to convey 
support and quality.  In this manner, the traits used to judge one particular qualitative study 
may take on more, less, or even no relevance and/or importance in another (even under the 
same philosophical approach).  Indeed, this position resonates with Denzin and Lincoln 
(2008, p. 35) who assert that “there is no single interpretative truth . . . . [but rather] multiple 
interpretative communities, each with its own criteria for evaluating interpretations.” As such, 
the reader is directed toward characterising traits within each study of this thesis which are 
consistent with the selected research philosophy, strategies, and methods.  
From a wider perspective, and reflecting the chosen pragmatic philosophical position, 
it is important to consider how the overall quality of this thesis may also be evaluated (NB. as 
per comments above on the need for coherence between philosophy and quality markers, this 
also helps to contextualise judgements of each individual study).  Primarily, and as suggested 
throughout this chapter, the research process and its findings are ultimately measured against 
the nature and usefulness of the practical implications which they provide for those who the 
research is focused on (Giacobbi et al., 2005).  Indeed, as the topic under study is “typically . 
. . precipitated by a problematic situation [i.e., high turnover of elite sports team managers], 
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where one [i.e., study participants] can’t just act automatically or habitually”, the evaluation 
of research quality is directly accountable to the consequences which it presents (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p. 3).  Taken against the preceding paragraph, it is this focus on consequences 
which distinguishes pragmatism from the positivist (and postpositivist) pursuit of validity and 
truth (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  As noted by Bryant (2009, para. 102), “the ultimate criterion 
of good [pragmatic] research should be that it makes a difference.”  More colloquially, the 
“so what?” principle applies; specifically, what practical difference do the findings make if 
they do correspond to tangible applied artefacts? (Bryant, 2009, para. 47). 
In addressing the question of whether acquired knowledge (or ways of knowing) is 
useful, pragmatism prioritises the quality marker of community agreement.  Specifically, to 
explore the extent to which inquiry has discovered and disseminated valuable practical-level 
truths (i.e., those which are functional for the context in which study was engaged: Giacobbi 
et al., 2005), feedback and interaction is sought from those with topic-relevant experience and 
expertise (including, in this case, elite sports team managers and applied sport psychologists).  
Accordingly, the value of work underpinned by pragmatism is tested “through dialogue, the 
usefulness and consequences of knowledge, and negotiations within communities” (Giacobbi 
et al., 2005, p. 22), all of which demands ongoing discussion and reflection over the findings’ 
implications (Buman, Yasova, & Giacobbi, 2005).  In this regard, significant effort has been 
made throughout this thesis to disseminate to, interact with, and source feedback from sport 
psychologists (academic, applied, and both).  More specifically, three oral presentations have 
been delivered at conferences of the British Psychological Society’s Division for Sport and 
Exercise Psychology on the studies reported in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 (cf. Appendix B).  
Additionally, and alongside two co-authored book chapters, five papers have been accepted 
for publication/published in peer review journals (see Appendix B) - one of which was 
solicited by the journal’s editor after observing one of the conference presentations described 
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above - conveying a consensus that the culture change construct and my findings to date are 
useful and impactful for applied practice. 
Significantly, beyond the perceived usefulness of the results from this thesis, practical 
application of the findings have also recently been incorporated into a training resource for a 
group of current and aspirant elite sport performance team managers (rugby union).  Using a 
one-day workshop as the vehicle, participants’ engagement with, response to, and perceived 
utility of this event are described in Chapter 9.  As the pragmatic research philosophy views 
research-derived theories and implications as provisional and fallible tools (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008), with knowledge an unremitting social activity (Bryant, 2009), this workshop has also 
acted as the first step in an ongoing action-research study which aims to support participants’ 
practice and provide an opportunity to continue the modification and refinement of this initial 
knowledge.  While specific details of this study and its methodology are not included in this 
thesis (as this represents the “next step” rather than the primary agenda), action research is 
considered particularly apt due to its generation of both scientific and practical understanding 
and, of fundamental importance under a pragmatic research approach, collaboratively (i.e., 
researcher-participant) designed solutions to applied challenges (Berg, 2004). 
3.6. Summary 
Reflecting my focus on elucidating optimal manager-led culture change in elite sport 
performance teams, this chapter has identified a pragmatic research philosophy as suitable for 
meeting the objectives of the thesis (cf. Chapter 1).  This decision was rationalised against: 
(a) the culture change construct’s clear applied focus; and (b) lessons learned from 
organisational CM’s problematic treatment change as an abstract and decontextualised 
phenomenon (cf. du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012; Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004).  In adopting 
this perspective, and reflecting the explorative nature of the thesis, qualitative methodology 
was therefore selected as the most appropriate means for investigation.  More specifically, 
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this approach was chosen for deployment within grounded theory (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) and 
case study (cf. Chapter 6) research strategies.  Importantly, these strategies were primarily 
selected with respect to their ability to best meet the objectives and questions on which this 
thesis was based (rather than imposed by rigid ontological and epistemological assumptions) 
and their privilege to methods (i.e., interviews) which were sensitive to the practicalities of 
the research.  To support reader judgment on the quality of these decisions, as well as the 
products of inquiry, this chapter has also proposed that research quality is best assessed 
against a set of characterising traits which are specific to (and described in) each of the three 
studies conducted for this thesis (Sparkes & Smith, 2009).  Finally, and consistent with my 
pragmatic research philosophy, it has also been identified that the quality of the overall work 
programme needs to be considered against the level of community agreement reached over its 
findings and the consequences it provides for applied practice (Bryant, 2009; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005); both of which are discussed in detail in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
DELIVERING CULTURE CHANGE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORT PERFORMANCE 
TEAMS: A GROUNDED THEORY MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE 
4.1. Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, managers of professional sport performance teams face a 
significant challenge in establishing and sustaining a culture which can deliver enduring high 
performance.  Indeed, acknowledged as a key feature of the contemporary remit (Lee et al., 
2009; Bennie & O’Connor, 2010), the requirement for this process to be paired with instant 
and enduring objective success has arguably never been greater.  As indicative (albeit 
extreme) examples, Chelsea FC has recently appointed its ninth manager in the last 10 years 
(Fifield, 2012) while Nottingham Forest FC has named its fourth manager in seven months 
after the third incumbent lasted 40 days (James, 2013).  While not suffering to the same 
general degree, rugby union and rugby league team managers are also now regular victims of 
the results-oriented short-termism which pervades professional sport (Foy, 2010; Prentice, 
2012).  Between the “lost specification” and untested models of organisational CM (du Gay 
& Vikkelsø, 2012, p. 121), the “immature” status of leader succession literature (in terms of 
links with strategic CM: Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012, p. 729), limits of current CM and 
culture change theory for sports teams (Frontiera, 2010; Schroeder, 2010), and a lack of 
parallel knowledge in applied sport psychology, change consultants are, however, faced with 
an unsubstantiated and fragmented evidence-base on which to support these figures’ practice.  
Accordingly, and as detailed in Chapters 1 and 3, the purpose of this chapter was to generate 
the first contextually-specific, practically-meaningful understanding of the chronology and 
nature of optimal culture change practice as led by newly appointed managers of professional 
sport performance teams.  To achieve this goal, Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) grounded theory 
approach was selected as the research strategy.  As described in Chapter 3, this decision was 
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made with respect to the methodology’s pragmatic underpinnings, value for practice-led 
disciplines, focus on how complex social processes work in specific contexts, and generation 
of substantive theory (Bryant, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Holt & Tamminen, 2010). 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Sampling and Participants 
To facilitate a fully iterative process (i.e., an interaction between data collection and 
analysis), theoretical sampling was employed to select participants (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
Rather than recruiting participants based on a set of standardised inclusion/exclusion criteria, 
theoretical sampling is a process which samples participants based on developing analysis.  
Importantly, rather than being used to confirm initial concepts and the developing framework, 
this process is underpinned by the pragmatic assumption that data is sourced which tests and 
assesses the circumstances and conditions in which these findings “work” (or don’t work) in 
the context of inquiry (Bryant, 2009).  Additionally, this approach aligns with philosophical 
pragmatism in acknowledging that participants can never be a “random” collection in terms 
of their personal history, background, and beliefs (Morgan, 2007); instead, reflexivity over 
sampling-based decision making is therefore prioritised (and detailed below). 
To ensure contextual consistency, it was decided that sampling would focus on three 
high profile professional sports in the UK; namely: football, rugby union, and rugby league.  
To enhance the usefulness of the findings, sampling parameters were also set that participants 
held a variety of experiences (i.e., early sackings versus long-term successes versus a mixture 
of sackings and successes) at the highest level of each sport (i.e., Premiership/Championship 
football, Premiership rugby union, Super League rugby league, International).  Institutional 
ethics approval to sample managers across the three sports was obtained. 
 Data collection was undertaken over three distinct phases.  Initially, one football and 
one rugby league team manager were purposively sampled based on their varied experiences 
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across a number of teams (which also varied in profile: e.g., history of success, resources; fan 
base; media coverage).  Based on the discovered consistency across analysed data from this 
first sample, alongside awareness of the social and political underpinnings of leading change 
programs (Hope, 2010) and sports teams (Potrac & Jones, 2009), sampling was consequently 
collapsed across all sports.  Further driven by the analysis of data from the purposive sample 
– predominantly the findings that culture change delivery was notably constrained by team 
traditions and external stakeholder interactions – it was decided that the second recruitment 
phase would target individuals who had delivered programmes at more historically successful 
and/or publicly scrutinised teams (e.g., those who received significant media coverage).  
Additionally, as the “prototypical” sport in terms of the nature and scale of challenges faced 
by team managers (as per the implicated financial stakes and public profile), sampling in this 
second phase was also focused primarily, but not exclusively, on football team managers.  
Finally, as interviews in the first two data collection phases had centred on each interviewee’s 
perceptions of one or two of their delivered programs (see Data Collection section below), 
the final manager recruited was also involved in peer training/development in order to obtain 
a wider perspective on cross-team principles of best practice. 
The overall sample included eight managers: four from football and four from rugby.  
All interviewees were male, aged between 37 and 57 (M = 47.50 years, SD = 8.02 years), and 
had held management roles (i.e., manager/head coach, assistant manager/coach, director/head 
of sport) for 79 years in total (M = 9.88 years, SD = 4.80 years).  In terms of time in the role 
of team manager (i.e., with ultimate responsibility for a performance department), the shortest 
and longest tenure’s were 6 months and 5 years respectively, with average tenure across all 
managed teams 2.29 years (SD = 1.44 years).  Four participants were currently employed in a 
management role, while four had left positions within a year preceding their interview. 
4.2.2. Data Collection 
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Data were collected through the semi-structured interview guide described in Chapter 
3 (also see Appendix A).  Significantly, while Schroeder (2010) used Schein’s (2004) model 
of organisational culture change to guide his sports team-based research and an abundance of 
CM models exist, no predefined theory or concepts were employed at the start of enquiry (cf. 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Expressly, the literature detailed in Chapters 1 and 2 was used: (a) 
as a guide to express the overall intentions of inquiry (i.e., a temporally-underpinned process 
of change from one specific situation to a new/refined state: du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012); (b) to 
optimise sensitivity to the general topic and challenges faced by elite sport performance team 
managers (i.e., Board, fans, media, powerful players, diverse staff); (c) offer suggestions for 
initial follow-up probes for application in interviews; (d) to support theoretical sampling (i.e., 
directing focus onto managers who had overseen teams with varying traditions, histories, and 
public profiles); (e) to stimulate questioning during data analysis phases; and (f) to support 
the later comparison of data/findings to study-specific and wider knowledge (and identify any 
commonalities and distinctions from prior understanding) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Pilot interviews were undertaken with three elite sport performance team managers to 
evaluate and refine the focus, content, and clarity of the initially developed interview guide.  
For example, initial memos written during this piloting phase revealed that pressure from top 
management (i.e., the Board) played a major role in shaping a manager’s focus (e.g., instant 
results vs. long-term development) and approach (i.e., instant changes or extended planning) 
at the onset of their tenure.  While the main questions of the guide were not amended from 
these pilot interviews, follow-up probes were refined to enable in-depth discussion over the 
challenges of such “external” influence. 
Turning to the main participant group, all conducted interviews revolved around the 
seven general open-ended questions detailed in Appendix A.  Crucially, and as described in 
Chapter 3, while all of these questions were posed to each participant, each discussion flowed 
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naturally and issues were pursued as they were presented.  For optimising data relevance and 
quality, managers were encouraged to compare and contrast their experiences across different 
teams (limited to three teams to prevent dilution of findings).  Supporting an iterative process, 
follow-up prompts and probes were also further modified between each sampling phase.  For 
instance, after analysing data from the purposive sample, follow-up probes were adjusted to 
enable greater exploration of dark side leadership actions (i.e., socially undesirable 
behaviours: Hogan & Hogan, 2001; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; cf. Chapter 8) and optimal 
management of the media; factors which the purposive sample revealed to play a key role in 
driving and sustaining culture change.  All interviews were conducted at locations chosen by 
participants and lasted between 100 and 200 minutes.  Verbatim transcriptions were analysed 
using qualitative analysis software (QSR NVIVO 9).  Confidentiality was assured and all 
participants provided informed consent. 
4.2.3. Data Analysis 
All transcripts underwent open coding to identify concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) 
and the constant comparison method was used to support the generation of unique conceptual 
categories and elucidate their underlying properties and dimensions (involving comparisons 
between data, codes, concepts, and literature: Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  To explain and 
expand on developing concepts and establish category and subcategory relationships, asking 
critical questions of the data (e.g., what is the manager saying he did what did he not do?) and 
axial coding was deployed (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  When further development and 
saturation of categories were required, this process acted as the trigger for further theoretical 
sampling.  This interaction between data analysis and collection, alongside my immersion in 
and quality contact with the data (as per thesis engagement), also further facilitated my 
sensitivity to the issues and challenges being described by participants (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Suddaby, 2006).  Importantly, in cases where comprehensive analysis could not take 
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place before the next interview, an iterative process was maintained through detailed note-
taking (e.g., on new and/or key concepts), memo writing, listening back to the previous 
interviews, critical discussion with my supervisors, and preparing initial findings for intra-
institution presentations (cf. Holt & Tamminen, 2010).  Lastly, saturation was considered to 
have been achieved when participants provided little new data or explanations of professional 
team culture change (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
To discover a central process and refine the theory, theoretical integration was used 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  To this end, memos detailing evolving ideas – some in reflection 
against my own personal experiences (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) – and relationships between 
concepts and categories were used to facilitate “thinking theoretically” (as well as reflexivity 
and analytical distance), with diagramming also deployed for thinking through concepts and 
their relationships.  Additionally, during the final phases of data collection and analysis, 
concepts and categories were compared, contrasted, and integrated with extant theories and 
constructs; as further supported by a delayed second exploration of the literature (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008).  Aligning with Sorge and van Witteloostuijn’s (2004, p. 1222) assertion that 
“the purpose-specific generation of new specialist knowledge . . . is inappropriate when used 
in isolation [i.e., without integration with “old knowledge”]” this inspection process was used 
to establish whether pre-existing labels could be applied (to ensure consistency with current 
knowledge) and, importantly, confirm the uniqueness of a range of discovered concepts. 
 Finally, to ensure that the grounded theory model was grounded in both the data and 
culture change practice, and therefore optimising its utility as a tool for the specific contexts 
of professional sport performance team culture change, a separate and later meeting was held 
with the participant involved with peer training and development to “tell the story” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p. 113), obtain feedback on a proposed model, and further refine this model.  
Remaining consistent with the methodology’s pragmatic underpinnings, feedback from this 
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individual was elicited on the model’s practicality and not its “truth” (the latter reflecting a 
realist ontological perspective7).  The content of the model was not changed by this process. 
4.3. Results 
To illuminate the optimal process of manager-led culture change in professional sport 
performance teams, the activity’s main components are now described before explaining their 
conceptual links in the grounded theory model (Figure 4.1).  These results are a combination 
of team managers’ perceptions of previously successful approaches, views on best practice, 
and reflections on key mistakes/lessons.  Furthermore, while data was collected on the 
deployed systems (e.g., interdisciplinary support), structures (e.g., training schedules), and 
processes (e.g., role clarity) – or the “what” of culture change – my interest lay in how team 
managers ensured that these would be adhered to on a daily, monthly, and yearly basis (as 
required of a high performing culture: cf. definition provided in Chapter 1).  Indeed, as noted 
by Sorge and van Witteloostuijn (2004), mixing the process (i.e., the how) with content (i.e., 
the what) in CM study is a fundamental error. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, delivering and sustaining culture change was characterised by 
team managers’ fulfilment of two linked yet conceptually distinct roles.  Specifically, when 
appointed in a role, best practice involved initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact and 
management of a holistic, integrated, and dynamic culture optimization system.  While both 
elements were co-initiated and co-dependent, the former acted as the catalyst for efficient and 
effective change.  This opening process is now described, focusing on how incoming team 
managers manoeuvred and propelled themselves toward operating an optimal holistic system.  
Adhering to the tenets of Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) methodology, variation and complexity 
                                                 
7
 Reflecting my pragmatic research philosophy, the findings from this study did not “emerge” 
(as would be described through a positivist/post-positivist epistemology) but were developed 
and “grounded” in both the data and culture change practice (Bryant, 2009). 
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are provided in these results.  Football manager quotes are denoted by (F), rugby union by 
(RU), and rugby league by (RL). 
4.3.1. Initial Evaluation, Planning, Set-up, and Impact 
4.3.1.1. Evaluating Fit with the Club and Board 
Reflecting the size of the culture change task against the incessant (and almost 
immediate) pressure to deliver results, the need for an initial and comprehensive evaluation 
was evident.  Providing an anchor for cultural, performance, and outcome goals, appraisal 
began before accepting a job and primarily focused on the perceived fit between personal 
(e.g., management style, career goals) and team factors (e.g., history, tradition, current 
resources, competitive context).  Interestingly, however, fit with key Board members was 
arguably the greatest early success factor, especially for novice managers: 
The first thing I did was . . . look at who the chairman was, look at the background of 
where he is and what sort of business he is in, where has he got his money.  Also 
other directors, you can try and find out who they are and the way the club has been 
managed.  Then I’ve looked at the playing staff . . . because you are going to have to 
work for [the Board] and they are non-[football] people mainly. (F3) 
Reinforcing the need for alignment with the Board, at least professionally, an examination of 
shared expectations over the team’s short and long-term potential was also crucial: 
You go to clubs and you say, “right, what’s my remit?”  For all that shit you hear 
about “we want to get to this mythical ‘next level’” - forget it . . . I keep laughing my 
bollocks off! . . . . [Top teams] will be there forever because they spend the most . . . 
And every chairman wants to join that group; they’re never going to get there! (F2) 
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The same manager quoted above revealed how failing to gain a detailed understanding of the 
team’s most fundamental resource – its players – contributed to an early termination of their 
contract:  
I really should have [turned down the Chairman’s offer to manage Club X.  He said:] 
“What [salary] would it take [to work for Club X]?”  I told him, and he said “we’ll 
give you it” . . . You’ll face it one time in life where you’ll do something [for] the 
money . . . Because you’ll do it ‘cos of your family or whatever, I did it because of 
mine.  And that was a mistake. It might not have been a mistake if I’d done my proper 
homework on the players. It’s only a mistake now (F2) 
Thus, while the lure of personal reward (e.g., salary, profile) often mediated decisions on a 
job offer, alignment with the Board and an understanding of internal contexts was considered 
imperative for program success.  
4.3.1.2. Evaluating the Performance Department 
On accepting the team manager role, initial evaluation continued with an essential and 
intense phase of multi-source information gathering; the speed of which being dictated by the 
manager’s time of arrival (i.e., off-/mid-season) and the team’s current competitive contexts 
(e.g., league standing).  Indeed, as each team’s history, traditions, and current resources all 
interacted to provide a unique challenge, the uncritical application of prior successful 
methods was deemed naïve: 
Clive Woodward’s [autobiography] . . . shows the . . . planning, the preparation of 
England winning the [rugby union] World Cup.  It was absolutely bang on.  Then I 
bought [sic] the DVD of the 2005 [British and Irish] Lions and [Woodward] applies 
the same principles and practices with a different group and it didn’t work . . . . 
You’ve got to be really clever analysing the culture . . . and deciding where that 
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culture needs to go.  The culture I developed at [team] would be very different to one 
if I was working at [team]. (RL1) 
Primarily focused on the amalgamation of multi-stakeholder perspectives, including current 
and former players and support staff, evaluation of the performance department also involved 
assessing: player and support staff capabilities; training facilities; present systems, structures, 
and processes; player and support staff personalities; and the social milieu.  For example, one 
manager described the importance of understanding the man-management needs of individual 
players; particularly those with greatest social standing/performance experience: 
We did [an exercise] . . . to see who were the more submissive players in the group, 
who were the more quiet players in the group and who were the dominant ones, who 
were the worriers if you like, and that gave us a handle on how we might want to man 
manage those players a bit differently as well.  So we knew that some players were a 
little bit introverted and might struggle if they were given feedback in a certain way, 
whereas other people needed a kick up the arse and a kick up the arse in front of 
everyone sometimes . . . . You wouldn’t treat the senior players in the leadership 
group the same as you’d treat a first year rookie and. . . it gave us a better handle on . . 
. how we might manage them differently. (RL2) 
As noted above, another key lesson was discovered to be a need to understand players’ short 
and long term capabilities, thereby increasing the chances of the manager deploying methods 
and processes which would be well received and confer optimal impact on performance: 
[In the future] I just need to make sure that, especially early on, I look [sic] at players, 
look [sic] at what they are comfortable at, knowing that I can get to where I want to 
go [in the future] but I may not, because of the ability of players, be able to do it [as 
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quick as I’d like].  So I [may] have to sacrifice a little bit [in the initial transition] . . . 
knowing I’ll get a result [i.e., playing style change] later on. (F1) 
Accordingly, rather than impose idealistic or imitative values, standards and practices, an 
extensive assessment process instead enabled cultural, performance, and outcome goals to be 
set and disseminated which were optimally grounded in the team’s contexts and potential. 
 4.3.1.2. Setting and aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations.  To 
optimise the transition from the prior manager’s program and create conditions which would 
enable the most rapid uptake of new or refined ways of operating, the importance of instantly 
setting and aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations was revealed; a process 
often facilitated by proactive pre-appointment upward influence tactics (Yukl & Falbe, 1990):  
 [At] our interview, we . . . said “we know what it is that needs to be changed we 
believe, and if you can’t provide that to us don’t employ us because we will be . . . 
coming to you and saying [that] we need to employ X, Y and Z straight away” . . . . 
[That] was a definite condition. (RU1) 
Indeed, reinforcing the importance of establishing immediate shared perceptions with those 
who held ultimate power over organisational decision making, another manager revealed that 
not working to set such expectations was a critical mistake in their tenure at a previous club: 
[The Board at Club X] were very open . . . [as] they were desperate for change, but at 
[Club Y] I think there were barriers . . . . and I might not have communicated [what I 
needed] as effectively as I wanted to . . . . with the powers that be, the directors . . . . I 
should have said: “Right I’m not coming unless this, this, and this is happening . . . . 
[Support staff member is] coming with me and [support staff member is] coming with 
me and you’re getting rid of [existing support staff member] and I don’t care if he’s 
under contract.”  That again is something, that confrontational communication, I’d do 
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now if I went to [another club]; I’d be confident and experienced enough to do that 
which perhaps I wasn’t [back] then (RL1) 
Beyond Board-specific groundwork, managers also described the importance of optimising 
player and support staff belief in the imminent program as soon as possible after appointment 
(and/or quelling uncertainty and resistance).  Notably, this task was often viewed as a “one-
shot” challenge: “That one moment of time . . . [is] your strongest point.  After that it’s yours 
then to lose” (F4).  Indeed, regardless of personal reputation, the need to deliver impactful 
opening communication and action was vital: 
It was important that we made a statement straight away. . . . You’ve got your suit on 
to give the perception of: “I’m in charge” . . . . [But] I didn’t want to go in and say: 
“right, I’m in charge, you will do this and you will do that” . . . . So [instead] it was a 
case of [saying]: “right what are we good at?” I needed to see who wanted to talk, 
how to get the interaction [with players and staff] . . . . The feedback . . . [from players 
and staff] after the first meeting (clicks fingers): I have them in my hand. (F4) 
Importantly, as well as facilitating optimal receptivity to the impending programme through 
interpersonal impact, another manager discussed how the dissemination of his intentions in 
more concrete/formal terms also eased his transition into a new club: 
I needed to make a stand . . . . My first way of doing that was . . . a 180 page 
document [on the football vision] that I gave to the . . . the Head of Scouting, the 
Head of the Academy and obviously my own staff, and at one of my clubs the 
Director of Football . . . . The feedback I got . . . was [that] they’d never seen anything 
like it.  It was an impressive document to them. (F1) 
Reflecting players’ primary focus on performance-based matters, the same manager noted the 
need for similar action with “substance” in training and performance contexts: 
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First and foremost I needed to make sure that what I was bringing in was something 
different . . . . I prepare players differently than . . . the traditional way . . . . This is 
something that they are getting from a bigger level. (F1) 
Importantly, while optimising player perceptions to gain support for the planned programme 
via innovative methods was impactful, another manager reported that, in a different context, 
gaining immediate support from the players was more simply achieved by addressing clear 
issues with the previous incumbent’s regime: 
One of the big things that was causing a lot of frustration [was that the players and 
staff were] . . . out training for hours and hours and there was no thought process to it. 
The players became de-motivated, staff became de-motivated, loads of injuries, loads 
of different things so [immediate focus was on] trying to channel all that together. 
(F4) 
In other cases where new approaches were required which were not inherently appealing to 
the players (e.g., processes to optimise effort and work-rate), introduction processes were 
explicitly justified and framed in terms of their performance-relevance: 
[Players] have got to see the benefits [of new training methods] . . . . For example, 
with the GPS [monitors8] it’s no good just saying: “wear these they’ll make you better 
players”.  You’ve got to say: “the reason that we’ve got them is for you to wear them 
when training and during games and then we will analyse them, and we will make 
training more specific . . . positional-wise and that will help you become a better 
player”.  That’s the type of sell that you’ve got to do. (RL1) 
                                                 
8
 GPS-systems are commonly used in professional sport performance teams to objectively quantify training- and 
match-based performance measures (e.g., heart rate) and feed back into the design of players’ conditioning, 
recovery, and injury prevention processes. 
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Beyond structural and process changes to training, using players to model new performance-
based behaviours was also considered an important mechanism in setting expectations: 
When I was at [team] I brought in a young guy who was with me at [previous team] . . 
. . He’d worked with me three or four years, and I brought him in and he played in my 
first game . . . and straight away people . . . . could then see certain types of players 
that I liked.  Players that were professional, disciplined, tactically strong, technically 
capable and physically and mentally good. (F1) 
Interestingly, however, the process of setting and aligning player expectations was not always 
based on positive interaction: 
[Player] was a mess.  First day at training . . . he smelled of alcohol and I said “have 
you been drinking?” “Just a couple of beers” . . . . “That’s two weeks wages you’re 
getting fined”.  I never made a big song and dance about it to everybody because 
[football] players talk.  And he’s went [back to the squad] and gone “what about this 
maniac?!  He’s done me two weeks wages!” . . . You set standards then. (F2) 
As revealed by this quote, the deployment of dark side practices was often required to ensure 
that the team manager’s core standards and values were quickly “visible” and emphatically 
reinforced.  Indeed, the need to overtly and covertly assert one’s position and power, 
particularly early in the manager’s tenure or at times when they were directly challenged by 
players and staff, was considered pivotal for role survival and enduring system success. 
4.3.1.3. Identifying and Harnessing Social Allies and Cultural Architects 
Reflecting the need to deploy dark side leadership skills alongside the inherent 
scepticism and/or uncertainty which an incoming manager’s program brings, best practice 
was also perceived to be dependent upon the simultaneous acquisition of support from 
socially powerful players who then acted as cultural architects (Railo, 1986); vital for 
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ensuring that new and/or refined values, standards, systems and processes were accepted and 
consistently adhered to by the playing squad: 
I [started the process] by canvassing the senior players . . . . [Player X] is your perfect 
‘culture player’ . . . [but] I worried . . . [he was] going to be bored . . . . [Player Y], no 
interest in [team culture]; he is purely a rugby tactician . . . . I had to explain to him as 
he is Captain: “I know this is not your bag but I need you to support it.” (RL2) 
Furthermore, the need to rapidly ascertain the “dependability” of these allies and architects 
was also noted as a particularly important process: 
I asked [X], who had coached [influential player] at [team]: “what are this guy’s plus 
points and . . . negative points?  Can he be trusted?” . . . Harsh questions have got to 
be asked in order for you to come up with the correct needs analysis. (RL 1) 
For one manager who was an internal appointment after a period as player/coach, the task of 
acquiring support from influential players had to be treated with particular sensitivity due to 
the innate shift in interpersonal/power dynamics between this individual and his former peers: 
There were still two or three [senior] players that were there when I was a player so 
they knew me [and] they saw that transition from player to coach and now ultimately 
they had to help me make that transition from coach to management.  Not everybody 
accepts it.  There might be a small part of resentment in that . . . it might be easier for 
them  - and it might be easier for me -  if I didn’t know them.  But I felt I had to keep 
that relationship right.  Three years ago I was in the dressing room with them as a 
player, and now all of a sudden I’m the main man giving out the orders . . . . I was 
mindful of the fact that I wasn’t going to be too heavy handed.  “Who does he think 
he is?  He was in with us two years ago, three years ago!” (F3) 
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Reinforcing culture change’s status as a fundamentally social challenge, the need to identify, 
harness, and entrust social allies and cultural architects was a central theme throughout the 
data and resonates with prior organisational change models which point toward establishing 
guiding coalitions and political sponsorship (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996). 
4.3.1.4. Withholding Initial Action in Sub-Optimal Conditions 
While all managers discussed the need to instantly set and align stakeholder 
perceptions and expectations, some revealed that the extent to which they could engage with 
their identified, evidence-based changes was often constrained by the prevailing social milieu 
and capabilities of the players and support staff which they had inherited.  For example, when 
“weight of numbers [between] . . . ‘good culture’ players to the ‘bad culture’ players” was 
insufficient to “pull [those on the fence] into the good box”, one team manager revealed the 
need for “damage limitation” strategies to enable role survival to the point when significant 
personnel changes could be made: 
It was a case of get your crash helmets on and get through the year . . . because we 
knew half the guys were not going to be there [in following year] and it would simply 
be a waste of time . . . . We had to just cajole and kid and try and get the best out of 
what we had got . . . . The [culture change] program [I wanted to deliver had] started 
an internal shit fight [at another club as] the egos in the squad . . . couldn’t handle the 
honesty [involved] and it actually had an undermining effect and exploded. (RL 2) 
Indeed, rather than forcing new values, standards and practices upon unreceptive or incapable 
recipients, participants reported that best practice often involved the careful avoidance of 
conflict, even if it temporarily compromised the manager’s ideals and long-term vision: 
When you take over as a manager - don’t look for fights, they come looking for you.  
Don’t go in and say “I’m going to change it, I’m going to do this; if you don’t do what 
I say then I’ll get rid of you”.  Don’t do that, there are enough fights as it is. (F2) 
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Notably, when managers felt that some changes had to be made regardless of the inevitable 
resistance and conflict which they would incur, the introduction process was still somewhat 
softened and gradual in nature; thereby allowing any initial to flare-up to subside: 
I was trying to get that across to the players that in a month’s time, six weeks’ time, 
we are going to start and do [strength and conditioning] programmes . . . . I drip-fed 
that in for a month or so leading up to it . . . . People initially, for two or three weeks 
were: “what we doing this for, what we doing this for, fucking hell”; as you would do, 
it’s something new.  But then after two or three weeks [of the programme running] it 
became part of the norm . . . and people started to do it and I found in that short period 
of three months, between then and March, we found that people were getting less and 
less injuries and they [the players] were finding that it was making a difference. (F3) 
In short, sensitivity to the prevailing culture and social milieu at appointment was pivotal in 
determining the initial focus, nature, and timing of the new manager’s changes. 
4.3.1.5. Delivering Instant Results 
While evaluations of the Board and performance department,  setting and aligning 
multi-stakeholder perceptions, harnessing social allies, and withholding from some hazardous 
initial actions were all viewed as crucial for establishing oneself at a new team, all 
interviewees acknowledged that the extent to which new values, standards, and practices 
were accepted and internalised by players and support staff was ultimately dictated by initial 
on-field results: 
It’s a results business.  At the end of the day if you are not winning games you are out 
. . . . You can’t lose six games on the spin . . . . It’s about winning, you’ve got to win . 
. . you have got to find a way to win.  You have to find a way to win.  (F4) 
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Indeed, another interviewee who had targeted tactical and technical improvement to support 
attainment of a long-term performance goal without pairing this to a focus on instant results 
recognised this as a fundamental mistake: 
What I’ve learned from my last experience was that, and especially in football now, 
unless you get your short-term plan you will never even get to your intermediate one.  
So you have to find the formula of winning . . . . So even if your philosophy isn’t 
totally carried out in that period . . . whilst it’s on-going you have to get a winning 
formula, and that’s one of the biggest learning things that I have had is that short-
term, that first six months, is vital or else it can put you under immense pressure. (F1). 
Reflecting the outcome-oriented interpretative lens of players, support staff, the Board, fans, 
and media, balancing a program’s initial focus on long-term cultural change and short-term 
results was therefore considered a crucial skill for rapid success and role longevity. 
4.3.2. Management of a Holistic, Integrated, and Dynamic Culture Optimisation System 
The second and most substantial role in delivering and sustaining culture change in 
professional sport performance teams was management of a holistic, integrated, and dynamic 
culture optimisation system.  Focused on constantly generating and sustaining shared 
performance-optimising values, standards, and practices within the performance department, 
this system was built upon a two-way interaction and power-share with internal and external 
stakeholder groups (the components of which were managing multi-stakeholder perceptions 
and expectations and action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions and actions; see Figure 
4.1). 
4.3.2.1. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Support Staff 
Common across all managers’ perceptions, a united, loyal, and engaged support staff 
was viewed as fundamental to successful culture change delivery; enabled, for example, by 
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keeping this group optimally informed of any decisions and actions which impacted on their 
daily roles: 
When we . . . made the changes [to restructure the strength and conditioning staff], we 
made it once and once only . . . . What we didn’t do is make a change and two or three 
weeks later make another change - that just sends out . . . the wrong message . . . . We 
were [also] very keen to make sure . . . we were very clear and that the staff 
understood that those changes were for very particular reasons. (RU1) 
Reflecting the diversity of modern support staffing, and thereby the vast and varying opinions 
on general and specific performance-related matters, the acquisition and integration of inputs 
across all supporting professions was a further central theme: 
I want [the coaches] to coach . . . . I want [the strength and conditioners] to have a 
program in place that [the coaches] can follow and interact with.  The medical staff, 
we need to make sure that . . . a player is available to train and . . . play . . . and that 
we are not putting them at risk, so their information is valuable.  It takes time trying to 
harness everybody in, to make them aware of your/their role: “You’re in the [football] 
club, your department is valued and so we are going to listen.” (F4) 
Similarly, when discrepancies did emerge between manager expectations and support staff 
performance, interactions remained respectful of these individuals’ contribution and agency: 
[The program] exposed one of the assistant coaches . . . . He wasn’t up to the job . . . . 
So it gave me an opportunity to . . . tell him what I expected of him.  Then again three 
or four weeks down the line when it wasn’t happening: “we’ve had this talk but this is 
still not happening, why isn’t it happening? . . . Can we support you in any way?”  To 
the point where . . . we had say: “despite having three or four meetings . . . and setting 
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you some targets and goals . . . you are still not doing them; I’m going to have to let 
you go” - which was a very difficult situation because he was a nice guy. (RL2) 
4.3.2.2. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Playing Staff 
Rather than solely top-down direction, the optimisation of players’ values, standards, 
and behaviours also involved a two-way process of consultation and negotiation; in fact, as 
well as actively managing player perceptions and expectations (e.g., by providing an 
understanding of behavioural standards, the reasoning behind manager decision 
making/action, the demands of optimal and consistent performance, and pertinent upcoming 
plans/events), accommodating a “to and fro” of power  was at times mandatory with respect 
to the power held by high-status and high-ego players: 
[Player X] said “I don’t want to come back [from holiday], just take the [two week’s] 
wages [fine].”  Rather than turn up for a week’s training [during the off-season] he’s 
given £64,000 away . . . . People die for £64,000 . . . but that was their mentality. (F2) 
Indeed, awareness that “athletes are simply interested in themselves” (RU1), coupled with the 
power they held, led to an ebb and flow of power in many decision making processes: 
We have changed stuff . . . purely on the basis that the senior players group didn’t 
want to do it . . . .  [For example], as soon as we told [the squad about arrangements 
for an away match] . . . you can see a couple of the senior players pulling their faces: 
“why are we setting off at that time? . . . Why don’t we train at four . . . and then we’ll 
go straight to the hotel from there?”  So within a couple of minutes . . . we agreed that 
. . . we would train at four . . . and then go straight to the hotel.  “Great, that’s all we 
wanted  . . . . If you are comfortable doing that then we’ll do that for you.” (RL2) 
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Similarly, the need to modify short-term action in relation to player opinion and power was 
often viewed as the most effective way to reach longer-terms goals, even if it led managers to 
temporarily sacrifice or suppress some of their principals and intentions: 
To help the process go forward sometimes you have to concede certain things that you 
might not have believed in . . . .  [So] as long as we were going in the right direction, 
let’s go [to] the halfway house . . . rather than make the big leap . . . . Because by 
doing the first step they realised it wasn’t . . . as painful as they first thought. (RU1) 
4.3.2.3. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Board 
Reflecting their control of resources and the overarching organisational strategy, 
facilitating support from the Board via similar to and fro interactions was also vital in driving 
and sustaining culture change.  As stated by one manager: “managing up is just as important 
if not more important than being able to manage the players” (F2).  Indeed, this challenge 
was particularly crucial with respect to the Board’s powerful but often uninformed position 
on performance department matters:  
What you’ve got to realise is that the board members very often haven’t got a fucking 
clue [about performance].  They just come to the game and watch it as a spectator.  So 
there’s an education aspect of it . . . they’ve got to know where you are going and how 
you are going to get there . . . . So you have to keep them informed [and]. . . I think 
the more you keep them informed the more on-side they are.  [In fact], it’s [actually] 
more what kind of impact [it causes on the performance department] if you haven’t 
got the support of the board!  Because they can be obstructive and negative and 
destructive . . . . That’s why it’s very important to have them onside. (RL1) 
Important for generating the freedom to deliver innovative changes and “buying time” for 
when inevitable mixed or poor results would be experienced, another manager also revealed 
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how managing upwards was at times vital for even preventing chairmen and owners from 
directly interfering with the performance environment: 
[The Chairman] runs the show from top to bottom . . . he [always] needs to know 
what’s going on . . . . On a match day he used to storm around the stadium - a bag of 
nerves . . . . So [after my first game], I said “why don’t you come and have a cup of 
tea with me [before matches]?” 12:30-12:45 is dead time for me anyway, so [now] I 
go into his office, we have a tea, and chat about life . . . . [It helps as] everyone [can 
be] on tenterhooks around him because he could sack somebody just like that. (F4) 
The significance of managing upwards echoes recent writing in sports and mainstream 
organisational change showing middle manager agency to be constrained by organisational 
position, resource access, and top management support (Cunningham, 2009; Tatlı & 
Ӧzbilgin, 2009).  Notably, however, participants’ recognised that any bought time (e.g., via 
successful “issue selling”: Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001) was finite and that 
the Board would expect a significant return on their patience; take the example of the 
manager who adopted the damage limitation approach until new players could be recruited: 
It did help when I did . . . a recruitment and strategy presentation to [the Board during 
an initial period of mixed results] – [outlining] where our club was sitting amongst a 
host of its competitors and that the club and probably previous management had been 
culpable in letting it get to this state . . . . [I told them that]: “if you live by these [new 
recruitment] principles . . . you will never have a team that finished in bottom four 
again” . . . . They just wholeheartedly said – “go on, make your changes”.  [But] I 
knew I would have to have a better year [of results] . . .  the year after. (RL2) 
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Reinforcing the need for continually open and transparent interaction with the Board, another 
manager noted how the lack of a two-way communication with their CEO was a significant 
factor in derailing what had been an initially highly successful CM programme: 
[While] we are encouraging our staff and players to report to us, open door affair that 
type of stuff you know, I don’t think we had that the other way [with the CEO/Board] 
and I think at times that was detrimental to understanding where we were trying to be.  
Because there were cases where we . . . getting on with what we felt was a really 
important part of our three year plan only really to learn that there was some real 
hardship behind the scenes as regards to future investors putting the money up.  We 
were really only being kept up to date as and when they believed that we should be 
informed.  Where really at that time because you are making decisions, sometimes on 
a daily basis . . . if that’s the case we need to take a different line of approach on that 
three year plan because we are not going to have the finance . . . . I still think we 
could have prevented a number of those potential financial issues and respectively 
been able to manage expectations and manage the business probably in a better way 
so that we didn’t fall into the trap that actually happened. (RU1) 
4.3.2.4. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Fans 
Reflecting their generation of important psycho-social and financial capital, managers 
also reported the need to engage fans in driving and sustaining team-level culture change.  
With a need to meet the “demand from the spectators for you to play [a] certain way” (RL1) 
and “excite the crowd” to optimise the energy and atmosphere in the stadium (F4), a 
proactive approach was required to positively harness these stakeholders’ unique and 
substantial influence: 
I’d had meetings with the supporters clubs . . . because what they know about you is 
only what they read in the paper, and then normally when they meet you they go away 
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with a different perception altogether.  So yes, it’s constant work to put [the fans] on 
side, to let them understand, because this is their own club. (F1) 
Recognising fans’ ability to impact top management perceptions and decisions - even though 
their understanding of a manager’s program was limited and filtered through the media’s lens 
– participants also revealed the need to act as “sensemaker” and “sensegiver” via meetings 
with supporters clubs and, more commonly, media interactions (cf. Goosby Smith, 2009): 
Fans might not be going to every game so they try and listen to the radio or they try 
and read the newspapers to catch up on what’s happening and what they are reading is 
what they think . . . must be happening . . . . So you’ve got to get that across - what 
you want the fans to read - what you want people to perceive is happening. (F3) 
4.3.2.5. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Media 
Reflecting their ubiquity in professional sport team environments, and as suggested 
above, positive interactions with the media were essential for optimal culture change practice.  
However, one manager who found press conferences to be “like an inquiry” discussed the 
challenge of engaging with and being held accountable to a group who were not necessarily 
experts on sports performance matters: 
What did upset me was . . . two young [journalists who had] never [covered football] 
before . . . [were] asking me about my tactics . . . . I’ve not got a problem with the 
older [journalists] asking ‘cause they’ve been in the game for 35 years or they’ve got 
a degree in journalism . . . [but] they [didn’t have] a degree in anything, they were 
doing the [local] morning radio show! . . . They had no right to ask me questions! (F2) 
With another manager noting that the media “can hound you to such an extent that they get 
the message [they want] across . . . [and ultimately] get rid of you”, efforts had to be made to 
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optimise this group’s perception and increase the chances of positive coverage; or, in many 
cases, avoid responses or interactions which could lead to negative or sensationalised stories: 
One thing I’ve learned [is that] . . . if you give the media a yard they will take a mile, 
and without being negative you are better to play down the situation . . . . [I went in 
[to Club] and . . . I promoted this [message]: “we can really challenge and it’s going 
to be a positive year, and it’s going to be a year of transition” – trying to be positive 
with it.  [But] when the results don’t come then all this comes back, it always comes 
back.  You don’t get the chance to formally then come out and say – “no that’s 
wrong.”  So the media has a massive, massive part. (F1) 
Beyond such meeting of the media’s needs (e.g., allocating extra time for interviews) and 
being “cordial, approachable and media friendly” (RL2), managers also revealed how their 
interactions with this group were largely shaped by awareness of who the media disseminated 
information to: 
[Using media] is part of changing the culture . . . . You only get the chance to speak to 
the fans and directors at times via . . . the media.  For me I had a board meeting once 
every month when the directors would be there but they wouldn’t all be there at times 
so that [media] might be your one chance to speak to them . . . . You have got to be 
getting that message across . . . when you can because ultimately . . . fans, directors, 
chairman, and the players are going to keep you in a job . . . . So I think that’s of 
maximum importance, how you treat the media, so if you are not comfortable with it 
then you may have problems. (F3) 
Rather than viewing the media as an unwanted distraction (albeit they often were), managers 
recognised the unique opportunity they provided to send “flanking” messages: such messages 
either being explicit (e.g., reference to precise issues) or implicit (e.g., protecting credibility 
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by negotiating the media’s “fabricated drama[s]”; F2).  As one participant stated: “It’s just so 
important to . . . use [media] for your ends . . . . It might sound quite Machiavellian . . . [but] 
it’s the reality of the situation” (RL1).  Using a club’s own media outlets was also considered 
especially valuable when messages could be completely controlled and appropriately framed:  
There used to be somebody who would write [my match-day program notes] . . . . I’d 
do an interview with him and he’d write the program notes, and I lost my head a little 
bit because he didn’t put in what I said . . . . So I wrote them myself, because . . .  it’s 
a great opportunity to keep planting the seeds and sending the message. (F4) 
Interestingly, this two-way interaction with the media contradicts Frontiera (2010, p. 78), in 
which team owners and general managers were encouraged to “ignore this media pressure, 
stay true to their values and remain focused on the larger plan”.  Indeed, the present sample 
reported that the media could in fact be used as a valuable tool to socially construct and 
reinforce new or refined values, standards, and practices within performance departments. 
4.3.2.6. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with Other Significant Influences 
Beyond the Board, fans, and media, the need for profitable interactions with other 
significant influences was also revealed.  Reflecting each team’s bespoke context, history and 
traditions, a variety of groups were reported; for example, catering staff, the local 
community, potential investors, and team-specific icons/“legends” (i.e., former players and 
staff; celebrity fans): 
There was a real disconnection between players, club, supporters . . . . I got two 
influential people back involved . . . . [Celebrity fan] is an iconic figure . . . and he had 
taken himself out of the club . . . . For me it was about: get him back involved! . . . So 
straight away the supporters can identify getting back to ‘the old [team]’.  [Ex-
manager] was a legend at the club . . . so getting him back in an ambassadorial role 
they could see . . . they are a club starting to come back together again. (F1) 
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While these “other influences” were both diverse and variable in terms of the magnitude and 
speed at which they could impact the performance department, all were considered to play a 
key role in reinforcing the intended culture.  Lying at the heart of this practice was sensitivity 
to social complexity and recognition that apparently minor actors could shape the culture 
optimisation process.  For example, one manager discussed the need to “cement the right sort 
of relationships” with players’ partners in order to create a performance-supporting and 
conducive personal life: 
We helped some players’ [partners] on nutrition because some . . . had a different up-
bringing, a different background to good cooking . . . . So we helped to sort of say: 
“your husband/partner is struggling before us, you are doing a fantastic job but some 
of the food you are providing actually isn’t conducive to him losing weight.” (RU1) 
Similarly, another manager described the need to effectively engage with a groundskeeper to 
ensure that training pitches were kept in peak condition, thereby providing a platform upon 
which changes to the team’s playing style could be introduced and sustained: 
You are asking [the head groundskeeper] all of a sudden to get off [his] arse and not 
be lazy, yet he might have the ear of . . . three or four of the directors . . . .  All of a 
sudden [his] workload has doubled [because of promotion] but [he] is not getting paid 
twice as much so for him it’s: “why do I have to do this? I’m not getting paid more!”  
That’s where the politician in you . . . has to really come out . . . . Don’t go . . . and 
say – “this is wrong” . . . . Go in there and say “look, I think a little bit more work can 
be done, what do you think?  Can you spare one of your ground staff to come down a 
little bit more?” You are sort of tip toeing around it, not to upset people. (F3) 
4.3.3. A Grounded Theory: Culture Change in Professional Sport Performance Teams 
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The grounded theory of manager-led culture change in professional sport performance 
teams is depicted in Figure 4.1.  After assessing fit with a club and its top-level management, 
best practice involved a concentrated and comprehensive period of evaluation and planning to 
ensure sensitivity to and exploitation of a team’s historical, psychosocial, and competitive 
contexts.  Reflecting an expectancy for improved performance and results, whether internal 
(i.e., players and support staff), external (i.e., the Board, fans, media), or both, this opening 
phase was paired with the need to set and align multi-stakeholder perception, identify and 
harness social allies, withhold some intended actions in sub-optimal conditions, and deliver 
immediate on-field results.  Used to optimise respect and trust from players and support staff 
and buy time, space, and support from key external groups, this process was crucial for 
generating the psychosocial momentum required for rapid and enduring cultural change. 
Regarding the major and permanent component (management of a holistic, dynamic, 
and integrated culture optimization system), the model explains that culture change was not 
only dependent on generating and regulating shared values, standards, and practices within 
the performance department but also protecting this “cultural bubble” (cf. circle surrounding 
manager, support staff, and playing staff) from external interference.  Due to the nonlinear 
(cf. broken double-arrowed lines) and negotiated (cf. solid double-arrowed lines9) nature of 
social interaction, best practice therefore involved the constant acquisition, integration, and 
management of (a) players and support staffs’ oscillating perceptions and opinions, and (b) 
perceptions and opinions of those who could indirectly reinforce and shape the developing 
and/or established team culture (i.e., the Board, fans, media, other significant influences).  As 
summarised by F1: “The biggest thing about . . . cultural change . . . [is] persistence . . . . Not 
getting tired of putting those values and those principles in place.”  Rather than a step-by-step 
process, an explanatory framework is therefore presented which embraces the complex and 
                                                 
9
 As the purpose of this study was to explore manager-led change, the research process and results section 
primarily focused on manager-based (not extra-manager) interactions 
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contested nature of professional sports team environments to ensure that players and support 
staff beliefs, standards, and behaviours supported the continual uptake of and adherence to 
deployed systems, structures, and processes. 
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Management of a Holistic, Integrated, and Dynamic Culture 
Optimisation System: 
- Managing multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations 
- Action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions and actions 
 
Initial Evaluation, Planning, Set-up & Impact: 
- Evaluating fit with the club and Board 
- Evaluating the performance department 
- Setting and aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations 
- Identifying and harnessing social allies and cultural architects 
- Withholding initial action in sub-optimal conditions 
- Delivering instant results 
 
denote manager-based 
“to and fro” interactions 
denote media influence 
Figure 4.1. 
A Grounded Theory Model of Manager-Led Culture Change Best Practice in Professional 
Sport Performance Teams10. 
  
                                                 
10
 As per the tenets of grounded theory methodology (cf. Corbin & Strauss, 2008), this model is a representation 
of the analysed data from this specific study (NB. predicted interactions between non- team management groups 
– beyond those involving the media – are therefore not depicted; cf. future research directions in Chapter 10) 
Support
Staff
Manager
Playing
Staff
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4.4. Discussion 
This study developed a grounded theory of optimal CM practice in professional sport 
performance teams, as delivered by incoming team managers.  With initial evaluation, 
planning, set-up, and impact considered the crucial foundation for efficient and enduring 
change, the model primarily presents a holistic and integrated approach to the optimisation of 
team culture.  More specifically, the power, agency, and interaction of internal and external 
stakeholders generated a theoretical framework which revolved around a constant acquisition, 
negotiation, and configuration of multi-group perceptions; thereby ensuring that the “cultural 
bubble” surrounding the performance department was constantly sensitive to and exploitative 
of macro (e.g., history and traditions), meso (e.g., financial resources, competitive contexts), 
and micro (e.g., stakeholder perception) contexts.  Indeed, the discovered model emphasises 
that the content of change (i.e., what is to be changed/modified/refined) is entirely dependent 
on the specific internal and external circumstances of each given team (Sorge & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2004).  This model’s integration with and extension from prior knowledge is 
now evaluated in greater depth (cf. Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004). 
4.4.1. Integrating and Distinguishing the Grounded Theory Model 
As academics and practitioners of organisational change will note, many principles 
within the initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact phase are not new concepts.  For 
example: evaluating the performance department may be considered a variant of Kanter et 
al.’s (1992) analyze the organization and its needs for change; identifying and harnessing 
social allies and cultural architects a variant of Kotter’s (1996) creating a guiding coalition; 
and delivering instant results a variant of Luecke’s (2003) focus on results, not activities.  As 
well as providing some much needed evidence-based support for these tasks and revealing 
their saliency in professional sport, this parallel also reinforces the professional sports team’s 
scope as laboratory for complimenting and critically extending organisational knowledge.  
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On this note, one theme from the present study which has received little coverage in 
organisational change frameworks was withholding initial action in sub-optimal conditions.  
Indeed, while organisational researchers have focused much attention on employee change 
readiness (e.g., Drzensky, Egold, van Dick, 2012; Sekerka, Zolin, Goosby Smith, 2009), CM 
frameworks have often overlooked the active-disruptive role that change-recipients can play.  
Further contradicting guidelines which promote an active “selling” of organisational change 
to recipients (e.g.. Armenakis & Harris, 2009), this study showed that incoming sports team 
managers employ a subtle mix of creating readiness (e.g., by harnessing social allies, setting 
stakeholder expectations, etc.) and withholding from action until contextually appropriate 
circumstances prevail (e.g., after staff restructuring).  With manager succession triggering an 
innate reconfiguration and redistribution of power due to the altered psychosocial dynamics, 
team manager decision making and action was not rooted to a checklist or the perceived need 
for change, but instead to moments and phases when optimal impact (or least damage) would 
likely be conferred (as tempered against the need for instant and consistent results). 
While the initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact phase demonstrated overlap 
with prior organisational CM frameworks (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 
2003; Price & Chahal, 2006), the non-linear and boundless features of the developed model 
are in direct contrast to these sequential ‘n-step’ methods.  Aligning with claims that 
theoretical perspectives should account for change and continuity (Graetz & Smith, 2010; 
Pettigrew et al., 2001), best practice in professional sport performance teams was portrayed 
not as a single, time-locked, prescriptive event, but rather as a pivotal transition/set-up phase 
adjoined to an unrelenting multi-stakeholder perception- and power-based system.  Of further 
divergence from prior organisational models which institutionalize, consolidate, or refreeze 
change as a final step (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Schein, 2004), the model aligns 
with Schroeder’s (2010) sport-based work in that reinforcement, adaptation, and 
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sustainability processes were engaged instantly and permanently (cf. managing multi-
stakeholder perceptions and expectations and action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions 
and actions in figure 4.1).  This finding resonates with Brännmark and Benn’s (2012) concept 
of stakeholder interest balance - rather than prioritisation of particular groups - as a condition 
for sustaining change.  Alignment is also found with Buchanan et al.’s (2005) work on the 
sustainability of change in that the present model incorporates all “influencing factors” 
identified by these authors (i.e., the program’s fit with the organisation; stakeholder 
commitment/expectations; managerial style, approach, and behaviours; finances; leader 
vision, values and goals; organisational polices, systems, and structures; shared beliefs, 
perceptions, norms; stakeholder and coalition power; implementation methods; external 
contexts and norms; and the timing and flow of events).  Finally, and aligning with 
Armenakis & Harris’ (2009) assertion that leader- and recipient-centric approaches should 
not be considered mutually exclusive, the current model reported that culture optimisation is 
not best delivered by top-down imposition but by a two-way interaction and power-share 
with internal and external stakeholder groups. 
Indeed, diverging from prior organisational CM models (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; 
Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 2003; Price & Chahal, 2006) and leader-centric portrayals of 
manager/head coach-led programmes in sport psychology (e.g., Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; 
Schroeder, 2010; Vallée & Bloom, 2005), the current model is grounded in the contested 
agency of multiple stakeholders and therefore power- and political-based dynamics; a point 
which Tatlı and Ӧzbilgin (2009) consider has been largely overlooked in change management 
processes to date.  Notably, the model’s elucidation of a to and fro of power between team 
managers and support staff, players, Board, media, fans, and other external influences aligns 
with organisational findings that point to the program derailing-potential of self-interested 
and marginalised stakeholders and organisation politics (e.g., Buchanan, 2008; Hope, 2010; 
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Reisner, 2002).  Resonance is also found with earlier sport-based research which has reported 
links between successful change and power-sharing structures (Amis et al., 2004), the need 
for power and politicality to be incorporated into models of change (Cunningham, 2009), and 
the sports team head coach/manager’s need for political skills (Potrac & Jones, 2009).  
Support is thereby found for Pettigrew’s (1987, p. 650) statement that leadership is “a central 
ingredient [in delivering change] but only one of the ingredients, in a complex analytical, 
political, and cultural process”. 
4.4.2. Evaluation of Research Quality 
To support judgment on the quality of this study, the reader is directed to a variety of 
“characterising traits” (Sparkes & Smith, 2009) which address both the process and product 
of this chapter (Sparkes, 2002).  Considering process, and beyond markers of my sensitivity 
to the data (as noted in the reflexive content in Chapter 3), demonstration of methodological 
coherence (i.e., congruence between philosophical perspective, theoretical position, research 
question, participants, and methods) is a critical measure of quality (Holt & Tamminen, 2010; 
Suddaby, 2006).  Furthermore, and for meeting the objectives of this study (cf. Chapter 1), 
the commitment to operate from precise specification as opposed to general abstraction acted 
to support the practicality of the research product.  Additionally, the rapport established with 
all participants (as evidenced by the length of interviews; the longest being nearly 3.5 hours 
in duration) contributed to the construction of highly detailed, contextually-sensitive findings. 
Regarding the study’s product, the reader is encouraged to apply Corbin and Strauss’ 
(2008) methodology-specific criteria and evaluate the findings’: fit (i.e., do they fit with the 
experiences of professional sports team managers and CM consultants?); applicability (i.e., 
do they offer new insights and develop practice?); concepts (i.e., are they organised around 
concepts and themes which facilitate shared knowledge?) contextualization of concepts (i.e., 
are they contextualised against professional sport performance team challenges?); logic (i.e., 
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do they “make sense” and follow a rational flow?); depth (i.e., do descriptions add richness?); 
variation (i.e., do they contain negative cases and demonstrate complexity?); creativity (i.e., 
are they innovative?); and sensitivity (i.e., are they the product of a data and analysis-driven 
process?).  Upholding a pragmatic research philosophy, the reader may also benefit from 
applying the “so what?” principle described in Chapter 3 (cf. Bryant, 2009); more explicitly, 
what practical difference does the theory make if it does correspond to tangible applied 
artefacts?  In this case, the framework’s status as the first bespoke model of professional sport 
performance team culture change is a significant indicator. 
Addressing Sorge and van Witteloostuijn’s (2004, p. 1222) call for “multidisciplinary 
knowledge integration” (or “synthetic and diligent linking of distinct theories that are general 
and already available”) as well as Suddaby’s (2006) search for combined literature, data, and 
experience as a marker of theoretical sensitivity, the presented model is supported by its 
development from data grounded in professional sports team environments which has been 
consequently integrated with understanding in organisational change, CM, organisational 
behaviour, change sustainability, leader succession, sport psychology, and sports coaching.  
Finally, although the model does not provide a universal account of driving and sustaining 
culture change (as per the defining tenets of grounded theory and pragmatism: Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005; Suddaby, 2006), its’ contextual, social, and power-based 
foundations suggest that it may be a potentially useful framework for incoming managers in 
small to medium size organisations. 
4.4.3. Limitations and The Next Step 
While characterised by many strengths, this study was limited in aspects of design and 
focus.  Due to the adoption of an identical methodological approach in the second study of 
this thesis, design-related constraints are acknowledged in greater detail at the end of the next 
chapter.  Regarding focus, the results of this chapter are limited to the extent that they offer a 
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model of culture change best practice which is specific to the professional sport performance 
environment.  Accordingly, it is unknown to what extent this framework and its underpinning 
features are common to other pertinent, UK-based performance domains; especially, Olympic 
sport performance teams.  Typically running larger programmes as a result of operating on a 
national scale (in terms of performer/staff numbers and/or geographical distribution), work is 
therefore required to explore how optimal cultures are created and sustained in Olympic sport 
settings.  Significantly, the relevance and importance of such research was reinforced by one 
manager interviewed for this chapter who reflected on a parallel comparison between his CM 
experiences in a small (sports team) and large (business) performance-focused organisation: 
One of the difficulties in [comparing my CM experience in a professional sports team 
and business] is . . . [that] I was with a national company . . . so we were changing [n] 
branches up and down the country and [there were] . . . three thousand people . . . 
scattered around . . . . So the challenges of how you roll that out were far greater than 
being in one location.  In the end we had seventeen people eventually working for us 
[whereas at sports team] I think we had [ten staff support members], and . . . a squad 
of . . . forty players.  So that’s not a huge amount of people and being in . . . one 
location meant that most things we did happened almost immediately . . . .  [The] time 
frames [in the large business] were so much longer . . . . [and] there were a lot of other 
tiers of selling and training and planning that had to take place in order to ensure the 
process [was successful] . . . . You had to make sure that the top tier was right, then 
the middle management was right, before you went to where it was really going to 
have the biggest influence; which is obviously the . . . [frontline] staff. (RU1). 
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CHAPTER 5 
DELIVERING CULTURE CHANGE IN OLYMPIC SPORT PERFORMANCE 
TEAMS: A GROUNDED THEORY MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE 
5.1. Introduction 
 In Chapter 4, the optimal culture change process as led by managers of professional 
sport performance teams was presented.  From these findings, it was evident that CM best 
practice in this environment was dependent on successful negotiation of an initial evaluation, 
planning, set-up and impact phase which acted as the vital catalyst for efficient and enduring 
change.  More broadly, and rather than a top-down, checklist-based activity, the delivery of 
change was also found to be an essentially open-ended activity, symbolised by a holistic and 
integrated approach and driven by the constant acquisition, negotiation, and configuration of 
internal and external group perceptions.  Furthermore, and contrary to many organisational-
based models (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 2003; Price & Chahal, 2006), 
this framework was rooted to the contested agency of these stakeholders and therefore power- 
and political-based dynamics.  As such, the identified to and fro of social power between PM 
and all stakeholders pointed to the joint construction and propagation of a new or refined 
team culture.  While these findings provide initial understanding of CM in professional sport 
performance teams, the purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the chronology and nature of 
the parallel CM process (i.e., optimisation of team culture) in traditionally amateur elite sport 
settings; or more specifically, Olympic sport performance teams. 
Reflecting the “no compromise” and outcome-based approach by the UK government 
funding agency, UK Sport (Sam, 2012), and increasing demands of Olympic competition, it 
is crucial that Olympic sports teams possess cultures which support the continual search for 
(and attainment of) peak performance which are also protected from wider organisational 
distractions (e.g., internal politics: Arnold, Fletcher, & Molyneux, 2012).  As the figure with 
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ultimate responsibility for managing the individual, intra-group and inter-group elements of 
Olympic sport performance teams (or at least the one who should be: Collins & Cruickshank, 
2012), the optimisation of team culture is therefore a decisive task for the Olympic sport PD. 
Certainly, while Olympic sport PDs typically deliver little if any “hands on” coaching 
(or at least should not if their role is to avoid becoming “clouded”), their influence on pan-
individual performance (positively, negatively or indifferently) is arguably the most 
significant of any in the national sport organisation’s performance department (i.e., including 
team management, performance-specific administrative staff, support staff and performers) 
apart from personal coaches.  Specifically, by holding responsibility for team policies, 
systems, structures, and processes (at least in an optimum system), the PD’s ambitions, 
actions, and decisions will always, to at least some extent, be reflected in the perceptions, 
preferences, and behaviours of all those lower down the organisational chart. 
Alongside growing awareness of the role of Olympic sport organisations in delivering 
medal success (e.g., Fletcher & Wagstaff, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2012a), focus has recently 
turned to research the underpinnings of PD best practice (Arnold et al., 2012; Fletcher & 
Arnold, 2011).  From work to date, results have suggested that the creation of a team culture 
is dependent on establishing role awareness and creating an organizational and team 
atmosphere (cf. Fletcher & Arnold, 2011).  While providing a first snapshot of the PD-led 
culture change process (albeit pointing to likely incomplete culture change competencies 
rather than comprehensive, expertise-based processes), Fletcher and Arnold have called for 
future research to “focus on how leaders and managers create, optimise and maintain a high 
performance environment” via approaches which facilitate “more lucid, evidence-based 
recommendations [emphasis added]” (p. 237). 
As such, the purpose of this study was to develop a grounded theory of PD-led culture 
change in Olympic sport performance teams.  As well as revealing the chronology and nature 
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of this domain-specific process, particular interest also lay in examining how findings would 
compare and contrast with PM perceptions and processes of elite team CM. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Sampling and Participants 
To enable interaction between data collection and analysis, as required by the iterative 
research process, participants were selected through theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008).  Beyond requiring all participants to have held a PD role at a British Olympic sport in 
the last two Olympic cycles (2004-2012)  - across either individual, team, and individual plus 
team sports - the credibility of findings was further enhanced by setting parameters that the 
final sample must have: (a) experienced varying degrees of success (i.e., short- and long-term 
role survival); (b) been employed by sports with contrasting public profiles (i.e., low to high); 
and (c) been employed by sports which received varying levels of public funding (i.e., low to 
high).  No stipulations were set regarding objective medal success criteria, although such 
statistics did support the selection process.  Institutional ethics approval was obtained to 
sample on these grounds. 
 Data collection occurred over four phases.  Initially, two PDs (both from an individual 
plus team sport) were purposively sampled.  Driven by the analysis of data from this sample, 
in particular the significant constraints placed on PDs by Boards of Directors and UK Sport, 
it was decided that sampling in the second recruitment phase would focus on PDs who had 
experienced particular challenges in dealing with top management and external agencies (one 
from an individual sport; one from a team sport); as informed by my supervisor (a former PD 
of UK Athletics).  Guided by the ongoing analyses’ recognition of “external distractions” 
alongside findings which pointed to the heightened challenges of an impending home Games, 
the third recruitment phase targeted two PDs (both individual plus team sport) who currently 
worked in multi-discipline sports.  As the final data collection phase, and addressing findings 
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which pointed to the significance of media-based challenges, a PD from a high profile sport 
with high public scrutiny was recruited. 
The overall sample included seven PDs: five who had led change in individual plus 
team sports; one in an individual sport; and one in a team sport.  All interviewees were male, 
aged between 47 and 59 (M = 53.00 years, SD = 4.28 years), and had held PD roles for 68 
years in total (M = 9.71 years, SD = 6.26 years).  The shortest and longest tenure’s were 4 
years and 21 years respectively, with average tenure across all managed teams 7.56 years (SD 
= 3.63 years).  Four participants were currently employed in a PD role at the time of 
interview. 
5.2.2. Data Collection 
Data was collected through the same semi-structured interview guide and procedures 
detailed in Chapter 4.  Adhering to an iterative process, follow-up prompts and probes were 
again adjusted between each sampling phase.  For example, after analysing the data from the 
purposive sample, follow-up probes were modified to enable detailed exploration of the role 
and influence of top management structures (particularly UK Sport).  Additionally, after the 
data from the third sampling phase was analysed, follow-up probes were tailored to allow for 
greater discussion on the role of the media in the Olympic team culture change process.  All 
interviews were conducted at locations chosen by the participants and lasted between 110 and 
165 minutes.  Verbatim transcriptions were again analysed using qualitative analysis software 
(QSR NVIVO 9).  Confidentiality was assured and all participants provided informed 
consent. 
5.2.3. Data Analysis 
Data were analysed using the same procedures, processes, and techniques detailed in 
Chapter 4.  Specifically, data were subject to Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) methods of open 
coding, constant comparison, critical self-questioning, axial coding, note taking, memo 
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writing, critical discussion with my supervisors, and initial presentation at an applied sport 
psychology conference (cf. Appendix B).  Saturation was again considered to have been 
achieved when participants provided little new data or explanations of culture change best 
practice (Corbin & Strauss).  Similarly, the developing theory was also refined via theoretical 
integration based on detailed memo writing on concept/category relationships, diagramming, 
and comparison of concepts/categories with extant theories and constructs. 
5.3. Results 
To illuminate optimal PD-led culture change in British Olympic sport performance 
teams, the activity’s main components are presented first before explaining their conceptual 
links in the grounded theory model (Figure 5.1).  As in Chapter 4, results are a combination 
of perceptions of previously successful approaches, views on best practice, and reflections on 
some key “lived” mistakes/lessons. 
Mirroring the findings in Chapter 4, efficient and effective culture change in British 
Olympic sport performance teams was characterised by PDs’ implementation of two related 
yet conceptually distinct activities.  Explicitly, when appointed into the PD role, best practice 
involved an opening phase of initial evaluation, planning, set-up and impact adjoined to the 
management of a holistic, integrated, and dynamic culture optimization system.  Of further 
overlap with Chapter 4’s results, these features were both co-initiated and co-dependent, with 
the initial evaluation, planning, set-up and impact phase acting as the vital platform upon 
which change was optimally delivered.  Crucially, while a high level of accordance was 
found with the results in Chapter 4, the nature and finer components of this grounded theory 
model are nonetheless specific to the unique contexts of British Olympic sport performance 
teams (as shown within the results and, more explicitly, in this chapter’s discussion section).  
A description of the opening CM process - during which the thrust toward management of a 
holistic culture optimisation system was generated - is now provided. 
Chapter 5 
 
103 
 
5.3.1. Initial Evaluation, Planning, Set-Up, and Impact 
5.3.1.1. Gaining an Understanding of the Cultural, Political, and Performance Landscape 
Reflecting the magnitude of the PD-led culture change process, as dictated by the 
need to deliver change on a national scale and in conjunction with a considerable number and 
variety of stakeholders (i.e., upper/lower echelon support staff, performers, governing body 
Boards, UK Sport, the BOA, external partners, the wider sport membership, general public, 
and the media), the importance of gaining an optimal understanding of the sport’s cultural, 
political, and performance landscape was a fundamental initial CM responsibility.  Indeed, 
such analysis acted as the central pivot from which short-, intermediate-, and long-term goals, 
plans, and implementation strategies could be designed, deployed, monitored, and modified: 
I probably just didn’t spend enough time [trying to] understand the . . . environment 
[in prior PD role].  I’d probably made the assumption that the level of performance 
was way, way higher and way more professional than I expected . . . . I’d come in 
from . . . the real cutting edge of high performance sport . . . and if I’m honest with 
you my expectations and the reality of where the sport was at – there was a big 
disconnect you know.  So I probably tried to be way, way too advanced and I didn’t 
spend enough time just understanding what the environment was about.  I think that’s 
something I’ve tried to rectify this time round. (P1) 
Invariably, this exploration of the sport’s history, traditions, resources, competitive contexts, 
governance and staffing network, and relationship with key external agencies (e.g., UK Sport, 
the BOA, Institutes of Sport) involved the acquisition and assimilation of perceptions from a 
spectrum of pertinent internal (i.e., team management, support staff, performers) and external 
(e.g., governing body Board members, top management) stakeholders: 
I talked to people who were employed [team management and support] staff.  I talked 
to people working just within the governing body, committee members.  I spent a lot 
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of time in my car driving around talking to personal coaches . . . . I talked to people 
that were working as partners of the governing body, so I talked to people about their 
perceptions of what [sport] was and I actually did a lot of that work before I decided 
to take on the role anyway . . . . I talked to people about their perceptions about what 
the governing body was about.  I did a lot of background work on the person who 
would be my boss as well, as to how amenable they would be to change, what their 
management style was likely to be . . .  how I would be managed as a person, how 
much freedom I would have to make decisions.  So that was a process . . . that stood 
me in pretty good stead. (PD1) 
While speaking to a variety of stakeholders was undoubtedly important, as reinforced by all 
other PDs, of particular note in this quote is this PD’s focus on developing a pre-appointment 
understanding of the personality and working style of their line manager (i.e., CEO).  Indeed, 
reinforcing a need for detailed awareness of internal and external conditions before officially 
accepting a PD role, another interviewee described the problems of not being provided with a 
precise understanding of the sport’s internal management structures: 
It was clear to me [after appointment] that [parallel director] . . . wanted me to report 
to [him/her], which had been introduced to me [by the CEO] as: “you won’t have any 
problem working with [parallel director]”.  [At the time I said:] “No, I’ll work with 
anybody so long as we can pass comments back and forth”.  Very rapidly it became 
clear that [parallel director] wanted to manage me.  I think [his/her] famous quote 
was: “I’m not quite ready to let you off the leash yet” . . . . That was about three 
months into the job, and I just went – “this is crazy.”  I didn’t know what he/she did 
except that I paid for part of his/her salary . . . [and] that he/she stuck her nose in 
wherever he/she wanted . . . for example I had to keep funding [performer] for a 
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whole year after 2008.  At this point [performer] was doing sweet fuck all.  It didn’t 
work. (PD7) 
As such, as well as unearthing important “factual” information (e.g., funding levels, facilities, 
numbers of supported performers, staff numbers/spread, equipment, etc), the optimal opening 
assessment was also a highly tactical and political process, with certain individuals explicitly 
targeted for initial interaction on the basis of holding influential structural or social positions: 
I talked to lots and lots of different people.  I didn’t agree with everybody but I 
listened.  So . . . I went and met the sort of elder statesmen in the sport . . . . “Give me 
your opinion and tell me what you think I should do” . . . . They were . . . very, very 
powerful, a lot of people listen to them, very loud, fantastic records in terms of 
achieving what they achieved . . . and some very contrasting ideas. (PD7) 
Ensuring political sensitivity “from the off”, this gathering of multi-stakeholder perceptions 
was therefore also an early opportunity for PDs to ease their transition into their environment 
and garner support (or minimise dissent) from those who could significantly influence the 
nature and outcomes of the CM process (even though such elder statesmen/influential figures 
were often ill- or misinformed as to the requirements of optimal performance systems).  
Equally, who the PD chose not to speak to in the opening phases of their tenure could also 
send out a more “subliminal” message as to the intended focus and direction of the ensuing 
programme. 
Beyond developing a picture of the existing Olympic programme, pertinent historical 
events (especially in the relationship between UK Sport, governing body, and the governing 
body’s performance arm), traditional approaches to performance, and the pervading culture, 
initial analysis also included assessment of: the capabilities and potential of  “upper echelon” 
team management/support staff (i.e., those operating at the top-end of the performance: e.g., 
performance managers, technical directors, discipline head coaches) and funded performers; 
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established systems, structures, processes, resources, and facilities; and the internal/external 
social milieu and its “key players” (e.g., powerful team managers/staff, coaches, performers).  
Significantly, a number of PDs reported that this process was best framed by consideration of 
the standards of and opportunities for Olympic medal success (as perpetuated by UK Sport’s 
outcome-based funding model).  Protecting against uncritical application of prior successful 
approaches and the formulation of strategies based on inaccurate or invalid assumptions, this 
breadth and depth of information was vital for optimising the contextual appropriateness and 
therefore likely success of the ensuing culture change programme. 
5.3.1.2. Identifying, Recruiting, and Harnessing Multi-Domain Experts, Allies, and 
Cultural Architects 
Due the inherent scepticism and/or uncertainty surrounding the new PD and their 
programme, and in some cases overt disapproval (especially in sports where the role had not 
previously existed), best practice in the opening CM phase was considered to be reliant on the 
concurrent facilitation of personal and programme support from multi-domain experts (e.g., 
Head of Science and Medicine, expert coaches/performance analysts) and socially influential 
actors who could then act as cultural architects (Railo, 1986).  Reflecting the operational and 
geographical scale of the national PD culture change task (particularly so for non-centralised 
sports), the establishment of a guiding coalition (or as PD3 described it, “my war cabinet”) 
was a critical marker of instant and enduring success: 
I tried to be as non-threatening as possible.  I’ve always been a very opinionated 
person, I don’t think I lost that through that initial six months at all, but I very much 
knew that . . . . I had to develop a relationship with the [Head of the Men’s and 
Women’s Performance Programme] . . . . Without a relationship with those two 
people . . . then I would have been doomed to fail. (PD1) 
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Often adjoined to an immediate reorganisation and/or streamlining of management structures, 
such coalitions also often required the PD to recruit personal and programme allies due to the 
shortcomings of incumbent staff for delivering their intended programme: 
[The appointment of a Head of Science and Medicine] was a watershed, absolutely a 
watershed, not only for the role that he was coming to do, which was to start to drive 
science and medicine and have a much more process driven approach to how we 
looked after our athletes, but it was also I guess some sort of ally for me because that 
wasn’t someone [sport] through and through, it was somebody with good sporting 
experience but wasn’t hung upon the history of [sport]. (PD1) 
Importantly, and rather than “passively” facilitating the desired culture via their adherence to 
the PD’s espoused values and standards, such structurally significant individuals were used to 
actively construct the values, perceptions, and practices of the staff which they oversaw: 
I used performance management [to help deliver my changes] . . . because I couldn’t 
rely on coaches . . . because coaches were all doing their own little thing - “mutter, 
mutter, mutter” - and it just wouldn’t work.  So I had to have some central means of 
people looking down [and] . . . keeping an eye on [coaches] . . . . I used the term: 
asking the hard questions and requiring the hard answers.  So [the performance 
managers would ask:] “what are you doing with your athlete, where are you going, 
what’s the plan, how does it work?”  They [performance managers] were, if you like, 
my agents of change. (PD7) 
While all PDs felt that the crux of their role lay in driving change via developed and deployed 
systems, structures, and process, it was nevertheless widely recognised that key individuals 
within the performer group and lower echelon support staff also had to be instantly engaged 
and their support acquired (or their opposition dampened): 
Chapter 5 
 
108 
 
The primary focus of my work is through the Technical Directors . . . . I don’t tend to 
spend a huge amount of my time talking directly to the athletes themselves.  For me 
I’m . . . driving the system forward not individuals within that system.  Having said 
that . . . only last week I spent a day with one of our best performers because there are 
some people who are incredibly valuable to the programme and, as is the case with a 
lot of Olympic sports [when] looking at medal targets, . . . if you lose a key player 
then you have challenges.  So I would have more of a relationship with some of the 
senior [performers] and we would expect more input from the senior [performers] into 
their programme as well. (PD1) 
Interestingly, social allies and cultural architects at the coach/performer level were not always 
the current top performers or those based at historically successful training locations.  Indeed, 
and highlighting how short-term actions were often (and optimally) delivered against longer-
term agendas - as shaped by the need to (most significantly) peak every four years - one PD 
described how they explicitly targeted a performer (and their coach) who were “bubbling up” 
in their system rather than another who was a multi-World champion but who “caused a lot of 
noise in a negative direction” and whose “career was on the downturn”: 
You probably want to identify the . . . cultural leaders . . . . [The individuals] that you 
anticipate might be receptive but also have some influence.  Finding a dormouse that 
is receptive is not a great deal of help in changing a culture.  Finding a future potential 
world champion, and their coach, who you know are open to new ideas and you think 
will come on a journey with you starts to be very influential because you can make 
some noise around them which is good . . . [The potential World Champion] was 
significantly disenfranchised with what was going on prior to my arrival.  So there 
were some easy runs by making him significant.  He was going to be the team leader 
for some years to come and so making him know that the programme was about him, 
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not that he was second fiddle, was very important.  As one demonstration of that he 
wintered in [country] and I flew out to . . . spend a week with him, to just meet with 
him and listen to his views.  “Wow, no one’s ever come out to . . . see me before” . . . 
. So that was good. (PD4) 
Outside of the performance department, and as alluded to above, one particularly clear point 
made by all PDs – primarily in the form of significant learned lessons – was the need to 
immediately establish (and then sustain) alignment with and support from the  sport’s CEO: 
Making sure you are covered [with your CEO] would be a career lesson for me I think 
. . . . You kind of want a mucker with you and they’re the person, because if they’re 
not with you then they’ll pull the rug out when a big call’s needed . . . . At [prior role] 
I didn’t form that relationship and somebody else did . . . so when a couple of big 
calls came [the CEO didn’t support me] . . . . I have probably learned . . . to make sure 
you have a strong and trusting relationship because ultimately it’s [top management’s] 
direction, they have the power . . . . If you want to take something in a direction they 
don’t want to go they’ve got the influence to stop you. (PD4) 
Finally, and reflecting their ability to shape both internal and external stakeholder perception, 
instantly positive interaction with the media was also revealed to be an important CM factor; 
particularly as a proactive mechanism for dampening inevitable future criticism: 
It was very good to have had journalists on-side [early] because . . . when shit does 
start hitting the fan you can speak to people and that’s pretty helpful . . . [Ultimately] 
they are going to write what they want to write and . . . because it’s their job . . .  [but] 
if you’ve got a relationship they will write about you personally with respect . . . . I 
think as soon as you start being rude or exclusive or prohibitive they’ll remember that 
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and when something goes wrong it becomes about you – “oh he’s an arse” – as 
opposed to – “the programme struggled or the team didn’t perform.” (PD4) 
Notably, and reflecting the constraints and limits in optimising short-term performance when 
appointed shortly before major competition, another PD pointed to the importance of keeping 
the media onside if faced with an inevitably poor first set of results: 
I flew to [major event shortly after appointment] . . . so you couldn’t sort of sit back 
and say well I’ll bring my team in and I’ll do this . . . . You had to take what you had . 
. . . [It was] like waiting for a car crash . . . . I knew we were weak and I knew we 
were under-performing and I had to sit there knowing this was coming but . . . not be 
able to do anything about it . . . . [We underperformed] and I had to . . . explain [to the 
media] why . . . and say: “you’re absolutely right it’s not good enough”.  [The media 
said:] “You agree?”; “of course it’s not good enough, it must change . . . . I know 
where we are, I know we’re poor I know things have got to change.” (PD7) 
5.3.1.3. Facilitating Shared Perceptions and Multi-Stakeholder Support 
As well as enabling support from structurally and socially influential actors, all PDs 
revealed the need to promote broad understanding of their impending programme’s focus and 
goals across all (or as many) corners the performance department’s internal and external 
contexts.  Disseminating pertinent (yet filtered) information via meetings, presentations, and 
media communication to governing body board(s), UK Sport, the BOA, external partners 
(e.g., Institutes of Sport), performance management and support staff, funded and potentially 
future-funded performers, and wider sport membership (e.g., lower-level/recreational 
coaches/performers), this process was key for increasing the chances of the CM programme 
being optimally received and propagated: 
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I think in anything you do in life the first impressions are the most important.  You 
know if you go out for a date with a girl who sits down and farts and burps you are 
pretty turned off before the meal even starts aren’t you . . . . First impressions are 
important and they do in my humble opinion impact on performance . . . . To me that 
applies to everything whether it’s people’s first impressions of the programme or 
arriving at the Olympic Games. (PD6). 
Within the performance department, the value of canvassing and engaging all upper echelon 
team management and support staff in programme design was particularly highlighted: 
It’s about . . . trying to get [upper echelon support staff] all in the same place so they can 
start to be really creative [about the programme vision]; they are not coming in just 
thinking about the here and now . . . . So that when you’ve done it, it’s theirs . . . . It’s not 
about me . . . . They’re meeting all these volunteers and to me that’s really important.  If 
you are trying to shift a culture you have got to get your people to buy into what it is you 
are trying to do or you are not going to go anywhere. (PD5) 
Notably, facilitating shared perceptions and support from the broad performer and coaching 
group was also noted as worthwhile; even if the acquired input was not technically “valid”: 
Engaging people within the design of the strategy is very important . . . . There was a 
core group of athletes and they were obviously key people and then you broaden it a 
bit wider, get a few more people engaged.  The same with coaches, there were some 
key people and then you broaden it a little wider so everyone feels that they’ve had a 
go in there, had an input in there.  They can even respect you if you discard that view 
but you’ve had a view, you’ve had a go. (PD4) 
Interestingly, generating multi-stakeholder support was not always addressed through overt 
dialogue; indeed, symbolic actions could also help to foster collective buy-in and support: 
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Some of [the impression management activities] have obviously got to come through 
as a demonstration; it could be as simple as the next time [that the performers] go on a 
training camp the quality of that training camp is higher than what they’ve seen 
before.   “Wow this is professional!  Oh my god we’re doing some good stuff here, 
look at this!”  In 2002 we brought [high profile former performer from another sport] 
in [to share expertise] - “that’s interesting!” . . . So things like that.  They go – “Jesus, 
this is different!”  Even you could say the quality of the hotel . . . the food is better, 
it’s been thought through and it’s professionally delivered, that was important. (PD4). 
Due to the “noise” and therefore distractions which they could generate in and around 
the performance department, facilitating positive first impressions across governing body 
boards (and, where pertinent, their sub-disciplines) was also particularly impactful: 
I used to go to the [n disciplines’] committee meetings which were every three weeks 
and they would go on for like a day . . . . I’d be there for a whole day and I’d sit 
through the A to Z of the whole discipline, but . . . I’d be kind of engaging and 
interested and understanding, trying to see what was common for all . . . and I think 
that meant quite a lot to people that I was actually doing that . . . . You just try and 
take people with you.  That’s what all that was about really. (PD5) 
Reflecting the importance of government funding, and the consequential pressure exerted on 
performance departments to provide a “return” on this investment, proactive and politically-
sensitive engagement with UK Sport was a further vital initial process: 
The first role I [had] was to write the four-year plan to UK Sport.  It wasn’t a funding 
application . . . but it was a justification of the money we were going to receive . . . . I 
can look back now and think actually the timing of it worked personally particularly 
poorly for me . . . . The plan was in effective a lip-service paper exercise that was 
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required by government . . . that was not the point in time to be making people very, 
very defensive about my input . . . . [So] the [eventual] plan . . . was a conservative 
plan . . . but . . . always with the knowledge that we could . . . be a little more radical 
down the line. (PD1) 
5.3.1.4. Prioritising and Addressing Most Pressing Needs 
Beyond optimising individual and group-wide support (and minimising detrimental 
conflict), interviewees also revealed the importance of instantly addressing the performance 
department’s most pressing needs.  This normally involved early optimisation of internal 
staffing structures and/or its members:  
I was pretty dissatisfied with . . . [the support staff] . . . because we’re not pushing any 
boundaries, we have got to push the boundaries here and we’ve got to find the next 
level not just do what [was being done] . . . ten years ago. I don’t want that, I want 
[support staff] to come in with something new here . . . . There was a physio went . . . 
. I brought somebody in over the top of [current sport scientists] and gave them liberty 
to run some exciting stuff . . . . It was a pretty quick process . . . . There was a little bit 
of pain – “oh they’re people we’ve worked with for a while” - [but] that’s something 
you would describe as a step change, we just changed it. (PD4) 
Beyond system- and structural-level alterations, the need to address political matters was also 
raised; particularly the relationship between PD, the sport’s governing body, and UK Sport: 
The relationship the governing body had with UK Sport as I came in was relatively 
fractious so it almost felt for the first twelve months that I was positioning myself . . . 
in-between UK Sport and the governing body.  So for me there were a lot of bridges 
that needed to be built in that relationship, which is a fairly key relationship when one 
of them is giving you [n] million quid over four years and expecting a result for it . . . 
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. The one thing I wasn’t prepared to do [was] . . . to have anybody managing that 
relationship on my behalf . . . so all the conversations that we have with UK Sport are 
from the ‘horse’s mouth’ conversations. (PD1) 
Indeed, due to the disruption which top-management/external conflicts could have on team 
performance (via their direct or indirect reverberations), smoothing out (as best as possible) 
any pre-existing political differences was a crucial early activity for most PDs: 
I picked up very quickly when I got here that World Class wasn’t wonderfully popular 
amongst the [governing body and sub-disciplines] and the bridges had been broken so 
it was a matter of rebuilding that communication.  Communication is at the heart of 
everything we do, absolutely at the heart of everything we do because of the 
geographic [spread] and the number of people involved. (PD6) 
5.3.1.5. Withholding Initial Action in Sub-Optimal Conditions 
As well as targeting areas for immediate modification and improvement, it was 
notable that interviewees also reported a need to initially refrain from (or delay the delivery 
of) some actions due to their likely negative impact; particularly vital as opening decisions 
and actions could significantly (and often irreversibly) shape a programme’s ultimate focus, 
nature, and success.  Described by many PDs as “picking your battles”, sensitivity to 
stakeholder perceptions, opinions, and power alongside an awareness of “the bigger picture” 
lay at the heart of best practice: 
A problem for me was getting enough time out of the office to be on the ground. . . 
because . . . at the start of the job . . . I was having to manage upwards ridiculously . . . 
to keep [parallel director] off my back . . . . But the [other challenge] was that 
[coaches] didn’t want to talk to the performance managers; they want to talk to me - 
why talk to the monkey when you can talk to the organ grinder.  So to an extent I 
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deliberately wasn’t there.  I’d get round and I’d look and I would also recognise the 
volume of challenge and I’d choose my battles . . . I can do something about this, I 
can have a win here; but there’s not much I can do about this at the moment unless I 
get rid of that bloke or unless we change this or unless, or unless. (PD7) 
Interestingly, beyond actively avoiding some inevitably damaging (or conflict-perpetuating) 
situations, another PD described the need for interpersonally- and politically-sensitive “on-
the-spot” decision making to support attainment of long-term goals: 
When you raise something [to a stakeholder], you might think it’s very important but 
you are gauging what that first response is . . . . If you really kick against it, I’ll 
probably put it back in my pocket.  I might get it out again in a couple of month’s 
time.  I probably still know that we need to go there but what I’m going to find is a 
different way of going there . . . and it’s a long game, yes it is a long game.  [It can 
take] four, five, six years to put together a culture. (PD4) 
5.3.1.6. Facilitating Optimal Immediate Results 
Tying in with all of the above themes, PDs also reported the significance of 
facilitating optimal immediate results; particularly those who were appointed shortly before a 
major event: 
When I arrived . . . [City Olympics] was only [n] months away and it was very clear 
that what I would consider basic logistic details hadn’t been finalised . . . . So aim one 
was [Olympics] - that had to be the focus and for the first few months I said to the 
person . . . running the development programme - “not interested!” . . . [While] there 
[also] wasn’t good communication . . . [and] a positive environment [within the 
programme] . . . . it was clear that that wasn’t going to be fixed by [Olympics]. (PD6) 
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Significantly, while most PDs did not describe the facilitation of initially positive results as a 
major focus of their opening approach, it was commonly perceived that such outcomes did 
(or could) promote a speedier acceptance of and a greater thrust behind fledgling programmes 
(or, conversely, protect against prolonged uncertainty and/or conflict over the new direction): 
At almost exactly the same moment in time as [appointing two new performance 
managers] we had [major event] which were the best [major event] we had ever had.  
I can’t claim to be hugely influential in that but I like to think I played a part . . . and I 
think what that allowed . . . was, whilst the two issues were probably relatively 
unrelated, confidence to see performances were improved at that same time as we 
were making change.  That almost was a green light to continue to make change.  I 
think if those first [major event results] had been poor. . . I may have found that I 
would have been under more pressure. (PD1) 
Indeed, while initial focus was primarily placed on creating a system which could facilitate 
enduring, long-term success, optimising the potential for instant positive results was found to 
give the PD “a much stronger hand . . . [particularly] if there are a lot of question marks” 
(PD3) and facilitate multi-stakeholder support (or minimise resistance): 
Hitting those [n] medals . . . started to make it a little bit easier . . . . We could fall 
back on something; we had achieved . . . . [It] made people who were maybe never 
going to be happy . . . accept us a little bit more. (PD5) 
5.3.2. Management of a Holistic, Integrated, and Dynamic Culture Optimisation System 
The second and most substantial element of optimal PD-led culture change in British 
Olympic sport performance teams was management of a holistic, integrated, and dynamic 
culture optimisation system; built upon a two-way interaction and power-share with internal 
and external stakeholder groups (the components of which were managing multi-stakeholder 
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perceptions and expectations and action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions and actions; 
see Figure 5.1.).  Exemplars of this process are now provided for each identified stakeholder 
group. 
5.3.2.1. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with Upper Echelon Team Management 
and Support Staff 
Reflecting the task’s scale, establishing and sustaining an empowered and “on 
message” support staffing at the performance department’s upper echelons was considered a 
critical CM success factor; particularly as staff self-interest and self-protection was often a 
common challenge as the dust settled from the new PD’s appointment: 
The input [from in-post performance managers on performance plan] was very, very 
limited [and] . . . really didn’t do an awful lot more than rubber stamp what [I] had . . . 
laid out . . . . You can view that in two ways: you can view that as “we’re a hundred 
percent happy with what you’ve laid down.”   It’s unusual if that is the case [as] what 
you tend to find is: “well you’ve written the plan and we are happy to support you, but 
the moment it doesn’t go according to plan we’ll be . . . gunning for you.” (PD1) 
To overcome the programme-detracting influence of self-preservation, particularly prevalent 
in Olympic environments due to the sporadic nature of outcome feedback (i.e., infrequent 
competitions), an inclusive and teamwork-based management style was widely advocated: 
[I would sit] round this table [with my performance managers and ask] “how are we 
going to do this?  The outcomes [i.e., Olympic medal success] are comparatively non-
negotiable . . . . [but] where there is wriggle room is how we are going to do it.  I’m 
thinking we might do this, what do you think?”  Then you would solicit input and . . . 
when people stopped being defensive, when they realised that . . .  I was willing to 
listen to what they said and to take their ideas [they said] “that’s great, let’s do this” . . 
. . Someone commented . . . about three or four months down the line: “you told 
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everybody [idea X] was my idea”.  I said: “yes, it was your idea”.  “[Response:] Yes 
but you [delivered it]”.  I said: “yes, but it was your idea that’s why I give you the 
credit”.  [Response:] “But when I fucked up you called me in and told me, you said 
‘we had’”.  I said: “yes, because that’s the way I am, that’s the way I work.” (PD7) 
Notably, the value of a promoting a united approach was further reinforced by the inherently 
counterproductive interactions which characterised many Olympic sports team settings:  
Within some of the programmes there wasn’t good communication, there wasn’t a 
good basis, there wasn’t a positive environment . . . . It was clear to me . . . there were 
staff having little meetings behind other people’s backs, it wasn’t a cohesive, happy 
environment and [creating a more positive environment] was the primary aim. (PD6) 
With another interviewee acknowledging that “if you are trying to do it just on your own it 
will probably fall apart” (PD2), and reflecting the power and influence which top echelon 
management and  support staff held (via structural position and/or personality), opportunities 
were often sought to select compromised decisions and actions which met all parties needs: 
It was a two-way decision [to redefine the role of the influential national coach], who 
did a fairly good job of masquerading as a Level Four coach: he wanted to move 
[geographically] . . . and we wanted to try some different stuff and it seemed to fit.  I 
was very happy to go along with it because I [also wanted] . . . [him/her to] to be 
[personally] flourishing. . . and then they give. . . what’s beyond the norm. (PD4) 
5.3.2.2. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with Lower Echelon Support Staff 
Akin to the preceding theme, similar interactions with lower echelon support staff 
were also considered vital for efficient and effective culture optimisation.  Interestingly, PDs 
further revealed that two-way communication and power-sharing was also encouraged within 
the staff themselves: 
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To help [top performer] we brought in a [foreign nation] coach . . . but I made it clear 
to . . . [foreign coach that top performer’s] coach is totally in charge: “you are what 
we call ‘adding value’.”  It might do nothing but reinforce [top performer’s coach] in 
what he/she’s doing but sometimes it’s really important for a coach to have another 
one next to him/her saying, “this is good, or you need to add this.”  So we saw it as a 
support mechanism to the coach and that’s been a real success story . . . . We’re 
saying . . . let’s bring them in to help the British coaches, whereas [nation] has got a 
lot of [other nation] coaches and [nation] coaches are gone, they’ve just taken over, so 
that’s not very good. (PD2) 
Indicating how interactions with support staffing were not always such positive or smooth 
processes, however, another PD revealed the need to remain firm in one’s negotiating stance 
to optimally manage the perceptions and expectations of a problematic coach: 
[Lower echelon coach] kept shouting down the phone at me about: “[you’ve] got no 
respect for me, and I can do this, and I can do that, and I can do the other, and you 
should pay me this much” . . . . “Whoa, whoa, whoa, you’re not qualified man, you 
know you have no record, show me you can do it and I will fund you but I am not 
funding you now.  I’ve got to fund things that will give us the success in short order; I 
haven’t got the ability to take flyers on people as coaches”.  It was a very, very much 
a gimme, gimme, gimme culture because that’s how it had been before . . . I had to 
rattle that cage almost single-handedly. (PD7) 
5.3.2.3. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with Performers 
As those on which the PD’s programme was ultimately focused, building and 
sustaining effective two-way relationships with performers was pivotal for both immediate 
and enduring programme success.  However, with most sports only able to select a relatively 
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small number to compete at the Olympics, conflict and tension was a common threat or real 
factor; sometimes rising to extreme levels: 
It got really, really incredibly difficult in [discipline] you know and there were threats 
to me and my family; it was very, very difficult.  But I do understand it because if 
people have put their whole life into something and they really, really believe it, and 
you come along and you say you are going to change it [then] you are going to have 
serious confrontation. (PD5) 
Additionally, the power of performers with long histories in their sport meant that top-down 
direction was (at least as the “routine” approach) neither workable nor effective: 
Some of the top athletes . . . have been doing [sport] for over thirty years you don’t 
just walk in and go – “right you are doing this, this and this now”; they would just tell 
you to fuck off! (PD6) 
Accordingly, it was imperative that PDs (either directly or via established channels) provided 
a continuous stream of information on pertinent actions and decisions which respected athlete 
performance and general well-being, as well as optimising their role clarity (e.g., selection 
and funding standards) and providing a “managed” level of ownership: 
I think [performers] have to have a voice . . . . Whether you ultimately listen to that 
voice [is a different matter] but I think [performers] have to have a voice, they have to 
feel they have a voice, so that’s two-way communications if you like.  So creating 
things like athlete representation, creating the situations where it is about them. (PD4) 
Notably, and reflecting the complexity of the Olympic sport performance environment, this 
two-way communication was often hampered by the interactions of external agencies; 
revealing that power was not something which resided within groups but rather was a product 
of the relative position they held in comparison to others: 
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Funding is an interesting aspect . . . . because [UK Sport] don’t allow you to define a 
team, they talk about athlete places on world class funding . . . . Sometimes it can 
interfere with the process of [performance] review[s] because athletes will clinically 
strive to be on funding as opposed to striving to be the best that they can be:  “I met 
the criteria to be on funding, I’m getting my money” . . . . It clouds the performance 
discussion . . . . “Well, do I have to do [suggested training modification] because I’m 
on the programme?” “No, you have to do that because you want to get better.”  “What 
happens if I don’t do that, will I come off funding?”  “No you’ll go slower.” (PD4) 
Interestingly, while a “safe” power share with performers was the preferred path for all PDs, 
directive and forceful action was again often required at pivotal points of bifurcation: 
I was keeping as much of the politics [with top management] as I could away from the 
coaches and the players. They didn’t need to know anything about that other than, 
“this is the four-year pathway, this is what it looks like on the playing side, this is 
what you will be expected to do, do you want to be part of this or not, because I’m not 
here to negotiate how little you can do.  This is [now] about Olympic [sport] and you 
need to change your mind set.” (PD3) 
5.3.2.4. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Governing Body Board(s) 
Reflecting the clear power held by the governing body boards, PDs revealed the 
importance of two-way relationships with those who oversaw the sport’s ultimate direction.  
Notably, the challenges of engaging in such a process were particularly pertinent in the lead 
up to the London Games: 
When we went to [a 2010 practice event], I got back and one of the chief execs said to 
me: “I haven’t seen you around recently”.  “You know, [practice] event?”  “Oh was 
it.”  This year they all [are asking] . . . . “what’s our role at [practice event]; we 
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haven’t got a role . . . but there are British people [competing] and we’re the chief 
executives of British [sport]”.  Well who gives a fuck, you know!  And: “are we going 
to be accredited for the London Olympic Games because . . . blah, blah, blah.” (PD6) 
As the standard premier point of contact with the Board, the PD relationship with their sport’s 
CEO(s) was crucial for preventing such interference impacting on performance; with optimal 
benefits found from establishing and maintaining a to and fro communication channel: 
I used to talk to [CEO] quite a lot and say, “I’m thinking of this, I’m thinking of that, 
what do you think, how do you think that will go?” . . . . I don’t know if I’d say daily 
but it wouldn’t have been far off, just end of the day call up – “I’ve been doing this 
today what do you think?  Anything for me? What are you hearing around the place?” 
. . . . To start with you are in shared power I think . . . [and] so long as you include 
somebody as you go along then they stay in shared power and respect you if you have 
a difference of opinion, or a different opinion. (PD4) 
Indeed, one PD recounted that the CEO-enforced cessation of such two-way interactions was 
a particularly significant marker in their programme’s eventual termination: 
I think [I managed] upwards went quite well until [the appointment of a new CEO] 
and then I was excluded from the Board . . . . The excuse was – “oh you’ve got too 
many other things to do” - but it was really [that they were planning to recruit a new 
PD]!  I should at the time have insisted [on staying involved and continuing to deliver 
bi-monthly reports to the Board]. (PD7) 
5.3.2.5. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with UK Sport 
As the most significant actual or potential funder of Olympic sport programmes, the 
need for effective two-way interactions between PD and UK Sport was imperative if 
enduring high performance was to be actualised.  Interestingly, one PD who felt that “UK 
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Sport became a bank manager” rather than support agency revealed how this stakeholder’s 
continued evolution toward an active-directive agent had significantly changed the face of the 
PD role: 
There’s a change point in my experience . . . in that the winning arguably became 
about me [hitting medal targets/meeting funding requirements] . . . . There became 
lots of processes: “this is what you’ve got to do, we need the athletes doing this” . . . . 
[and the role] became about satisfying [UK Sport’s] programme . . . . If they accept 
that I genuinely want my team to succeed, their role is to help me and support me; 
guide me for sure, nudge me occasionally, but not simply to measure me.  I don’t 
need measuring, I can see the score board . . . . We became about process and 
answering to the bank manager rather than a mutual coaching process . . . . In the end 
that’s probably why I left. (PD4) 
With a more recently incumbent PD stating that “UK Sport decided that it was going to be 
more than a bank . . . [and] would like us [all] to have this big system . . . like cycling” (PD7), 
the challenge of tempering this body’s preoccupation with objective success over the sport-
specific, process-based nuances of Olympic competition was a major hurdle for establishing 
and sustaining performance-focused success cultures: 
[UK Sport] have brought in this stretch target now which I don’t actually agree with.  
So ours is like [n1] to [n2].  I would never agree to [n2] . . . . because when they 
announce this in June [2012] I just think the press will look at the . . . [n2] – and 
maybe we’ll hit [n1].  Fantastic, how good is that.  “Ah, but you didn’t hit your target, 
you know” . . . . . It’s just focusing on the wrong thing - you don’t go in focusing on 
medals and targets.  It’s about your process isn’t it?  It’s about being the best you can 
and doing everything you can in your process.  You go in there thinking about medals 
and . . . you are just going to tie yourself up in knots and likely under-achieve. (PD5) 
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Indeed, the strict outcome orientation of UK Sport was also major personal drain on the PD 
(ironic in that the PD was a key individual who this agency was investing in to perform at 
their best and optimise the chances of medal success!): 
[At] Athens [Olympic Games] we had n1 finalists, [at] Beijing we had [>n1]: that’s a 
massive change . . . [However] the first comment . . . [from UK Sport Representative] 
was “oh, you didn’t get a medal”; it’s all negative. It wasn’t ‘til I . . . shoved [a table 
of comparisons] up his nose he suddenly went, “geez you’ve done pretty good” . . . It 
shouldn’t be like that, these people need to understand and they don’t; because if 
there’s no medal they think it was no good, and that was really frustrating.  I was 
actually quite buzzing [after Beijing] . . . what a stepping stone for London! . . . Then 
I come home and deal with some of these xxxx’s and you’re just deflated . . . . So it’s 
very important to just keep everything in perspective and not always measure it on the 
outcome, that’s why it’s not called outcome director!  The day it is I won’t be turning 
up. (PD2) 
As such, two-way interaction with UK Sport was portrayed as highly political process, with 
PDs focused on proactively conveying alignment with the agency’s principles and practices, 
educating their representative(s) on the sport’s nuances, explaining and justifying actions and 
decision making, promoting performance successes, integrating representatives in work and 
social activities, and rationalising outcomes against the bigger picture.  Indeed, rather than the 
more transparent relationships which PDs held with their performance management team, the 
nature of interactions with UK were fundamentally more guarded: 
You are conscious that they are your funder so you are playing a little bit of a game to 
make sure that you get your money . . . . It’s rather like write down four strengths and 
write down two weaknesses.  Well, we’re not really going to tell you the weaknesses 
we are going to tell you the things we can improve.  We are not going to tell you we 
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are crap at them or that we really stuffed up.  We are going to tell you, here are some 
areas for improvement, and it’s going to be like that positive school report.  We can’t 
say that we stuffed up. (PD4) 
5.3.2.6. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the BOA 
As the body with responsibility for organising and delivering Team GB, the BOA was 
found to be another key stakeholder group who could influence culture change delivery both 
directly and, through the performance-irrelevant “noise” which it sometimes generated, 
indirectly: 
[BOA Chairperson] wants the BOA’s role in sport to be far greater than it is and] . . . 
would see UK Sport purely as an agency that hands out the cheques and that the BOA 
becomes the elite sporting leadership in the country . . . . It [was] interesting to see 
that during Beijing . . . [of the] three-hundred-odd press releases from the BOA . . . 
only two mentioned UK Sport funding.  I mean that’s just childish.  The holding 
camps this year, the practice camps prior to 2012 were paid for through UK Sport 
funding and so . . . this churlish little battle between [BOA Chairperson] and [UK 
Sport Chairperson] does nobody any favours at all. (PD6) 
As well as working to minimise the impact of such distraction on the staff and performers in 
the performance department, PDs also noted that a healthy direct relationship with the BOA 
was a key feature of the PD culture change process; a challenge again heightened ahead of a 
home Games where stakeholder self-interest and self-promotion was often at large: 
[BOA Director] . . . was dreadful.  He said: “I’m not going to go to any athletes 
without your permission”.  He then went and talked to [performer] and set stuff up.  
He was just awful.  He was an ignorant, lying cheat . . . . He was trying to promote his 
own system: “you should be training like this and I’ve got my own group and can help 
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you and they are much better”.  That’s what he was trying to do at all sports and none 
of the sports signed up to it so he had no toys so he was very unhappy. (PD7) 
Similar to preceding quotes which exemplified the need to proactively acquire and sustain the 
support of UK Sport, the impact of not having an optimal two-way relationship with the BOA 
often only came to light at times of major significance: 
We had an . . . absolutely critical catastrophe where in team selection for [Olympics] 
we had an athlete who was coming back from injury, didn’t race in a . . . selection 
race, the other athletes didn’t perform to the standard . . . and I made a very, very bold 
decision . . . as Chairman of Selection to pick the athlete who was just coming back 
from injury . . . . I put some [performance] markers in . . . [which returning performer] 
didn’t achieve . . . and [so] I had the conversation [to say they couldn’t be selected] . . 
. and there were tears and whatever.  When I phoned the . . . BOA to say “right, here’s 
where we are, I need you to make that change,” they wouldn’t do it.  Then you go – 
oh shit! . . . “You are stopping me delivering on what I’ve said and what I’ve said is 
not contrary really to . . . any over-riding rule” . . . . Then I’m a lame duck and I might 
as well walk out now, actually I probably should have done. (PD4) 
5.3.2.7. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with External Partners 
With the dependency of peak athletic performance on available and quality 
medical/sport science support, national Institutes of Sport were the main external partners 
which PDs described as requiring two-way interactions with.  Indeed, while in this case the 
PD held particular power as “the customer”, the need to positively engage with these 
stakeholders and create/sustain shared expectations was deemed valuable to optimise the 
provision of committed and tailored support: 
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When you go in [to the Institute] somebody explains that this is the services that we 
supply, and my first question is – “do I have to use the people here?  I might want to 
go to [country] and get somebody on the technology side . . . . Or if I’m not happy 
with the two sites that you are offering me I might want to go some place else” . . . .  
So you know that’s a difficult question for them because they’ve got people 
employed, they’ve got a network and . . . I went in and we had a good chat about 
things. (PD3) 
Significantly, however, and echoing previous quotes which have purported the need for dark 
side leadership activities if an optimal programme is to be delivered, the same PD also 
discussed the difficulties with a member of Institute staff who was working to their own 
agenda: 
We had a few issues with some of the people who were running [the performance 
lifestyle] support . . . because for me they’re a pain in the arse because all the time 
they’re trying to get our athletes on college courses and this is core time.  “These guys 
need to train, the Olympics is here, stop fucking off with them” . . . . It’s as hard as 
that because all the time I knew [nation] were training here and doing this and we 
were fannying around giving them this and this to do. (PD3). 
Resonating with this point, another PD felt that they could have perhaps been more ruthless 
in their negotiations with the Institute with respect to the power which they held: 
I think the management to EIS was always a challenge . . . . All of a sudden I said “I 
don’t want to be there any more, I don’t want to be in [region] any more.”  “Oh what 
will we do with our Centre?” “I don’t fucking care, I don’t want a centre there, I don’t 
want it, I don’t need it, you know, it’s not helping.  I don’t want the service done like 
this because a service done like this is not the way I want it done.”  That created all 
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sorts of difficulties for them . . . . What I should have done I think was to have been 
even more bloody . . . . instead of being [as I was] slightly more corporate and going – 
“well ok, we can adjust this and do that.” (PD7) 
For one particular sport, the need to effectively respect, engage with, and respond to partners 
who provided key resources but received no financial payment for these meant that particular 
attention had to be directed toward the quality of interpersonal relationships: 
It’s about creating that environment again where people want to be part of Team GB.  
Now, whether that’s giving [external partners] free clothing . . . or taking them out to 
dinner occasionally, or giving them montages of [supported performance successes], 
that’s our life, it’s all about creating this environment where people want to be part of 
the team.  You can’t force them. (PD6) 
5.3.2.8. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with the Media 
While more of a concern for the PDs of higher profile sports, the challenge of media 
power and influence – particularly ahead of and during a home Games – was nonetheless 
well recognised by all PDs: 
One of the things that we suffer from in this country is the media.  It annoys me to the 
point of fury this: “the public has a right to know but we the media will decide what 
they know and how it’s put across to them” . . . . Radio and TV I don’t have too much 
an issue about because you get an opportunity to put your side [across] . . . but when 
you come to the written media they say: “oh, it’s the public’s right . . . of access to 
these funded athletes” . . . . Then what they actually write is their opinion of what they 
thought the facts to be and you get no recourse. (PD6) 
Indeed, with some sections of the media pursuing their own and often sensationalist agendas, 
the threat of “the media pack mentality” was salient and could provide a major distraction to 
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both the PD and the performance department.  Recognising that this “problem” could not be 
simply ignored, PDs noted the benefits of proactively addressing media needs (within limits) 
by providing a level of quality access to themselves and the sport’s performers; for example, 
via forums at training venues and self-organised events at major home competitions: 
We’ve very much changed our approach . . . from being reactive . . . to a lot more 
engaging with the media . . . . We are trying to build a level of expectation around 
what we are trying to do [as] we are a membership-based organisation so we want to 
be perceived to be in a good light . . . . At recent [major event] we ran a media day 
and . . . . it allowed us to build up relationships with journalists so I think we actively 
have a lot of people who are on our side now . . . . Ultimately we want to develop the 
sport in the eye of the media.  We want greater exposure, we want more members into 
the sport . . . and give the sport a legacy as well.  So we are mindful of that. (PD1) 
As indicated  by this PD, the merits of engaging with the media and developing useful two-
way relationships was not primarily for the purpose of optimising the perceptions of specific 
journalists or reporters per se but rather to the stakeholders who their perception and opinion 
was disseminated to: 
Ultimately, why do you speak to journalists?  Because you want to get them on board 
[and] if they think I’m respectful of them then they might listen to what I want to say . 
. . . The bigger story [for me] was getting [sport] out to the public so that people knew 
who it was and if the sport grew we’d get more money.  Whether I thought about it 
that crassly, I probably did frankly! (PD4) 
Indeed, reflecting the geographical, operational and political challenges which characterised 
many sports, the ability to use the media to send rapid and repeated messages to particular 
individuals and groups was considered a particularly beneficial culture change mechanism: 
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The written media got better . . . as I stopped answering questions and started using 
them, and it got better as I got a good press officer . . . . It [the press officer] was a 
means to send messages up, out and down, at the same time as it was a means to stop 
them shooting because there was a very vociferous and negative press. (PD7) 
5.3.2.9. Two-Way Interaction and Power-Share with Other Significant Influences 
As a team operated within its own unique contexts (as shaped by the sport’s bespoke 
history, traditions, staffing), an array of other significant external groups were found to shape 
the culture change process; most commonly, the sport’s wider (i.e., non-performance) 
membership, influential ex-performers/coaches, and (an outcome-focused) general public.  
While such groups did not posses as direct a line to the performance department as others 
(e.g., UK Sport), or the same level of influence, the social complexity of the performance 
department (as governed by the multi-agency and -interaction of variously motivated 
internal/external stakeholders) meant that their perceptions and actions could nonetheless 
trigger eventual critical shifts in the way in which team culture was generated and sustained.  
For instance, one PD discussed how they used internal media channels to optimise the 
perceptions of the sport’s wider membership:  
We have a internal magazine [sent to the whole membership] and . . . I’ve written a 
couple of articles in there in effect explaining myself, my background, and again what 
I bring to the role and what my role is . . . . I think it’s just getting the message across 
to a wider membership as well just to manage expectations if anything about what I 
am, what I can do, and very clearly what the team’s focus is as well.  Because there is 
always the dilemma in Olympic sport that performance tends to be hugely resource 
intensive, so you spend a lot of cash on a very small group of [performers], and I 
suppose you do have to go through the process of making some justification for that, 
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particularly as it’s either public money . . . or membership money which is paid for 
directly by the people who are paying their subs every month. (PD1) 
Additionally, being politically savvy over the impact of decisions and actions on those who 
had interests in performer training (e.g., owners/backers of specific training facilities/events) 
was highlighted by another PD as a particularly pertinent task: 
[I was] very, very, overt [with] “this is why we are doing what we are doing” to 
everybody; to [influential ex-performer] . . . to [influential ex-performer] . . . to 
[influential ex-performer] . . . . But [my conversations were] always starting with: 
“look you’ve been very good, what do you think?” (PD7). 
5.3.3. A Grounded Theory: Culture Change in Olympic Sport Performance Teams 
The grounded theory of PD-led culture change in Olympic sport performance teams is 
presented in Figure 5.1.  Initially, to optimise the probability of delivering a programme 
which was consistent with, sensitive to, and exploitative of the sport’s historical, 
psychosocial, and competitive contexts, best practice was found to centre upon the 
acquisition and assimilation of information on the sport’s cultural, political, and performance 
landscapes.  Reflecting the geographical, operational, and political challenges of leading a 
national sports team, and the prevalence of numerous and significant external agencies and 
pressures (e.g., governing body Boards, UK Sport, the BOA, external partners, the wider 
membership, media) this opening evaluation was paired with the need to: identify, recruit, 
and harness multi-domain experts, allies, and cultural architects; and facilitate shared 
perceptions and broad stakeholder support.  To further optimise internal and external respect, 
trust, and confidence in the PD’s impending long-term programme (and minimise the 
prevalence and impact of the inevitable opposition and/or resistance which change courts), 
invaluable psychosocial momentum was also best generated through prioritising and 
addressing the existing system’s most pressing needs (i.e., delivering “quick wins”), 
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withholding from initial action in sub-optimal conditions (i.e., “picking your battles”), and 
facilitating optimal immediate results. 
In terms of its main and enduring component (management of a holistic, dynamic, and 
integrated culture optimization system), the figure shows that culture change was reliant on 
establishing and upholding shared values, standards, and practices within the performance 
department but also on protecting this “cultural bubble” (cf. circle around team management, 
support staff, performers) from external noise.  Due to the nonlinear and negotiated nature of 
social interactions, optimal change therefore involved the continuous attainment, integration, 
and management of (a) the oscillating perceptions and opinions of team management, support 
staff, and performers, and (b) the oscillating perceptions and opinions of groups/individuals 
who could indirectly strengthen or alter the developing and/or established team culture (i.e., 
governing body Board(s), UK Sport, the BOA, external partners, the media, other significant 
influences).  Rather than a step-by-step, top-down, prescriptive process, the presented model 
is underpinned by the complexity and contested nature of Olympic performance team settings 
and therefore promotes a 360-degree perspective to the optimal establishment, propagation, 
and perpetuation of high performing values, beliefs, expectations, and behaviours. 
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Figure 5.1. 
A Grounded Theory Model of Manager-Led Culture Change Best Practice in Olympic Sport 
Performance Teams11 
  
                                                 
11
 As per the tenets of grounded theory methodology (cf. Corbin & Strauss, 2008), this model is a representation 
of the analysed data from this specific study (NB. predicted interactions between non- team management groups 
are therefore not depicted; cf. future research directions in Chapter 10) 
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Note. S-S-Ps: Performance department systems, structures, and processes 
Initial Evaluation, Planning, Set-Up, & Impact 
- Gaining an understanding of the cultural, political, and performance landscape 
- Identifying, recruiting, and harnessing multi-domain experts, allies, and cultural architects 
- Facilitating shared perceptions and multi-stakeholder support 
- Prioritising and addressing most pressing needs 
- Withholding initial action in sub-optimal conditions 
- Facilitating optimal immediate results 
 
Management of a Holistic, Integrated, and Dynamic Culture Optimisation System 
- Managing multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations 
- Action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions and actions 
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5.4. Discussion 
5.4.1. Convergence with Professional Sport Performance Team Manager-Led Culture 
Change 
The presented model of optimal PD-led culture change in Olympic sport performance 
teams shows significant overlap with that delivered by PMs.  Primarily, greatest equivalence 
with PM perceptions was found in the materialisation of a general two-pronged CM process 
(i.e., initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact; management of a holistic, integrated, 
and dynamic culture optimization system).  Akin to the results of the PM study, this PD-led 
framework was also rooted in the contested power, agency, and interaction of internal and 
external stakeholders and therefore built on the continual attainment, negotiation, and 
configuration of multi-stakeholder perceptions.  Again, such an approach promoted a tight fit 
between the established cultural bubble and the sport’s stable and shifting macro (e.g., history 
and traditions), meso (e.g., funding), and micro (e.g., stakeholder perception) contexts. 
 Significantly, the results in this chapter provide support for Chapter 4’s bespoke CM 
findings.  Explicitly, the importance of withholding initial action in sub-optimal conditions is 
reinforced through its occurrence and perceived utility in PD-led culture change.  Indeed, the 
ability to generate change readiness (e.g., harnessing experts, allies, and cultural architects; 
facilitating shared perceptions and multi-stakeholder support) and refrain from/delay actions 
in which immediate risks outweighed long-term rewards was an early critical success factor.  
As such, rather than administering a generic, prescriptive, step-by-step process, best practice 
was again characterised by the manager’s ability to make decisions and select actions which 
were carefully measured against short-, intermediate, and long-term nested agendas. 
 Contradicting the predominantly linear frameworks of CM in organisational literature 
(e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 2003; Price & Chahal, 2006), the findings in 
this chapter further align with the PM-based model in terms of their treatment of both change 
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and continuity (Graetz & Smith, 2010; Pettigrew et al., 2001).  Indeed, the PD-led culture 
change process also had no designated “end point” and depicted the optimisation of team 
culture as a boundless pursuit.  Accordingly, further support is provided for Brännmark and 
Benn’s (2012) identification of stakeholder interest balance as a requisite for sustaining 
change, with new values, standards, and practices constantly and consistently modified and 
reinforced (rather than being the “final steps” as in Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Schein, 
2004). 
 Finally, the findings in this chapter add further weight to the role and significance of 
political- and power-based dynamics in elite team culture change.  Again, the incorporation 
of a to and fro of power between PD and an array of internal and external stakeholders points 
to the context-specificity of elite team culture change and reveals that optimal management 
action is continually sensitive to and exploitative of the dynamic and layered interactions 
between multiple stakeholders with multiple interests and agendas. 
5.4.2. Divergence From Professional Sport Performance Team Manager-Led Culture 
Change 
 While many similarities are found between this chapter’s results and those revealed 
from the PM study, it is important to recognise that a number of clear but subtle differences 
also appeared.  Reflecting the context-specific nature of culture change, as accounted for in 
both models, these points of difference were underpinned by the bespoke cultural, political, 
and psychosocial conditions which surrounded change programme delivery. 
 Considering the initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact phase first, PDs were 
found to engage with gaining an understanding of the cultural, political, and performance 
landscape as compared to the PMs and their parallel investigative processes of evaluating fit 
with the club and Board and evaluating the performance department.  In this case, the lack of 
a parallel theme to the PMs’ evaluating fit with the club and Board perhaps reflects the fact 
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that there are fewer opportunities to become a PD than there are to become a PM (as dictated 
by the smaller population of PD roles and the typically longer life expectancy) and therefore 
an acceptance to work under prevailing conditions rather than finding prevailing conditions to 
work under.  Returning to the CM process, part of the variation in the focus and nature of the 
initial investigation phase would also appear to be governed by differential constraints on the 
PMs and PDs for changing the composition of the groups which they oversee.  Indeed, PDs 
cannot buy new performers and thereby must focus on developing systems which consistently 
produce high performing athletes/teams (hence the need to “gain an understanding” rather 
than “evaluate” against ideal types).  Similarly, the PD emphasis on gaining awareness of the 
political landscape reflects greater complexity amongst the agencies which exert top-down 
influence on performance (i.e., governing body Board(s), UK Sport, and the BOA). 
 Of further note is the variation between PD efforts on facilitating shared perceptions 
and multi-stakeholder support and PM attention on setting and aligning multi-stakeholder 
perceptions and expectations.  Specifically, with the pressure to deliver results concentrated 
around a relatively small number of events for the PD (e.g., European championships, World 
championships, Olympic Games), as opposed to weekly matches in professional sport, more 
time could be devoted to facilitating a shared outlook and support than the equivalent task’s 
immediacy for PMs (reflected in the emphasis on setting rather than facilitating perceptions).  
Indeed, one PD (individual plus team sport) interviewed for this study reflected: 
We have [major event] and [major event] every six months so I’m probably being 
judged every six months, maybe not in the same way as people in other sports are and 
certainly not in the way that people in pro-sports where they are playing football 
matches or rugby matches every week are. (PD1) 
Potentially further accounting for the difference in the PDs’ facilitating and PMs’ setting of 
perceptions and expectation, the “one position removed” nature of the PD role (i.e., managing 
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from a different site/non-coaching responsibilities) paired with this domain’s geographical, 
operational, and political challenges meant that delivering an immediate widespread impact 
(by addressing all performers/support staff at once) was rarely if ever an option.  Another 
factor may also lie in support staff and performer expectancy.  Specifically, with professional 
team support staff and performers usually working/interacting with their manager on a daily 
basis and Olympic team support staff/performers working/interacting with their PD on fewer 
(if any) occasions, it could be logically assumed that the natural performance structure of 
each domain generates different assumptions on a manager’s role and therefore how these 
figures “take people with them”.  In short, and as conveyed by the two models, with PDs’ 
physically, structurally, and socially further away from performers and (lower echelon) 
support staff than PMs, there is therefore a need for these individuals to deliver actions and 
decisions which allow them to (generally) lead “from above” rather than (generally) lead 
“from the front/behind”.  In this manner, the models also suggest that targets of change in 
Olympic sport tend to experience change through PD systems, structures, and processes, 
whereas targets of change in professional sport tend to experience change with PM systems, 
structures, and processes. 
 Interestingly, one element of the PD framework which shared no clear parallel with 
the PM model was prioritising and addressing most pressing needs.  Perhaps reflecting the 
PD’s primary focus on systems, structures, and external politics as opposed to PMs’ focus on 
delivering instant results (as per the high sacking rate and opportunities for weekly appraisal), 
this feature was also conceivably a product of the need to “show” change in an environment 
where the most significant marker (i.e., results) was a largely infrequent source of feedback.  
Indeed, this greater allocation of attention and resources on improving systems, structures, 
and processes, plus the longer time frames in which such changes would bear fruit, may also 
account for the identification, recruitment, and harnessing of domain experts (as well as 
Chapter 5 
 
138 
 
social allies/cultural architects) and subtle difference between the PD’s facilitation of optimal 
immediate results against the PM’s more critical need to deliver optimal immediate results. 
 Regarding the main component of the PD-led culture change model (i.e., management 
of a holistic, integrated, and dynamic culture optimisation system), two areas present notable 
divergence from the PM model discovered in Chapter 4.  First, and as highlighted above, due 
to the geographical, operational, and political challenges of delivering Olympic performance 
team culture change, PDs worked through their upper echelon team management and support 
staff to a greater extent than the PMs.  Second, and considering external stakeholders, the 
groups implicated in PD-led culture change clearly varied from those reported in Chapter 4, 
but more importantly, so did the nature of their connecting relationships.  In particular, the 
heightened social and political complexity of the environment “above” the PD offered a key 
contrast with the PM model; requiring PDs to often place proportionally more attention, 
resources, and effort on managing upwards than PMs.  Conversely, however, media scrutiny 
was markedly less for most (but not all) PDs and, as such, required less attention, resources, 
and effort.  Nonetheless, it is intriguing to note that effective management and use of the 
media was a valuable change mechanism for both. 
5.4.3. Limitations and The Next Step 
 Although the studies of this chapter and Chapter 4 possessed many strengths (e.g., a 
high level of access to high-level and hitherto elusive participants; methodological coherence: 
Holt & Tamminen, 2010; Suddaby, 2006; a focus on precise specification rather than general 
abstraction: du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012), some features of design limit the results.  Primarily, 
as questions in the interview guide were not framed in specific time blocks, the credibility of 
data may have been mediated by inaccurate recall, hindsight bias, and self-preservation biases 
(Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008; Coolican, 2004).  In addition, by only interviewing the 
leaders of change, the extent to which the targets of change (i.e., team management/support 
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staff/performers) and influential external groups (e.g., CEO and Board) jointly perceived the 
reported CM processes (i.e., did managers deliver what they said?), viewed them as impactful 
(i.e., did they work?), and, most pertinently for elite sport, considered them to have supported 
consistent high performance (i.e., did it make a difference?) is uncertain.  Retaining a pursuit 
for optimal theoretical and applied knowledge, Chapter 6 now describes a case study which 
explores elite team CM from a 360 degree perspective and explains its evolution and critical 
success factors through a framework which accounts for the complex and contested nature of 
multi-stakeholder change environments.  Indeed, the need for such an approach was also 
spontaneously acknowledged by one of the interviewed PDs: 
I feel fairly happy with what’s happened but I’m sure . . . other people who are 
looking at you delivering it, they might see things differently – “oh he should have 
done that” – and that makes sense.  I’m sure the coaches would say: “yeah, but I 
didn’t like what he did here though . . . . I wish he’d done this stuff” . . . .  So coaches 
would always be good ones to ask because I think they appreciate the changes and 
where they’re going and what they’re doing. (PD2) 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CULTURE CHANGE IN A PROFESSIONAL SPORT PERFORMANCE TEAM: 
EXPLORING SUCCESSFUL CHANGE THROUGH MULTI-STAKEHOLDER 
PERSPECTIVES AND DECENTRED THEORY 
6.1. Introduction 
 In Chapters 4 and 5 the first grounded theory models of elite sport performance team 
culture change were developed in specific relation to professional and Olympic sport settings.  
Notably, these models shared many common features in terms of their chronology, with both 
frameworks pointing to CM processes in which success was facilitated by a critical transition, 
integration, and impact phase adjoined to an incessant multi-directional management system.  
Indeed, rather than top-down imposition, culture change was found to have its foundations in 
the contested interests, power, and agency of internal and external stakeholders.  Intriguingly, 
a two-way interaction and power-share between manager and key stakeholders was therefore 
necessitated in order to ensure that the process and content of change was at all times rooted 
to and exploitative of stakeholder-based micropolitics.  By only interviewing the leaders of 
elite sport performance teams, however, Chapters 4 and 5 have offered an incomplete picture 
on the nuances and implications of this to and fro element; indeed, the constraints of single-
voice accounts are clear when CM is depicted as a process of “tensions, backstage behaviours 
and conflicts” (Buchanan & Dawson, 2007, p. 672).  Moreover, by exploring PM perceptions 
across a number of prior roles (therefore compromising data specificity) and not framing PM 
and PD interview questions against distinct critical moments and phases, the accurateness of 
the acquired data and usefulness of the presented models is, presumably, limited. 
 In light of these limits, the purposes of this study were to: (a) explore and substantiate 
success factors of time-locked, management-led change from a 360-degree perspective; (b) 
illuminate processes by which the two-way interaction and power share elements of the prior 
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presented models (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) were managed in a case of successful CM; and (c) 
operationalise and evaluate the utility of decentred theory as an explanatory framework for 
elite sport performance team CM research. 
6.2. Rationalising the Importation of Decentred Theory 
Recalling that the work programme of this thesis was structured in a way which met 
pragmatic conditions for an iterative process (both within and across studies) and focused on 
the evolution and accumulation of knowledge (cf. Chapter 3; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Giacobbi et al., 2005), this chapter aimed to extend developing understanding of elite 
performance team culture change (i.e., the findings of Chapters 4 and 5) by examining CM 
through a pre-existing theoretical framework; namely, decentred theory.  Significantly, 
however, rather than using this approach as a foundation for study (i.e., to guide data 
collection as well as analysis) – which could uncritically force sport-specific data into 
unsuitable concepts and categories, decentred theory was deployed only post hoc as an 
interpretive lens.  Adhering to pragmatic principles (Giacobbi et al. 2005), this decision was 
primarily made with respect to the stage of inquiry; specifically, as Chapters 4 and 5 
presented the first insights on elite team culture change and no multi-stakeholder work had 
been conducted (either in this thesis or in the literature), the evidence base was not sufficient 
to justify full assessment of the decentred approach.  Nonetheless, and as shown in Figure 
6.1, this framework was applied to: (a) corroborate and extend results from prior chapters; (b) 
offer alternative accounts of culture change best practice; and (c) support methodological 
decisions (in this case, data analysis procedures) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
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Figure 6.1 
Graphic Representation of Decentred Theory Application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recently embraced by sports policy researchers (Grix, 2010; Goodwin & Grix, 2011; 
Lindsey & Grattan, 2012) and further identified by sport psychology as an interpretive tool 
for elite team culture change (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a; Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b), 
decentred theory originates from work on the UK’s shift from central governmental power in 
policy creation and delivery to governance through distributed networks (Bevir & Richards, 
2009a, Bevir, 2003).  Devised as an anti-foundational alternative to prior positivist-dominated 
literature, decentred theory is based on the assumption that governance arises dynamically via 
bottom-up processes rather than linearly via institutional or structural imposition (Bevir & 
Richards, 2009a, Bevir, 2003) and views social constructions (or, in the case of this thesis, 
high performing cultures) as “complex and continuous process of interpretation, conflict and 
activity that produces ever-changing patterns of rule” (Bevir & Richards, 2009a, p. 7).  Offset 
from prior investigation under foundational epistemologies, the decentred approach reinstated 
individuals to the prevalent “agentless” accounts (Grix, 2010, p. 161) and portrays network 
members as divergent situated agents: i.e., not passive actors but instead individuals who act 
and reason in a novel manner within the contexts in which they operate (Bevir & Richards, 
2009a).  Rejecting top-down and uncontested conceptualisations of change, social reform is 
therefore depicted as a “chaotic picture of multiple actors, creating a contingent pattern of 
rule through their conflicting actions” (Bevir & Richards, 2009a, p. 7). 
Data Collection Data Analysis 
Decentred Theory 
Results 
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On examining decentred theory’s underpinning tenets, a close match is found with the 
contexts and needs of elite team culture change study.  Developmentally, decentred theory’s 
move to investigate and explain how governance networks (i.e., parallel of high performing 
cultures) are constructed over their traits or outcomes (i.e., parallel of group dynamics work 
in sport psychology: cf. Chapter 2) or their links with central direction (i.e., parallel of sport 
psychology’s leadership work: cf. Chapter 2) mirrors the evolution of the elite team culture 
change construct (cf. Bevir & Richards, 2009a; Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a).  With such 
networks usually “[operating] through interdependent relationships, with a view to trying to 
secure their individual goals by collaborating with each other” (Bevir & Richards, 2009a, p. 
3), further conceptual similarity is found with the variously-motivated, multi-group make up 
of professional sport performance departments.  Reflecting their pursuit of bespoke goals and 
possession of role- and person-specific needs, preferences, and opinions, the performance 
team’s management, support staff, and performers can also therefore be viewed as situated 
agents.  Notably, the “radical contingency” (Grix, 2010, p. 161) assumed to emerge from the 
interplay of these agents’ diverse and conflicting beliefs aligns with recent literature which 
depicts the management of sports team performers as a personal, power-ridden, and contested 
pursuit (Potrac & Jones, 2009) and, more significantly, resonates with the social complexity 
illuminated in the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
While the pragmatic research philosophy prioritises research questions in determining 
study design, and thereby methodological and practical over ontological and epistemological 
issues (Bryant, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005; Morgan, 2007), it is still 
important to acknowledge the philosophical contexts against which decentred theory has been 
developed and further highlight the links with this chapter.  Notably, although sport policy 
researchers have positioned decentred theory within an interpretivist or “hard” interpretivist 
epistemology (cf. Grix, 2010; Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012), Bevir and 
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Richards (2009a) consistently state that “to decentre is to focus on the social construction of a 
practice” (p. 3); a perspective which explains culture changes as “highly political processes of 
power, which result in the elevation of specific forms of knowledge to the rank of the true . . . 
for a specific context [emphasis added]” (Gemignani & Peña, 2007, p. 279).  Accepting that 
“researchers may use similar methods but from very different epistemological perspectives” 
(Krane & Baird, 2005, p. 89), decentred theory’s position at the “constructivism end” of the 
epistemological continuum (as described in Chapter 3; Giacobbi et al., 2005) suggests that it 
may therefore be suitable for purposes of elite team culture change study under a pragmatic 
approach.  Indeed, pragmatists and constructivists’ reject foundationalism and instead direct 
focus toward social, consensus-based, and context-specific truths.  Reflecting the questions 
and objectives driving this chapter (i.e., to explore multi-stakeholders’ views of successful 
CM), working from the “constructivism end” at this stage of the thesis therefore appears apt. 
Although not applied in this chapter to guide data collection, it is also worthy to note 
that, from a methodological perspective, the suitability of decentred theory is substantiated by 
its prioritisation of methods which: (a) “do not pre-empt or curtail the richness and 
contingency of findings” (Durose, 2009, p. 39), (b) consider a range of agents beyond those 
who dominate in terms of structural position (Lindsey & Grattan, 2012), and (c) focus on 
how networks (e.g., performance teams) construct and reconstruct new ways of perceiving 
and behaving (Bevir & Richards, 2009a).  Significantly, all of these features are accounted 
for by the interview guide and design of this study (see below).  Analytically, and recalling 
that pre-existing theory can be used to build on programmes of research (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008), a decentred theory-informed approach to analysis is appropriate with respect to the 
position’s assumption on the power- and political-based enactment of networks.  In summary, 
therefore, via its prioritisation of context, multi-stakeholder orientation, and sensitivity to the 
dynamic and contested elements of social change, decentred theory appears to be a 
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potentially useful framework through which elite sport performance team CM may be 
effectively explained and an approach which can promote the sophistication of sport-specific 
knowledge. 
6.3. Method 
6.3.1. Selection of an Exemplar Culture Change Programme: Leeds Carnegie 2008-2010 
Following the professionalisation of Rugby Football Union in 1995, Leeds Carnegie 
(formerly Leeds Tykes and Leeds RUFC) were named champions of English Rugby Union’s 
second tier professional league (now named The RFU Championship) for the first time in 
season 2000-2001 and consequently promoted (i.e., permitted entry) to the governing body’s 
top division (now named the Aviva Premiership) for season 2001-2002.  However, despite 
finishing fifth in their maiden season (therefore qualifying for the world’s most prestigious 
club tournament, the Heineken Cup) and winning their first ever trophy in 2004-2005, the 
Club was relegated (i.e., demoted) back to the second tier at the end of 2005-2006 (as a result 
of finishing last in the Premiership standings) before consecutive promotion and relegation in 
2006-2007 and 2007-2008. Upon the Director of Rugby’s departure at the end of this latter 
campaign, the Club appointed Andy Key and Neil Back (hereafter AK and NB) as Director of 
Rugby and Head Coach respectively.  Arriving from Leicester Tigers, English rugby’s most 
successful club, the team was promoted at the end of the management’s first season before 
finishing tenth out of the Premiership’s 12 teams in 2009-2010, thereby maintaining their 
status in the league and breaking the previous promotion-relegation cycle (for which AK 
received the Premiership’s Director of the Year award).  The Club was selected for the 
present study based upon AK and NB’s confirmation that their programme focused explicitly 
on culture optimisation and that successful performance had been (a) recently experienced, 
and (b) delivered in the face of notable contextual challenges (i.e., history of successive 
promotion-relegation; significantly increased level of competition). 
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6.3.2. Participants 
A sample critically implicated in professional sport performance team culture change was 
recruited (Cruickshank & Collins, 2012a).  As well as enlisting AK and NB, one member of 
support staff (a specialist coach) and six first team squad players were recruited.  As a further 
means for assessing the change process, players were purposefully sampled to reflect a 
differential experience of the change process. Two players (Player 1 and Player 2) were at the 
Club before AK and NB’s appointment, two (Player 3 and Player 4) were recruited in the 
2009 off-season, and two (Player 5 and Player 6) recruited in the 2010 off-season.  Reflecting 
the reported need to manage upwards with respect to gaining the time, space, and resources 
from top-level management to facilitate optimal programme delivery (cf. Chapters 4 and 5), 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Gary Hetherington, was also recruited.  Importantly, this 
feature of design also aligned with the consequent interpretation process as decentred theory 
asserts that that the beliefs and actions of actors outside of the system in question must also 
be considered to provide a comprehensive picture of change (Bevir & Richards, 2009a).  The 
specialist coach and CEO were both employed by the Club before AK and NB’s arrival. 
6.3.3. Procedure 
 All participants were approached on my behalf by AK and NB to gauge interest in 
taking part in the study.  Upon confirmatory response (all accepted), letters were sent to each 
identified participant to provide further background information on the work and 
commitments of participation.  To encourage critical evaluation by the players and specialist 
coach, particular emphasis was placed upon the confidential nature of their contribution and 
direct reassurance by management that the Club would not be permitted access to any of the 
recorded information.  As naming the Club meant that there was no feasible way to conceal 
the identities of AK, NB, and the CEO, these participants were made explicitly aware that 
they would be accountable for their provided information.  All participants subsequently 
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provided informed consent, with AK, NB, and the CEO agreeing to be named and all players 
agreeing to the description provided above12. 
  Representing their joint responsibility for delivering change, AK and NB were 
interviewed simultaneously and first.  Reflecting the retrospective nature of enquiry, they 
were initially requested to plot a timeline of the team’s perceived performance against that 
required of a top-four Premiership side (the management team’s programme goal).  It was 
further requested that the emergent graph be split into phases representing distinct periods in 
the change process as demarcated by major and chronological events (cf. Ollis, MacPherson, 
& Collins, 2006).  Deployed to address the limitations of Chapters 4 and 5 (cf. Chapter 5), 
this depiction was then employed as both an aid to recall and tool to frame questions (cf. 
interview guide in Appendix A) in specific time blocks (i.e., questions were asked in relation 
to the initial changes, transition between phases, and in-phase events).  Cognisant of the 
intention to obtain data grounded in individual experience, however, other participants were 
initially asked to share their views on the timeline and provided opportunity to amend AK 
and NB’s depiction to best represent their own beliefs, thereby tailoring their reference of 
questioning.  Similarly, while a semi-structured guide was utilised, the interview was based 
upon a ‘talk me through it’ conversational approach and shaped by the content and natural 
flow of each discussion (Patton, 2002).  After covering all identified phases, final questions 
were asked relating to the holistic process, nature and outcomes of the change13. 
                                                 
12
 It is acknowledged that participant confidentiality is standard research practice. To justify the decision to 
name the club and management/CEO, it would have arguably been impossible to conceal team identity (and 
therefore the identity of the management/CEO) if the context of the change-program was to be effectively 
depicted.  From an ethical perspective, team management and the CEO were made explicitly aware during the 
negotiation of this study that their identities would be made known. 
13
 Due to the retrospective nature of this study and its focus on how culture was changed rather than what the 
new culture looked like, the reader is reminded that interviews were the only method of data collection used in 
this study (cf. comments on ethnography in Chapter 3).  Additionally, this focus meant that components of 
culture were not explored; such as Schein’s (2004) artifacts (i.e., tangible cultural elements), espoused values 
(i.e., overt norms which govern, or are intended to govern, group perception and action), and basic assumptions 
(i.e., the subconscious “maps” which guide individuals toward particular interpretations, perceptions, actions). 
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All interviews were audio recorded and conducted by myself in a private office at the 
Club’s training ground, apart from that with the CEO which took place in a private room at 
the Club’s stadium.  To minimise current contextual factors interacting with retrospective 
perception and individuals discussing their interview with those still to participate, all 
interviews were conducted over 1 week (players over 3 consecutive days).  Interviews with 
the players ranged from approximately 60 to 150 minutes, as governed by their length of 
service (i.e., interviews were longer for those who had been at the club the longest).  The 
interview with the management lasted 250 minutes, specialist coach 300 minutes, and CEO 
135 minutes.  The shorter length of the CEO’s interview reflected this figure’s diluted picture 
of the culture change process, as dictated by his ‘distance’ from the performance department 
(see supporting footnote number 15).  Institutional ethics committee approval was obtained 
for all procedures. 
6.3.4. Inductive Analysis of Stakeholder Perceptions 
Aligning with previously deployed decentred analysis procedures (cf. Lindsey & 
Grattan, 2012, Davies, 2009), inductive content analyses were conducted on each 
participant’s data.  After reading and rereading the transcription, qualitative analysis software 
(QSR NVIVO 9) was used to transform raw data units into thematic hierarchies by 
recursively engaging in tag creation, category creation, and category organisation (Côté, 
Salmela, Baria, & Russell, 1993).  To revise identified concepts based upon emerging 
analysis, the constant comparative method was employed and conceptual memos recorded 
detailing evolving ideas and key notes (Davis & Meyer, 2009).  Reflecting the focus on team 
culture, all analysed players’ interviews were then amalgamated to produce a set of 
perceptions indicative of the group as a whole. 
6.3.5. Addressing Trustworthiness 
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Trust and rapport are key factors in shaping the process and outcomes of interviews 
(Sparkes & Smith, 2009).  Accordingly, several approaches were employed to optimise these 
features with all participants (later corroborated by AK and NB), including: (a) investigation 
of all participants’ careers to understand their bespoke history/current situation (it should be 
stressed that I had no pre-existing relationship with any participant prior to the research); (b) 
observation of two training sessions, the training complex, office environment, and a meeting 
delivered by AK and NB to Club coaches; and (c) knowledge of/empathy with the demands 
of professional team and culture change environments (cf. Chapter 3).  Evidence of the level 
of developed trust and rapport is shown in the duration of the interviews and, in specific 
relation to AK and NB, the invitations to observe the aforementioned club coach meeting and 
provide a feedback presentation (to AK and NB only) after completion of the data analysis 
process.  On-going interaction with AK also supports this assertion. 
Member checks were also conducted, involving a 10-15 minute meeting with each 
participant to evaluate the accuracy of quotes considered for inclusion in a paper submitted 
for publication in an academic journal.  Importantly, and in light of well publicised criticism 
on the parallel perspective on validity in qualitative study (cf. Sparkes & Smith, 2009), this 
procedure was not deployed to support credibility (the parallel of internal validity) but to 
evaluate the extent to which participants considered my interpretation of their data and the 
context of the results subsections in which their quotes appeared to be “accurate, balanced, 
fair, and respectful” (Sparkes & Smith, 2009, p. 495).  No thematic categories were changed 
from this process and 2 of 34 exemplar quotes adjusted.  Reflecting their responsibility for 
programme delivery, AK and NB were then provided with a full copy of results to comment 
on the paper’s overall precision14.  Both reported complete agreement with its depiction. 
                                                 
14
 The rationale for reporting the full results to AK and NB only was borne from this thesis’ focus on 
management-led change. 
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Trustworthiness of the analytical process was also addressed.  Facilitated by QSR 
NVIVO’s optimisation of transparency, the constant comparison method and conceptual 
memos challenging interpretation ensured that evolving meaning was continually re-
evaluated and reasserted (cf. Davis & Meyer, 2009).  To further optimise rigor, a reflexive 
journal was maintained (Patton, 2002).  Promoting cognisance of my presumptions and 
assumptions, my supervisors also acted as “critical friends” by supporting in-depth critique 
and investigation of emerging interpretation, discoveries, and explanations (Faulkner & 
Sparkes, 1999). 
6.3.6. Recentred Analysis of Higher Order Themes 
Once decentred accounts are obtained, an understanding of broader narratives, such as 
the culture change process, may then be achieved by providing a “recentred” (Bevir & 
Richards, 2009b, p. 139) account.  By assessing the coherence of higher order themes across 
all groups (i.e., management, specialist coach, players, CEO), a triangulated, meso-level 
generalisation of the change process was therefore obtained.  Importantly, such accounts are 
required to maintain a description of “contingent patterns of action in their specific contexts” 
and consider “power as something that flows up and down” (Bevir & Richards, 2009b, p. 
139).  Accordingly, the results are presented below with these qualifications in mind. 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Legitimising the Success of the CM Programme: Markers of Change 
 Reflecting this chapter’s objectives to substantiate effective CM practice and explore 
how the two-way power share between change-leaders and key stakeholders was managed, it 
is important to clarify that the selected case was one of successful CM (thus supporting the 
results credibility and usefulness).  Critically, programme success is conveyed by the 
achieved outcome success (i.e., first year promotion plus second year Premiership survival).  
Additionally, a number of process and perception markers also point to the prevalence of a 
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high performing culture (cf. Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b).  Regarding the former, inherent 
within the results were a range of processes introduced or refined to facilitate high 
performance (e.g., role clarity, performance feedback, team and individual goal setting).  
However, evidence of programme success is more effectively shown by the high levels of 
agreement between management and key stakeholders on the perceived methods, phases, and 
key event of CM (see Figure 6.2 and Table 6.11516).  Importantly, not only were these 
methods, phases, and events perceived to have occurred but they were also, in the main, 
evaluated as effective for creating and sustaining consistent success.  Additionally, 
particularly notable evidence of programme success was provided through the perceptions of 
the two players17 who had signed most recently and had played against Leeds Carnegie in the 
previous season: 
[The team I played for last season] . . . had this big crisis meeting and they start 
questioning the coaches and questioning the way we play . . . . Certainly I never heard 
of anything like that going on at Leeds . . . . That was really what the Leeds team were 
about [in matches too], you couldn’t really shake them off. (Player 5) 
Importantly, this culture offered a mark contrast to what players of other teams had been used 
to seeing previously from Leeds Carnegie: 
[Last season] the other teams . . . started taking them seriously because at first they 
thought Leeds always . . . come up and then they go down . . . .  [but] they are not 
                                                 
15
 Although many themes derived from the CEO were common to other groups (see Table 6.1), this individual’s 
account was not as detailed due to the their lower level of interdependence and proximity with other groups: 
My role is to . . . create the perfect rugby environment whereby the coaches can coach and the players 
can play and there is no external influence at all . . . . External influences can be counterproductive and 
thereby they have no place in the preparation of the squad and its performance. (CEO) 
 
16
 Please note that raw data themes are not presented in this table for reasons of parsimony and with respect to 
the intention to provide a meso level generalisation of the change process (as per the recentred analysis).  
Additionally, while not an explicit focus of this chapter, content on the management teams’ leadership and 
interpersonal qualities are included in this table as part of the decentred considerations of how a to and fro of 
social power was facilitated. Leadership and management attributes are considered in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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easy beats anymore, and you really could tell the difference between the Leeds of old 
and the new Leeds.  Because I even remember over at [prior team] the boys always 
talking about . . . how good Leeds were, even if they were losing, they were losing by 
only 7 points . . . . The old Leeds, if they were getting scored against, would just have 
given up whereas the new Leeds was: “we might be behind but we’re going to go 
down fighting” . . . . I’ve seen it the last month [since I signed], the work ethic the 
boys put in and the way they train, it’s always been 100 percent . . . . I see the unity 
and the togetherness of the boys, there are no cliques and that’s important as well.  I 
could see straight away why they’d been where they were last season. (Player 6) 
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Figure 6.2. Perceived Team Performance Level, Key Events, and Distinct Phases of the Change Process.
Note. Phases displayed at the top of the figure represent those perceived by AK/NB. Where no lines belonging to the players, support staff and CEO are present, 
this reflects agreement with AK/NB’s perceptions. Lines belonging specifically to the players offer a ‘best fit’ representation of the whole group’s perceptions. 
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Table 6.1 
Higher-order Constructs of the Culture Change Program at Leeds Carnegie 
 
Category 
 
2nd order themes 
  
Management Players Support Staff CEO 
Objectives and 
planning 
Establishing an understanding of the environment 
Long-term objectives 
Planning for objective attainment 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Optimising the 
holistic 
performance 
environment 
Establishing an open physical office environment 
Supporting the performance development of all staff 
Building a staff consistent with the intended culture 
Optimising the motivation and well-being of all staff 
Managing the CEO/Board’s perceptions 
Promoting clarity 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y (players only) 
Y 
Y (players only) 
Y 
Y 
Feedback 
systems to 
guide action 
Player feedback 
Support staff feedback 
CEO/Board feedback 
External stakeholder feedback 
Team/Player performance analysis feedback 
Sport science feedback 
Results feedback 
 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Reinforcement 
strategies 
Consistency of discourse and action 
Maintenance of systems, processes and procedures 
Reward and protection systems 
Optimising external perceptions 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Leadership and 
interpersonal 
qualities 
Displaying confidence in action 
Assuming ultimate responsibility for direction 
Libertarian Paternalism 
Informal working style 
Openness and honesty 
Adaptive to environmental complexity 
Role models for the culture 
Motivational/inspirational discourse and action 
Experience of high performance environments 
Pragmatism 
Understanding of their roles and responsibilities 
Innovative and comprehensive planners 
Respectful of others 
Driven and competitive 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Additions to 
constructs on 
leadership 
 Highly respected 
Performance-focused 
ruthlessness 
Highly respected Highly respected 
 Note. Y’s in bold and italic font = themes perceived as having been delivered with sub-optimal efficacy. 
denote sources which promoted a ‘regulated’ share of power between management and other group
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To meet the purposes of this chapter, the results section now moves to elucidate the 
variations in perceived performance (cf. Figure 6.2), identify some exemplar critical success 
factors and sub-optimal processes within the examined programme, and assess how the two-
way, power-based interactions with key stakeholders was managed by AK and NB. 
6.4.2. Multi-Stakeholder Perspectives on the CM Programme’s Performance Impact 
Contrasting the management’s view that “where we were going and where our team is 
going, you have only got to see that the performance got better and better and better” (AK), 
the other groups all revealed that, from their perspective, this was not strictly the case (cf. 
Figure 6.2); particularly during the second season when losing eight of the first ten 
Premiership matches: “It just kind of clicked after a while . . . . We started off pretty slow and 
I don’t think we kind of gradually got better; we were pretty bad, then slowly we figured it 
out” (Player 4).  As further suggested by Figure 6.2., match outcomes had a greater impact on 
perceived progress than reported by AK and NB.  Contextually significant victories or peak 
performances, for example after a run of poor results, had the ability to act as tipping points 
which reaffirmed belief in the programme, created a sense of momentum, and reduced 
anxiety.  While enhanced performance was uniformly perceived across all stakeholders, the 
challenge of building and sustaining a culture focused on high performing processes in the 
outcome-focused environment of elite sport was therefore clear. 
6.4.3. Exemplar Critical Success Factors of the CM Programme 
6.4.3.1. Initial Transition and Integration 
As detailed in Table 6.1, almost all of the methods deployed by AK and NB were 
perceived as effective in establishing and maintaining a high performing culture.  Of 
particular note, and aligning with the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5, facilitating 
instant optimal perceptions in the CEO was considered valuable, especially by the CEO 
himself: 
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They had got videos of all our previous games . . . when we were in the Premiership – 
the year when we got relegated – and did a fairly thorough audit on the strengths and 
weaknesses within the organisation and within the team, which were quite good . . . . 
[It] confirmed that they would be very thorough in their planning which is essential . . 
. . It gives you a comfort that they had considered every part of the job and that they 
would be better prepared as and when these challenges arise . . . . Quite often we find 
coaches are purely focused on performance . . . . so I think it is very healthy that they 
have [also] got an interest in all the club related issues. (CEO) 
Once appointed, addressing the inevitable concerns and anxiety in the staff over the focus and 
direction of the impending programme was also considered highly impactful: 
It was great to see [AK and NB] being so open and honest . . . If there was a worry 
factor that was quashed very quickly . . . . In our first meeting we sat down and [NB] 
said “let’s have a talk about your philosophy on the game,” and we talked about 
everything, and he very much said – “right [specialism] is yours because I am going 
to have my hands full . . . are you happy with that?” . . . And he’s been absolutely true 
to his word from that moment . . . . He trusts you . . . and that’s the ultimate to do your 
job . . . . [AK and NB also] held a meeting with . . . myself and [another coach and] 
AK said “what do you think about attack and what not?”  That’s what we did, right 
from word go; it was an open and informal atmosphere, and that’s how we went 
through things . . . . Four blokes, four coaches talking rugby and it sort of got off on 
that footing and that’s how it’s always been. (Specialist Coach). 
As perceived by all interviewees (apart from two players who had signed only a few 
weeks prior to their interview), the appointment of a Head of Performance to oversee all sport 
science support was a pivotal step in the change programme; particularly as a central goal of 
Chapter 6 
 
157 
 
the management was to address the team’s reputation as a “60-minute” team (i.e., one which 
could compete for three-quarters of a match before falling away due to fitness-based issues): 
One of the biggest things was [the appointment of Head of Performance] . . . . To 
have brought in someone like [Head of Performance] who had a lot of experience, 
who had seen it all in different types of sports, who had been at the top, he had 
coached . . . he was a big gold card for me . . . . From what I’ve been told all the 
blokes were very physically unprofessional [at time of AK and NB’s arrival] and as 
soon as . . . [they appointed Head of Performance] that kick-started things I think.  
That was kind of the straw that broke the camel’s back and . . . kick-started the trend 
that you see on the time line. (Player 4) 
Notably, this perception was affirmed by one player who had only recently joined the team: 
I haven’t met [Head of Performance] but . . . [by] talking to a lot of the boys . . . I 
know that he’s done a good job in fitness . . . . Quite a lot of the boys they would have 
felt that getting him on board was a major factor in where they are at. (Player 6)  
Significantly, while this appointment was a contextually-specific requirement, the process by 
which AK and NB made this change resonated with the results of Chapter 4; in particular, the 
need to quickly set and align expectations over the focus and nature of the programme and its 
underpinning cultural values and standards: 
[Announcing arrival of Head of Performance in the media was effective] because he 
was a clear change in direction, he was a bit of a stamp on things - we can see 
immediately how we can improve . . . . So you’re immediately sending a message out 
that there is going to be a significant shift in how we do a certain thing. (Specialist 
Coach) 
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Echoing the results from Chapters 4 and 5, it is interesting to note here the early and effective 
use of the media to “send messages” with regards to the management team’s impending 
approach.  Continuing to use this appointment as a thread by which to contextualise AK and 
NB’s negotiation of the initial transition/integration phase (cf. Chapter 4), Player 4 further 
noted that this key cultural change (i.e., improved professionalism) was optimally received by 
the players as it was also supported by the staff (indicating the utility of social allies): 
[I’m aware that players bought into the new approach through] general comments 
people have said, saying some guys played better than ever and that was . . . because 
we are fitter now, more professional and disciplined . . . They saw the benefits of it 
[which helped facilitate buy-in] . . . . but I think it’s also [down to] the way that [Head 
of Performance and support staff] have kind of bought into that as well. (Player 4) 
Additionally, the importance of gaining and sustaining the support of influential players was 
also found to be significant: 
I had to be somewhat of a leader [in supporting the programme] . . . so I knew that if I 
was going to fight it, there might be a lot of distress.  I was never going to not go 
along with it [because] I agreed with everything [AK and NB] said which made it 
easier for me to buy in. (Player 1) 
As the CM process created an inevitable level of anxiety (e.g., “you immediately paint 
the worst picture when change happens”: Specialist Coach), particularly as many players 
weren’t confident about achieving the third of AK and NB’s three year targets (i.e., 
promotion, Premiership survival, top-6 finish), following through on early statements of 
intent was also crucial for dampening any initial doubts: 
[Conditioning] was something they’d harped on about when they got here.  It was 
something they’d criticised the squad for openly, so . . . by bringing in [Head of 
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Performance] basically they were delivering on that plan which then makes you think: 
“well, they are going to deliver on the rest of the plan.”  Which for everyone was 
great . . . it was positive. (Player 2) 
Notably, and revealing how the enactment of optimal change does not necessarily have to be 
overtly conducted and negotiated, the symbolic nature of management action during the time 
of support staff restructuring (in conjunction with the Head of Performance appointment) was 
also considered to be impactful: 
With any take-over there are always going to be people who are upset but the more 
you can limit that the better, and I think they did pretty well . . . . The [support staff] 
who left weren’t happy, but the [support staff] who remained saw that [those who left] 
were treated . . . with honour . . . . I think if you [see other people] treated like shit I 
think it always gives a signal: “well maybe I’m going to be treated like shit.”  I think 
[staff restructuring] was probably done as well as it could have been done. (Player 2) 
From a performance-based perspective, players also described the immediate impact which 
was delivered by the management addressing some of the most significant perceived flaws of 
the previous regime: 
Everything is on the clock . . . . They dissect everything in terms of “alright we’re 
going to have five minutes for this, ten minutes for this [etc].”  The way that they 
broke it down – and they’re still doing it – it helps because . . . they go: “you’re going 
to be out on the field for 75 minutes” [and the players] go: “alright 75 minutes” . . . . 
The year before they showed up we’d be in meetings for two-and-a-half hours and 
guys were just dreading going to meetings.  If you’re out on the field then you’re out 
on the field for two, two-and-a-half hours sometimes and people are just standing 
around looking at each other going: “get me out of here” . . . . [It] has been really 
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professional compared to what it was . . . . People had to switch on, be ready . . . to 
train and know they had to get the drill right rather than, if you screw up then we’re 
going to go through it again, and again . . . . None of that happened, you had to do the 
drill [right] and get on with it. (Player 1) 
Used to facilitate an immediate and enduing shared understanding and approach, promoting 
clarity was manifest in all higher order concepts shown in Table 6.1 and included providing 
all individuals with an understanding of their role, expectations over their conduct, and the 
reasons behind AK and NB’s past, present, and future action.  Notably, although new training 
approaches were focused and demanding, content was designed and delivered in a way which 
would confer optimal development and group-wide “buy-in”: 
They were very much [approaching training as] a case of: “we know what you have 
been using in the past; we’ll change some of it straight away, not a lot, then we’ll drip 
feed in what we are going to bring in” . . . . It wasn’t a case of: “this is what we are 
going to do” . . . . On the playing [i.e., match performance] side of things there were a 
couple of things they wanted on board straight away – which they got – but I would 
say they clearly had a plan on how to introduce things over that first year . . . . Some 
of the guys you could have given it to them all at once . . . but [they would] have been 
screwed with a lot of them so it was the only way to do it . . . . Without question, in 
that three-year plan they had a year-plan to get us to that first game in the Premiership 
and giving us everything we were going to need, which I think they did.  They’d 
given us ninety percent of the stuff by the end of that first season and then finished it 
off in that pre-season. (Player 2) 
As evidenced by this quote, value was found in the management team’s contextually-specific 
approach; withholding from a major overhaul – which may have “rocked the boat” or led to 
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undesirable bifurcation points – and instead deploying action which encouraged and enabled 
all players to get on board with the new programme. 
 Although the management team primarily operated from a performance- and process- 
orientation, the extent to which all interviewees’ assigned importance to the initial positive 
results under AK and NB was significant (and further reinforces the models from Chapters 4 
and 5).  Indeed, success was found to buffer the more demanding features of the management 
team’s programme: 
They were pushing when they came in: “we’ve got to win [the Championship], we’ve 
got to go up, that’s non-negotiable, you’re not fit enough, we’re going to change that.”  
So they brought in [Head of Performance] . . . and we won all our [opening] games so 
they are on a roll with that and we were getting in better shape and we were getting 
these results.  So after only being there four or five months what they said they were 
going to do was happening, so from our point of view we are putting our trust in them 
. . . They’re happy because their plan was coming to fruition and we’re happy because 
things were working . . . we were winning; we were pushing conditioning, we were 
training hard, we were knackered but we were winning.  So you couldn’t really 
question the methods – they were working. I mean there’s only so much you can 
change.  I’ve said about [AK and NB] earning respect and what not, but winning 
matches is massive, especially in that first year. (Player 2) 
6.4.3.2. Holistic Culture Optimisation System 
Beyond AK and NB’s successful negotiation of the opening phase of transition and 
integration, a number of other critical success factors were found in relation to the more 
general culture optimisation system.  Of initial note, and following on from the earlier quote 
on the importance of promoting clarity, one player described the positive impact conferred by 
the management providing him with honest feedback over why he was not in the team: 
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[Player] . . . got put in the team in place of me . . . and even through this situation . . . 
it was explained nearly every couple of weeks, informally and formally, of why I 
wasn’t in the team.  So much so after the game NB would be – “I’m sorry mate, I’ll 
explain why.”  He doesn’t have to say that . . . . Some would argue that he does that 
because he is just trying to make everyone happy, but . . . the first couple of things he 
does after a game, he comes up to a couple of players and says – look, don’t worry 
mate, blah, blah” . . . . “It’s not just him being a robot, ticking the box in the coaching 
book . . . . I haven’t been managed like that before wherever I’ve been . . . . It makes 
me want to train hard . . . I go to sleep at night thinking NB’s still supportive of me, 
he still thinks that I’m part of this group and I’m integral to it . . . . Whereas if you are 
not getting the communication . . . you don’t feel one ounce a part of it, you’re an 
outsider basically, you’re nothing basically, absolutely nothing. (Player 4) 
Extending this point, another player revealed how similarly focused action with those 
currently not being selected in the team was vital for maintaining a high performing culture: 
Whenever [NB] is interviewed after a game you can guarantee he says: “I think it’s 
been a squad effort.”  I think he genuinely means it . . . . He’ll always thank the whole 
squad [after each game] even the guys who’ve travelled and haven’t played . . . and 
whenever you are in the changing room before a game he’ll always refer to the guys 
who aren’t there . . . . It just enforces that culture . . . where we all work hard for each 
other. (Player 2) 
Additionally, and recalling the operationalisation of culture provided in Chapter 1, whereby 
culture was defined as a process which involved group members self-regulating performance-
optimising perceptions and behaviours within and across generations, being afforded a high 
degree of ownership was crucial: 
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One of their strengths is involving players . . . . Through all the decisions [AK and 
NB] are making, obviously they are in control, but they try to make players make 
decisions . . . . Dictatorship in rugby or in any team sport just doesn’t work because . . 
. you can’t be a robot in sport.  Robot teams don’t win matches and coaches are not on 
the field to make decisions, so if you don’t empower the players in everything from 
goal setting to decision making you are not going to have the outcome you want as 
coach.  Because it’s your opinion and if someone doesn’t believe in what he’s doing 
when push comes to shove he goes back to what he’s used to . . . . So if everyone’s 
combined, if everyone’s in the same boat, we are sailing in the right direction.  If 
everyone’s rowing in different directions – whoosh – it’s a mess. (Player 3) 
Indeed, the importance of sharing the direction and success was also highlighted as a critical 
feature of programme delivery by the specialist coach: 
[AK and NB] are not daft, they know that the Press are going to focus in on them 
[when we’re successful] . . . . so – I don’t want to sound like they are being conniving 
about it – what they do is they’ve shared the ownership of everything . . . [as] they 
know they will only get [to the ultimate objective] if all of the squad and all of the 
management, coaching staff . . . feel valued and can work at their optimum ability. 
The way they do that is to make everybody feel as important as the next person, and 
there’s a great sense to that.   It’s always been the squad ethic, it’s never been the 
team ethic and it’s always been a group buy-in they’ve been looking for and they are 
getting that. (Specialist Coach) 
As indicated by this quote, the interaction of the media was recognised as a key challenge of 
delivering change, and one which all stakeholders felt that AK and NB had managed well; 
particularly for sending messages in times of pressure: 
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[NB] always backs [players in the media] which I think is great, I think that’s the only 
way to be as a coach . . . . It just shows solidarity . . . . Regardless of whether you 
have got issues in the camp, you have got to try and portray to the media [that there 
aren’t].  I know it’s not the be all and end all but guys do read the papers and your 
mates ring up from other clubs and say “what’s going on here?”  I do it to other guys 
if a drama’s going on!  So just to portray that united front, even if maybe it’s not, I 
think it’s vital . . . . You can criticise the team at times for a poor performance, of 
course, but especially when it comes to individuals I think it’s vital that you really 
back them, and he does, I think he backs the team a lot.  I mean he would be the first 
to tell us if we are doing anything wrong, Christ, behind closed doors he’s brutal but 
that’s what you want. (Player 1) 
Finally, and paired with the development of a system founded on robust underpinning values 
(rather than more superficial premises, such as group cohesion, or top-down imposition), the 
consistency of AK and NB’s approach was arguably one of the most crucial success factors: 
People [were] saying we weren’t good enough: the media . . . the pundits and whoever 
knew anything about the Premiership; It was important for [the management] to make 
sure that we were blind to that . . . . If we got “that was shit, that was terrible” [from 
management] and you had the media saying, “Oh, Leeds have gone” . . . you rock up 
on Monday and say why bother?”  Whereas the . . . [management’s approach] was: 
“It’s alright, come Monday we’ll fix it, it’s a [speed bump], we’ll get over it.” . . . . 
Sometimes you can be too positive but . . . it wasn’t overdone . . . it was just done in a 
sneaky kind of way, just tapping away . . . .  Our objective was to stay up no matter 
what; from the first game to the last game everything was in perspective . . . . nothing 
ever changed in terms of temperament . . . . We always stuck to: “we’re going to get 
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better, our training’s going to get better.”  So I think that was what probably helped 
really, everyone was consistent, we always just stuck to our guns. (Player 4) 
6.4.4. Sub-Optimal Features of the CM Programme 
Against the significant level of coherence of perceived management action and (more 
importantly) its effectiveness across all stakeholder views, it is important to examine the sub-
optimal feature of AK and NB’s programme; namely that in optimising the motivation and 
well-being of all staff (cf. Table 6.1).  This is helpful in that it aids the further triangulation of 
CM best (and not best) practice and, in the specific case of this chapter, begins the move 
towards identifying some “decentred” challenges faced by AK and NB and therefore frame 
the context against which the final section on power-share processes can be accurately 
considered and evaluated. 
6.4.4.1. Informing Players of Performance-Based Decision Making and Action 
While it was clear that AK and NB effectively addressed the motivation and well-
being of staff members (including players and support staff), one aspect of this theme which 
all groups reported as having been delivered sub-optimally was the lack of information given 
to some (not all) players on their exclusion from the match day team/squad and wider 
standing (i.e., their role and/or likely involvement in the long-term programme): 
Because they had started effectively with a Premiership squad from the previous year 
and big numbers it meant that they had a dilemma.  Do you just pick your best team 
and play that every week? And then if you do, what happens to all the other players? 
Where do they play, or do you rotate?  They adopted a rotation policy.  Now that 
throws up its own challenges because inevitably players want to play and if they are 
not playing every week sometimes they get a bit fractious . . . . I was aware of quite a 
number of players who were disappointed with (a) their lack of involvement and (b) 
the lack of communication they perceived about their involvement. (CEO) 
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Pertinently, this point was echoed by the interviewed specialist coach: 
Personally I think every player who is not going to be named in the side that’s in the 
squad, or certainly has been in the previous week’s team, should be spoken to prior to 
the meeting [to announce the team].  I don’t think that has always happened and I 
think that’s one of the things that could be done slightly better. Speaking to one or 
two of the players who left us last year - that was probably their biggest frustration, 
that of not being informed that they had been left out for any particular reason, or not 
being given a reason.  It was felt that some of the more senior players were being 
picked on reputation rather than performance. (Specialist Coach) 
Pointing to the “decentred” aspects of elite sport performance team culture change (i.e., the 
radical contingency of variously-motivated situated agents) and the concomitant challenge of 
creating and sustaining shared and robust performance-optimising beliefs when performers 
are publicly judged by (non-)selection on a weekly basis, the occurrence of players without 
full understanding of their specific situation was problematic in that those affected often drew 
inaccurate conclusions which influenced the perceptions of fellow players and staff.  Notably, 
however, many interviewees considered the uncertainty caused by partial or limited feedback 
from management to be a normal challenge of professional athlete life: 
I think they could have managed the players a bit better, but that’s always going to be 
said by players I think . . . . I mean that would be very critical . . . . but I think that 
would be the thing they would say [too] . . . . Just with respect to where people stand 
in terms of - are they a part of the future of the club? . . . . Unfortunately I think that’s 
going to be a by-product of any professional sporting team and it’s going to be hard to 
please everyone . . . . Not many people would have done [that] well. (Player 4) 
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Indeed, while many players empathised with the predicament of those who were not playing 
regularly, many also suggested that dissatisfied individuals were in fact largely responsible 
for perpetuating this situation: 
Every player thinks he should be playing . . . . [The management’s] door was always 
open . . . and they were always honest . . . . It’s quite hard for [the management] to go 
and see thirty blokes . . . and tell them why they’re not in the team so players should 
take responsibility.  The guys who were negative were usually the guys not going to 
see them.  (Player 3) 
6.4.4.2. Facilitating Social Interaction 
Another element constituting sub-optimal delivery in optimising the motivation and 
well-being of all staff was the management team’s shortcomings in facilitating non-
performance based social interaction: 
We probably didn’t do as much socialising, we recognised that at the end of last 
season that we should have created a few more opportunities where players and their 
partners and their kids could have got together and shared a bit more time together. 
(Specialist Coach) 
Additionally, one player described how more team-based bonding activities could have been 
attended to more effectively:  
I think it’s important that everyone fits in . . . . You don’t need to be best friends but 
you’ve got to get on.  But if people don’t like each other with a big vengeance that 
can cause impact that isn’t positive, especially if they are playing together week in 
and week out because you’re not going to push that extra ten percent . . . . That’s why 
it’s important, that social aspect of it as well, because by getting to know someone 
socially off the field you find out what they are like.  You have a few beers with them, 
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everybody relaxes, spend some time with them and then when you come back here 
you’re closer to them and then you dig in for them purely because you know them 
well.  Whereas if you don’t know someone that well you just do your job rather than 
that extra ten percent that most teams need . . . . They would argue that you don’t need 
a drink or anything but I think a few beers goes down really well.  A good night out 
with the boys you play with after a game in a different city. (Player 4) 
6.4.4.3. Player Ownership Issues 
Providing an effective example of the contested agency of players, the lesser degree 
of ownership provided to the team’s backs as compared to the forwards was a point which 
was recognised as a final source of tension: 
I think deep down [AK] wants it to be player driven but he finds it a little bit more 
difficult to sort of give them the reins like NB does [with the forwards].  But having 
said that, it’s related to the quality of player you have got at your disposal, like with 
NB there is an outstanding leader in [player] which is very easy for him to run things 
through there.  With AK it’s a bit more difficult because he didn’t have that quality of 
player in the backs [to] . . . let the backs sort of drive themselves or drive things from 
within like the leading forwards did. (Specialist Coach) 
Notably, while this point was echoed by a player, it is interesting to note that this individual 
also felt that a level of ownership had to be provided regardless of the standard of player at 
the management team’s disposal: 
I know from a back’s perspective things weren’t always great but . . . I think they 
needed to understand that maybe that was because they weren’t performing as well 
[as the forwards] . . . . I think they would have liked things to have been done 
differently and I think that if I was to criticise AK about that, regardless of what he 
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thinks that needs to be done, he might [need to] be ready to listen to them.  Even 
though he might need to . . . point them in the right direction there’s no point doing it 
if they are not going to buy in on it. (Player 4) 
As shown by these two quotes, even when players are not perceived to be capable of taking 
ownership and leading from within, a two-way power share is still required in building and 
sustaining high performing cultures. 
6.4.5. Managing and Exploiting the Power Flux 
As suggested by the themes and quotes presented thus far, appreciation of the power 
flux which characterises professional sport performance teams appears to have been pivotal 
in shaping the manner in which change was delivered (also see the to and fro interactions 
detailed in Table 6.1).  For example, it is evident that AK and NB took steps to minimise the 
likelihood of potentially dangerous swings in control and, importantly, optimise an ebb and 
flow of command.  Regarding the former, providing ownership, promoting clarity, enhancing 
perceptions of and through the media, managing the CEO’s views, treating staff with respect, 
focusing on the whole squad (not just starting XV), delivering on stated intentions, providing 
players with honest feedback on non-selection/development needs (where possible and where 
players showed a willingness to listen/source information), introducing new practices at a rate 
which was manageable for the whole group, and an unfaltering consistency in approach could 
all, arguably, be seen as means which protected against potential derailment.  Recalling that a 
“to-ing and fro-ing” of action was reported as a key characteristic of optimal culture change 
delivery in Chapters 4 and 5 (and further supported within this chapter), more interesting at 
this juncture is consideration of the processes employed to enable this two-way power-share. 
 Inherent within the feedback systems to guide action theme (see Table 6.1) were a 
number of approaches for facilitating a continual power share.  For example, a group forum-
based activity was deployed at the start of both seasons to ensure that all players had been 
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provided with an opportunity to contribute and shape the values which the team were to 
adhere to for the duration of the season and therefore, significantly, the criteria against which 
they would be judged by their peers and the management: 
We sit people on tables . . . [and] through initially working with the senior group, we 
came up with five or six subjects [one for each table] . . . . So we are sitting round this 
table . . . for five minutes [and address the specific subject].  One of us would [then] 
stay . . . because you are like the team leader of this table, then the others get up and 
move round every five minutes.  What you do is as the new guys come to this table . . 
. [the leader] summarises very quickly what they had put down . . . [and the new guys] 
now add to it: What is it about this particular question that the guys before haven’t 
solved?  So by the time you have gone round the whole rotation everybody’s had a go 
at every question . . . . We’ve done it for the last two years and have found it a good 
tool . . . to get lots of information out very quickly from a lot of people instead of 
everyone just being in the room and going – “who thinks what?” - and only two or 
three people have a say . . . . We need everyone to share those values, those standards, 
those key performance indicators, and feel that they have had an input into what the 
team are trying to do. 
I think as well it’s from different perspectives, you know we’ve got a range of 
people who have been in three or four clubs and seen a lot of experiences and you’ve 
got a young kid who has just come through the Academy but that doesn’t mean his 
thoughts and ideas are not as valued . . . or that he can’t come up with any good ideas.  
The problem with him is that if we left it to a big group environment there is a danger 
that he thinks – oh I’ve only been here three months, I can’t really add any value.  Yet 
what you find is that sometimes they look at it from outside coming in saying – “why 
don’t we do X?”  And everybody goes – “shit what a good idea, never thought about 
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that!”  So it really is about tapping into everybody’s . . . ideas and again, we keep 
coming back to the things we have said a few times, it’s about their team not our 
team.  Don’t wait until we get to a certain part of the year to say – “well, to be fair we 
should have done this shouldn’t we, or don’t you think this would have been better.”  
What we have had to do is really draw out and encourage everybody’s contribution. 
(AK and NB) 
As well as continually monitoring the appropriateness and utility of the forum-derived values 
throughout the season, an intermediary senior players group was also particularly valuable for 
ensuring that two-way interactions were continued throughout the season; thereby ensuring 
that both management and players stayed “on the same page” as much as possible 
I set up a senior players’ group . . . . and I had a meeting with my guys once every two 
weeks and that’s when we made our decisions . . .  I said to them [senior players’ 
group] “ok what’s the issues you want [discussed]” and they gave me all the issues 
from the players’ side, from warm up to everything and I went to [NB] and [AK] and 
said “listen I’m just the messenger and these are the issues” . . . . As players we got 
across a lot and they gave us a lot that we wanted, like . . . warm up [structure] and 
times of training.  So they gave, and I think they wanted things from us and we gave, 
so I think it was a good give and take relationship.  (Player 3) 
Importantly, the benefit of this power-share in performance-based decision making and action 
was also perceived by those directly involved in this senior players’ group: 
I think what [NB] and [AK] did really well was when the players did take something 
to them they sat down and discussed it with [senior players’ group leader] and said – 
“look this is why we do it but we can change it.”  An example would have been – 
we’d play say Sunday and then we’d come in the next day Monday to recovery, and 
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we basically said – “look, could we just have that day off and relax with our family 
and have a day away from the place?”  NB said – “look, more than happy to, but the 
reason why we do that is we want to make sure everyone’s managed this way, this 
way, this way.”  So then there was a few other things attached to that and a happy 
medium reached . . . . It kind of shows that you are not at school any more, it shows 
that you actually as a player have ownership in how the place is run and how you play 
and what you do.  That was a general theme of both [NB] and [AK] alike. (Player 4) 
Significantly, these two preceding quotes offer lucid examples of the to and fro interactions 
suggested by the decentred approach (see linking lines in Table 6.1).  Notably, the specialist 
coach also discussed how extension of the senior players group’s responsibilities to include 
performance-based matters was a fundamental reason behind successful programme delivery; 
allowing the players greater ownership over the team’s functioning and performance: 
The year we got relegated we had a senior players’ committee but it was more for 
managing off-field rather than on-field affairs; most of the driving of the standards 
on-field, the performance on the field, all came through the coaches and . . . the 
Captain.  After that there were only two senior players, it was like nobody believed 
they were good enough to stand up and say, “these are the standards we should be 
playing to.”  Then . . . [under AK and NB] we had senior players or players of higher 
quality and experience who could then start to impose themselves and once they had 
sat down with NB, AK, and myself and we talked to them of how we wanted them to 
lead . . . [and] bought into that they took ownership . . . and started to drive [the values 
and standards] within the squad. (Specialist Coach) 
As well as devolving power to senior and high quality players, one of the recent signings also 
pointed to the importance of every player being provided with an opportunity to contribute to 
the management of the team environment: 
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We get divided into different groups and different groups are on duty on different 
weeks so everyone is given the responsibility [to oversee an aspect of the performance 
environment], it’s not just the coaches saying: “do this” . . . . That’s another good 
thing because you’re not just listening all the time to what [management and staff] 
have to say but you are actually involved in keeping the kitchen tidy or bringing the 
drinks to the training ground or clearing up after the training . . . . [It] brings unity to 
the team . . . as it’s not just them telling us we need to work together . . . . [For 
example] if [players designated to a particular job] turn up a bit later, things have 
already been done for them.   No one complains, it just becomes a habit and you can 
see what has been brought in by the coaching staff and the change. (Player 6) 
Another formal process used to actively promote two-way interactions and shared power was 
found in the opportunity afforded to players to give feedback during end of season reviews: 
I think [the chance to provide formal feedback] is vital [as] you . . . want a chance to 
say if there’s anything that’s been [a challenge or issue] . . . Some of the guys will not 
have the relationship with [the management] or the personality to go and [provide 
spontaneous feedback] so a formal chance to do that maybe gives them the chance to 
do so . . . . I honestly think [the players] know the vibe [in the team] and the way that 
people react better than the [management and support staff] as the [management and 
support staff] aren’t in the changing room with us every day . . . . So I think it’s vital 
that they are getting messages from the players, which they do.  The chance for some 
guys who’ve got great ideas but don’t necessarily say a great deal, don’t get the 
opportunity to [have a say], that end of year is a good time for them to go in and get 
across what they think. (Player 2) 
From a support staff perspective, the specialist coach also revealed how the proactive 
integration of all disciplines helped to ensure that input and involvement was encouraged 
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from all corners of the support team, particularly crucial due to the physical constraints of the 
training complex: 
The medical staff are quite strange to us because they are tucked away in their 
specific area [of the building and] . . . sometimes they can get a little bit isolated but 
we have our staff meetings every morning or pre-season it’s three times a week, so we 
integrate quite closely in that environment. (Specialist Coach) 
As well as more formal power-share processes, the management’s “open door” policy and 
informal working style also promoted similar feedback on a less formal, ‘as and when’ basis: 
It starts with someone having a question and if they don’t feel they can ask it then 
they start asking themselves more questions, and something will just build inside of a 
player and then just grow and grow and grow.  Then he’ll start to poison other players 
and it will just grow from inside.  Next thing you know the squad is divided in two, 
things are going well for some people, things might not be going well for someone 
else, and it just poisons the team.  If you only have half the team working towards a 
collective goal you are never going to get there.  You are never going to get there in a 
million years.  So it’s good that there’s an open door policy to try and quash any of 
that, anything that might happen. [Particularly for the senior players], you can go and 
you can talk to them and just be like “listen I need you to tell whoever, sort this out, 
we need to do this, we need to do that”, and then they’ll just go and talk to the 
coaches and stuff.  (Player 1) 
Importantly, the open environment created by AK and NB was also particularly helpful in 
putting new players at ease, therefore working to protect the stability of the developed 
culture: 
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The facilities [here] are good . . . . That was a big problem at [previous team in] that 
everything was separated and staff were in different places, and the gym was in a 
different place and the training ground was in a different place.  There’s a lot better 
communication and accessibility to people [here] . . . You can always have a casual 
chat, you don’t have to go to an office and sit down with someone . . . . I think a lot of 
stuff can be said casually and not made a big point of . . . . But if it is a case of 
someone sat up in an office and you get called up to have a little point made, it’s a 
different kettle of fish really. (Player 5) 
Similarly, the specialist coach also commented on the value this flexible approach for aiding 
the functioning and performance of the support staff: 
The door’s always been open, they have always got time for you to go in and chat 
with them.  It just helps to put everybody at ease.  I think it just helps people to feel 
free to bounce ideas off each other and to discuss openly what is going on, be it the 
Academy side or the ‘A’ Team or the older guys, the First Team . . . it’s almost like 
an ongoing forum and everybody’s working with each other. (Specialist Coach) 
Significantly, beyond facilitating a “happy medium” between management and player/staff 
wants, the multiple opportunities to provide feedback also subtly optimised the governance of 
performance-facilitating principles by the group; further emphasising how CM processes 
operated on a number of levels simultaneously: 
At the end of the day the players are out there and the coaches are there to point you 
in the right direction and if it’s the other way round the players won’t buy into it, 
regardless of whether it is about the way they play or the way the place is run.  I think 
as soon as the players have a voice and get a say, it shows that it’s us not them. 
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It builds a culture, it builds a team, because everyone becomes tight-knit 
because we all agree how things should be done . . . . I hate to keep using that word 
subconscious, but it is something that only in hindsight when you ask these questions 
that you think “shit, that’s why that was happening.”  (Player 4) 
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1. Insights on the Specific Case 
This chapter examined culture change in a professional sport performance department 
and explored its delivery from a decentred perspective (Bevir & Richards, 2009a).  Regarding 
the specific case, the creation and regulation of the high performing culture at Leeds Carnegie 
was discovered to have been achieved through a predominantly endogenous process rather 
than imposed top-down by team management.  Clearly underpinning this approach was AK 
and NB’s principle of group-wide ownership, acting as the focus of, frame around, and driver 
behind every action and decision within the change process.  Accordingly, in efforts to ensure 
that the players and support staff adhered to and self-regulated the identified, context-specific 
cultural values, beliefs, expectations, and practices, a range of supporting systems, structures, 
and processes were introduced, refined, and consistently deployed.  Most notably, successful 
change was undoubtedly facilitated through the adoption of a more professional approach to 
performance, with the appointment a Head of Performance and the associated restructuring of 
support staff a particularly critical success factor.  Additionally, and in keeping with the new 
behavioural principles and standards, optimising role clarity and providing rationale behind 
management decision making and action were of further major impact in that these processes 
liberated the support staff and players by allowing them to work from a position of freedom 
and understanding.  Finally, and once again, a detailed appreciation of the context-specific 
nature of CM was perceived as fundamental to successful delivery. 
6.5.2. Integration with the Developed Models of Elite Team Culture Change 
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From a wider perspective, and as enabled by the instrumental nature of the case study 
(cf. Chapter 3; Stake, 2008), the findings from the chapter compliment and extend the results 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 (particularly chapter 4 with respect this study’s undertaking in 
a professional sport performance team).  Firstly, while establishing an understanding of the 
environment, long term objectives, and planning for objective attainment acted as the starting 
point, the examined programme did not represent strict, linear steps but instead an integrated, 
holistic, and dynamic process.  This result also aligns with prior sport-specific knowledge in 
that it is the manner in which performance-optimising processes are packaged and deployed 
which acts as the catalyst for efficient culture change, not strictly the processes themselves 
(Schroeder, 2010).  As such, significant overlap is found with the “two-pronged” models 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 whereby the management’s initial activities provided the 
catalyst for efficient and effective change.  More specifically, clear parallels were found 
between the purposes underpinning AK and NB’s opening approach and the processes which 
were included in the culture change model in Chapter 4; indeed, the quotes presented above 
indicate how AK and NB engaged in evaluating the performance department, setting and 
aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations, identifying and harnessing social 
allies and cultural architects, withholding initial action in sub-optimal conditions, and 
delivering instant results.  Additionally, AK and NB also reported in their own interview that 
a key focus before appointment mirrored elements of evaluating fit with the Club and Board: 
We hadn’t seen Leeds from the inside; when we first started to take the role on and 
went to the Board to do our presentation . . . it supported a lot of our thinking as an 
outsider of perhaps where [the team’s] shortfalls were . . . . What we saw was a very 
skilful set of players.  In actual fact some of their forwards were perhaps more skilful 
than the environment we had come from but could they last 80 minutes?  No they 
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couldn’t.  It was quite evident that depending on who they played, 50 minutes, 60 
minutes, it was a side that really started to struggle. (AK) 
As such, and reflecting the limitations of Chapter 4 (and 5) with respect to the development 
of a model based on manager perceptions only, this study has provided initial support for the 
usefulness and applicability of these initial processes.  
 More generally, and in terms of the integrated, dynamic, and holistic approach taken 
by AK and NB (a direct parallel to the major component of the models presented in Chapters 
4 and 5), the importance of two-way interactions with all stakeholders was reinforced; most 
fundamentally with support staff and players.  As indicated by the content on the perceived 
sub-optimal delivery of optimising the motivation and well-being of all staff, the challenges 
of dealing with a demanding, primarily self-interested and outcome-focused playing squad 
were again evident.  Additionally, Table 6.1 shows that upward management activities were 
considered necessary and effective in supporting professional sport performance team CM.  
Furthermore, inherent within the quotes presented above (and contained in the optimising the 
holistic performance environment theme in Table 6.1), profitable interactions with the media 
was viewed as another valuable CM activity by players and staff alike.  Certainly, the “extra-
manager interactions” emanating from the media in the model presented in Chapter 4 were 
clearly present in this study; as shown by the quotes which pointed to AK and NB’s “message 
sending” through this external stakeholder group.  Furthermore, and while explicit details are 
not provided above, the importance of engaging with other external agencies was also noted; 
particularly in exploiting University-based sport science support: 
[Head of Performance began to utilise] our relationship with the University which has 
always been there but never really been harnessed.  He really opened the doors to that, 
so all the sports science sort of things really took off . . . we had a lot of monitoring 
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and that sort of thing which we had never really had before, access to that which was 
great. (Player 2) 
6.5.3. Further Contributions to Knowledge: The Decentred Perspective 
 As evident across all features of the results, the dynamic, contested, and power-based 
interactions suggested by decentred theory were apparent and supported as effective by the 
participants of this study.  In particular, the findings indicate that successful CM was well 
supported by deployment of systems, structures, and processes which actively encouraged a 
to and fro of power between management and their support staff and players.  Indeed, rather 
than seeking to control, avoid, or ignore the multiple and conflicting motivations and interests 
which characterise professional sport performance team settings, this approach was effective 
in that it offered internal stakeholders opportunities to continually contribute to the direction, 
functioning, and performance of the team and, by inference, generate and perpetuate a culture 
optimisation system which was at all times sensitive to and exploitative of critical individual 
and group-wide perceptions.  As substantiated by the acquired multi-stakeholder perceptions, 
successful CM was supported by making a range of such contribution/feedback opportunities 
available and across a number of levels (i.e., formal/informal; short-term/long-term); namely: 
pre-season forums, player representation groups, annual performance reviews, integrated and 
regular support staff meetings, and an open door policy. 
 Through these bespoke results, and reflecting the dearth of culture change research in 
sport psychology and lack of robust theoretical accounts within other disciplines (cf. Chapter 
2), this chapter also therefore provides initial support for decentred theory’s applicability as a 
framework through which the dynamic, power-based interactions of culture change in elite 
sport performance teams may be explored and explained.  Indeed, with a focus on developing 
contextually-specific understanding through multiple stakeholder perspectives, the theory’s 
methodological value is evident.  Analytically, through an emphasis on the contested agency 
Chapter 6 
 
180 
 
and radical contingency of distinctly motivated individuals/groups, the utility of a decentred 
approach in accounting for the complex and context-dependent nature of culture change is 
also apparent through the richness of the results.  Finally, by considering power as a construct 
that flows between actors and groups and in all directions, the theory’s worth in illuminating 
systems, processes, and procedures which facilitate a regulated ebb and flow of control and 
command between team management and key stakeholders is also clear. 
6.5.4. Evaluating Research Quality 
For evaluating the quality of this study, the reader is encouraged to consider an array 
of characterising traits which support interpretative rigor and applied usefulness of the results 
(Sparkes & Smith, 2009).  Regarding the use of case study methodology, the approach taken 
adhered to the responsibilities of case study researchers (cf. Stake, 2008) by using patterns of 
data to develop issues, triangulating through multi-stakeholder perceptions, and considering 
alternative explanations in analysis.  To meet presentational criteria, research questions have 
been emphasised (cf. study purpose), the boundaries of the case set (cf. section 6.3.1.) and 
assertions developed about the case (cf. results and general discussion). 
Beyond techniques to enhance the trustworthiness of the research process, decentred 
theory’s emphasis on inductive then recentred analyses aligns with this chapter’s context and 
purposes and, of equal pertinence, the principles of working from the constructivist end of the 
philosophical continuum (i.e., consensus of multiple realities: Krane & Baird, 2005, 
Gemignani & Peña, 2007).  Additionally, value may also be found in applying pertinent non-
foundational criteria developed by Guba and Lincoln (2005) for evaluating the processes and 
outcomes of social constructionist oriented investigation; expressly, evaluation is encouraged 
on this study’s: fairness (the extent to which all participants’ perspectives were represented in 
the results to ensure the topic was addressed with balance, as facilitated by recruitment of 
players who had been exposed to the programme for varying lengths of time and who had 
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been regular and irregular starters in the team); catalytic authenticity (the extent to which the 
study promoted action in participants; cf. feedback session delivered to management); and 
tactical authenticity (the extent to which the study facilitated the researcher’s contribution to 
training participants in specific features of elite team culture change; cf. workshop described 
in Chapter 9). 
With all players and specialist coach unconcerned about confidentiality, the likelihood 
of accurate interpretation was further optimised.  Regarding the veracity of data provided by 
AK, NB and CEO, all three continually conveyed no concern about being named in the study 
(throughout data collection and member checking processes) or in the peer review 
publications which emanated from the data set; notably, these were also specifically approved 
by these individuals.  Supporting my own belief in the accuracy of these individuals’ 
perceptions, it is acknowledged that impression management is a mediating factor even in 
anonymous research and that the CEO’s perception of team performance level (cf. Figure 
6.2) does not portray programme success to the same extent as AK and NB, the specialist 
coach, and players.  Additionally, the emergence of the same five higher order themes across 
all groups (including those whose anonymity has been protected) must be acknowledged. 
Of course, in concluding it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study.  
Beyond issues of generalisability, data veracity may have been restricted to some extent by 
interactional effects such as poor recall, hindsight bias, and self-preservation bias; 
particularly as the identities of the club, management, and CEO were not concealed.  
Reflecting the retrospective nature of the investigation, not tracking the evolution of culture 
in real time also poses concerns over the accuracy of the perceived programme and the 
precise ebb and flow of power.  Finally, the omission of additional external stakeholders 
(e.g., media) and triangulation with performance data analysis represent other notable 
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shortcomings.  All of these features are addressed within the conclusions and 
recommendations provided in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
SHAPING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXTS: THE UNDERPINNING MECHANISM 
OF ELITE SPORT PERFORMANCE TEAM CULTURE CHANGE? 
7.1. Introduction 
Recognising that Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have offered insights on the chronology, nature, 
and power-share processes of elite sport performance team culture change, focus now shifts 
in Chapters 7 and 8 toward exploring how the models and approaches presented thus far were 
optimally delivered.  Indeed, and as outlined in Chapter 2, generating understanding on the 
“how” of culture change is crucial if results are to be of optimal theoretical and applied value.  
It is also completely in accord with the pragmatic approach adopted throughout the thesis.  In 
this particular chapter, attention is therefore directed from process to mechanism. 
Indeed, beyond providing the basis for generating the models presented in Chapters 4 
and 5, plus identifying the processes by which a to and fro of power was facilitated by the 
management of Leeds Carnegie in Chapter 6, the data collected for this thesis also revealed a 
range of devices which were used by management to aid change-targets’ acceptance of and 
adherence to new or refined values, beliefs, expectations, and practices.  For instance, and as 
detailed in their respective chapters, all PMs and some PDs of higher profile sports discussed 
the benefits of working through the media.  Additionally, data from most PDs also pointed to 
the significance of streamlining governance to manage the complexity of their environments 
and exert greater control over decision making processes and stakeholders’ contested agency 
(cf. Chapter 8); an approach which did not carry the same (if any tangible) relevance for PMs.  
However, one mechanism which fell out from the analyses conducted across Chapters 4 to 6 
did appear to underpin culture change best practice across all environments and all levels of 
management addressed in the thesis; explicitly, the subtle shaping of environmental contexts.  
Consistent with the intention of this thesis to deliver a practical difference to all participants 
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under inquiry, this chapter therefore centres on explaining and exemplifying this unique and 
highly impactful mechanism18. 
7.2. Shaping Environmental Contexts: Explaining the Mechanism 
Reflecting the need for elite sport performance team management to embrace social 
complexity and a two-way stakeholder power-share yet deliver instant and enduring results 
(i.e., a controlled and predictable system), the establishment and regulation of optimal values, 
beliefs, expectations, and practices in performance departments was best achieved through 
the subtle engineering of environmental contexts.  Indeed, beyond the overt identification 
(e.g., via team forums), refinement (e.g., via review processes), and reinforcement (e.g., via 
culture-consistent recruitment) of demanding cultural principles and standards, the saliency 
and significance of more covert, cunning, and discreet strategies was revealed. 
Specifically, beyond facilitating a two-way power share and visibly negotiating and 
challenging decisions and actions of players and support staff (cf. Chapters 4, 5, and 6), the 
efficient and effective delivery of change was aided by managers’ subtle creation of contexts 
in which change-targets (more so performers due to the support staff’s usual co-role in 
programme implementation) would be more likely to “autonomously” select decisions and 
actions which continually optimised their abilities and, by virtue, team performance.  Indeed, 
by shaping the contexts in which decisions were made rather than addressing decisions per se 
- and therefore minimising the potential for detrimental conflict and overly devolved power - 
this approach echoes Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) concept of libertarian paternalism; a 
method by which choices are contextualised in a way that increases the likelihood of 
individuals choosing those which are of optimal benefit to their well being (but not 
necessarily instantly rewarding).  In the case of the management participants interviewed for 
this thesis, framing was not entirely focused on conferring optimal benefit to individuals as 
                                                 
18
 To clarify, this mechanism was discovered from analyses of data which were considered but not used in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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such, but rather to the functioning and performance of the holistic department.  The 
application of this mechanism across system, structural, physical, psychosocial, and 
operational levels is now exemplified. 
7.3. Shaping Environmental Contexts: Exemplifying the Mechanism 
7.3.1. Shaping Performance Systems 
 Primarily deployed by PDs due to their structural and/or geographical distance from 
lower echelon staff and performers, the usefulness of shaping the systems in which support 
staff and performers operated was revealed.  For example, this approach could be seen in the 
conscious manipulation of the performance system’s overall focus and orientation: 
[To generate a new] focus on [discipline] I put up [in an early presentation to athletes 
and coaches] what it would take to get . . . [an Olympic] medal . . . and . . . ninety-five 
percent of them said to me: “well I can’t do that!”  So the [new discipline] made sense 
because . . . [it] was achievable . . . . So it was clever, “I didn’t say you’re going to do 
[new discipline].”  I simply said: “right this is what it will take to get a medal in [new 
discipline] and this is what it will take [in discipline historically targeted]”, knowing 
very well at that point in time . . . there was no-one going to . . . medal in [historically 
targeted discipline] . . . . It was just easy for them to look at that . . . as the coach and 
athletes [to] say: “we can achieve that.”  And so it became a goal for them, it was a 
goal they wanted to work for because they saw it being achievable, so that’s why they 
buy in.  But I didn’t tell them which [discipline] to [train for] so much, I just simply 
explained this is where the world’s at and you can draw your own conclusions . . . . 
But what I was trying to do was also [discreetly send a message of]: “coaches you 
need to step up, you have to show that you’re raising the game, because that’s why an 
athlete will leave you if they’ve got a bigger goal than you.” (PD2) 
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With this quote effectively highlighting how the manager modified the context in which staff 
and performers made decisions as opposed to directly addressing, challenging, or confronting 
these decisions, another PD pointed to the value of deploying a similar approach for the sub-
systems of the performance department: 
We initiated a five, three, and one-star medical system.  We said . . . five-star athletes 
they get this, this and this etc, three-star they get blah, blah and one-star they get that . 
. . . It’s another way of sending messages and it’s another way of showing that 
performance brings privilege. (PD7) 
Deployed as a means to subtly raise standards via rewarding those who were high performing 
and not rewarding (or even exposing) those who were not, shaping systems in this way was 
considered an effective means for establishing and sustaining an environment in which 
continual development and improvement was sought after by performers and support staff.  
Importantly, and reinforcing the extent to which elite team settings can be compromised by 
self-interests, another PD further described how particular care had to be taken in deciding 
how to precisely shape reward systems: 
You can be a bloody good coach and doing a fantastic job and your athlete doesn’t 
win a medal.  So I’m quite guarded and careful about [financial-based rewards] . . . 
because I’m very mindful of how that could . . . adversely affect the culture.  If it just 
becomes a culture of reward you have everybody trying to grab the best athlete 
potentially rather than developing a wider group of athletes.  So we do not have 
awards, bonuses or whatever for coaches.  I’ll sit down after an Olympics or maybe 
even before and I’ll do contracting and I’ll be pretty even across the board with all the 
coaches working on the podium programme. (PD1) 
Indeed, similar sentiment was offered by one PM: 
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I wouldn’t give [performers] extra days off [if they won a game], they wouldn’t get 
any extra money, they wouldn’t get the bonuses, it’s got them in their contracts.  Just 
because we won a game it doesn’t mean you get a day off, it’s recovering your body. 
(F4) 
7.3.2. Shaping Performance Structures 
 Further enabling efficient and enduring change, PMs and PDs also reported how they 
subtly shaped a team’s structural environment to achieve desired outcomes.  For instance, one 
PD reflected on their efforts to covertly raise performance standards by establishing various 
training hubs which generated internal competition forces: 
[Early on] I was looking . . . to move people to train in centres, not all one centre . . . 
[and] those centres would be beacons.  They would be places that people would train 
because things would be so good there and they would also act as attractor states to 
people to say: “come here, come and do this” . . . . [When] I started to get these 
[training] centres . . . the coaches . . . were actually starting to fire off each other.  
Whereas previously they would disappear you know, “I’ll coach my guys”, they were 
actually getting to a situation [through the training centre structure]: “could you do 
some [specialist work] with X? . . . Can X join in with that?” . . . We were [also] 
getting this little team event: [centre] versus [centre] versus [centre] and that was 
great . . . because now the guys are going “fucking ‘ell, we’re better than you!” (PD7) 
Again, by using the covert manipulation of contexts as a means to bypass the challenging and 
often troublesome interactions of power, politics, and personal interests, the efficiency of the 
change process was significantly enhanced.  Of further example, another PD described how a 
similar intention to draw athletes to a specific training site was supported by modifying the 
circumstances against which their decision to relocate from home would be made: 
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I really encouraged all the top [discipline] athletes in the country who hadn’t already 
moved to move here and I facilitated that and made that possible for them.  Big links 
with the University you know, got them spread degrees, which is very, very common 
now but it wasn’t that common [back then] . . . . So building your links; getting 
accommodation for them and just making it possible for them to move here. (PD5) 
Beyond PDs’ efforts to attract performers and support staff to specific locations and facilities, 
one PM described how training structures were engineered in a way which subtly reinforced 
their desired “high performance mindset”: 
We talked [to the coaches] about . . . pre-season games that we needed to play in order 
to put us in the right frame of mind to go into [the new season] . . . . We said “we’ll do 
this and we’ll do that [what coaches had already planned] but our last game we want 
to be challenged to the highest level even if it means losing” . . . . That’s why we went 
and played [team]. . . and we performed outstandingly well; what we demonstrated . . 
. was that we could compete as a Premiership side now that we had started to change 
our behaviours, our approach to the game, and our approach as individuals. (RU1) 
As such, rather than constantly negotiate decisions and actions, this quote clearly emphasises 
how “natural” pivotal moments (i.e., on-field success) were created, after which the players 
would likely further (or start to) commit themselves to the new manager’s program. 
 Shaping staff structures acted as another subtle change mechanism.  Indeed, through 
creating a squad in which there was competition for every position, players’ decision making 
and behaviour was further engineered to match that required of a high performing athlete.  
One clear example of this strategy was discovered in the Leeds’ management team’s efforts 
to initiate a shift from a culture where players would often drink heavily after away matches: 
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[Player] would come down [the bus] and say “were [sic] we allowed to have a few 
drinks?”  And [NB] would say “well do you think it’s the right thing to do?”  You put 
the emphasis back on them . . . . “Do you think we have earned it today?  Is it going to 
help us if we all get pissed now?”  And they would come back and say “no, we can’t 
drink!” . . . . [Because] there are . . . two good players competing for every position . . 
. . so there are a lot of pressures on the players to make sure they are in peak physical 
condition . . . . They understood they were in a position where they could [drink] but 
they wouldn’t get away with it [if they wanted to outperform teammates].  (Specialist 
Coach) 
In short, building a squad in which playing ability was evenly balanced in all positions meant 
that maintaining a place in the side required consistent adherence to performance-optimising 
perceptions and behaviour.  Similarly, one PM discussed how a focus on recruiting more top-
salary performers was used to develop young players’ commitment to professional practices 
without the need for constant management appeals: 
[Player X was injured] and he’d obviously gone out for a drink . . . . There was no law 
. . . but it was noticed by everyone and we put this to him: “what do you think the 
other players think about you? . . . [Recruited player Y] and [recruited player Z] are . . 
. [also] directly looking at him and saying: “we’re not sure how much you care about 
this team.” [Player X] has now completely turned himself around to the point that he’s 
. . .  on the verge of international selection and . . . arguably our best player. (RL2)  
As well as raising performance standards through competition for places, this quote further 
highlights the significance of harnessing influential players’ social power to shape individual 
perception and behaviour (a point which is described in further detail in 7.3.4.). 
7.3.3. Shaping the Physical Environment 
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Due to its potential to shape and constrain social interaction, manipulating physical 
space was another valuable mechanism for optimising stakeholder perceptions and behaviour.  
Indeed, manipulation of physical contexts was often used as a symbolic marker of a new way 
of working; such as changes to the presentation of pitches at the team’s training facility: 
When I went into [club] . . . there was . . . a feeling for change straight away.  So 
when the players came back [from holiday] the training ground had changed [and] the 
pitch presentation changed . . . . So that allowed for the players to see change. (F1) 
Again offering a means by which change could be enacted without the need for continually 
politically-sensitive interactions, the open plan environment installed at Leeds Carnegie’s on-
site training complex provided another example of how behaviour could be modified through 
shaping physical surroundings: 
You could just pull on people all the time for information; you didn’t have to get up 
and go and see if they were in a meeting and knock on the door. So there is just a real 
ease of access to information and it just keeps people conversing . . . swapping ideas, 
seeing how you can integrate your jobs.  Like I used to sit opposite [colleague] and he 
would say “oh they need to have conditioning here this week is there anything you 
need to drive home?” . . . between us we would discuss how we can do a practice that 
will give us a skill and a conditioning element.  (Specialist Coach) 
As conveyed in this quote, the amalgamation and transfer of information between staff was 
effectively optimised without reliance on negotiation or verbal persuasion (and the support 
staff’s conceptualisation as a team in its own right also reinforced).  Indeed, the importance 
of operating within culture-consistent physical contexts was also acknowledged by one PD: 
This building is going to be vacated in 2013/2014 and they were talking about open 
plan and I just said – “I’m not putting a World Class operation into one big open room 
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where you’ve got other people [i.e., non World Class staff] who rock up at nine, take 
an hour for lunch and leave at five on the dot, that’s not what I want.” (PD6) 
Of further example from the Leeds Carnegie case study, and regarding the performer-
specific environment, during the highly demanding pre-season period, novel and varied off-
site activities were used (e.g., boxing, judo) to maintain optimal application (coincidently, 
and highlighting how shaping contexts could impact upon a number of areas simultaneously, 
such new activities also acted as a leveller across skill levels, enabling an emphasis on work 
ethic which was then employed to model behaviour).  In similar vein, performance data were 
also put on public display: 
I had a board up there where . . . I’d put their tackle completion up, so it was all there 
black and white for everyone to see and that really generated a lot of interest . . . . I’ve 
heard a lot of blokes coming in and saying “oh I’m only just one tackle off, I don’t 
want to miss any this week I’ll remember that.”  (Specialist Coach) 
Notably, one PM noted how engineered physical contexts were also used to legitimise the 
new manager’s program by reinforcing the link between new behavioural standards (referred 
to in this instance as “trademarks”) with on-field success: 
We . . . find some photos of the player in a game where he’s had a good trademark 
score [i.e., peer-generated performance measure] . . . . So we’ll find . . . an action shot 
or some emotive shot . . . and print his anchors [i.e., culture-linked, player-specific 
behaviours] under it and stick them on the wall next to their peg. (RL2) 
7.3.4. Shaping the Psychosocial Environment 
 As shown in the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5, a major feature of shaping 
psychosocial contexts involved the proactive and political management of key external 
stakeholders; thereby protecting team culture from performance-irrelevant distractions and, 
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particularly in the case of the media, reinforcing new and/or refined standards.  In terms of 
the performance department, identifying and/or recruiting culture-compatible players and 
support staff (i.e., those who aligned with the manager’s ideals) and removing those opposed 
to or exposed by the new program was a key feature of psychosocial engineering.  Indeed, in 
all reported cases, change was largely driven via the harnessing of social allies, role models, 
and cultural architects (Railo, 1986):  
We [decided to] rid ourselves of . . . the guys who were [motivated by] free weekends 
and the drink and the man about town stuff . . . . [and] get into the club some senior 
players - even if they were past their best - that could . . . create a culture where it 
wasn’t seen as un-cool to be a good professional who . . . sacrificed things. (RL2) 
As suggested here, managers recognised that player belief, expectation, and behaviour could 
(more often than not) be shaped by what individuals considered the social norms; with these 
norms in turn shaped by those with greatest social power.  Indeed, as well as modelling key 
behaviours (e.g., optimal training effort), certain individuals were explicitly recruited and/or 
utilised for their ability to shape and govern group perception and behaviour.  For example, 
one PM used influential players to monitor and lead on many basic discipline matters (e.g., 
timely arrival at meetings) to minimise the threat of, and opportunities for direct challenge of 
team management:   
The players hang the player if he’s not there on time and that way, if you like, avoids 
that mass confrontation. Because you are going to get players who will always want 
to challenge authority, well we try and avoid that. (F4) 
The role and impact of management through senior players was further reinforced by another 
senior player interviewed for the Leeds Carnegie case study in Chapter 6: 
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Last year there was a very clear . . . team [selected for] playing [in the] Premiership 
and the other two [competitions] were not important and the guys [who were selected 
for those] knew that . . . . So that did create slight problems, but I think we dealt with 
them pretty well as a player group and management.  I think the management will 
know, they’ve got guys they’re pretty close to, myself and a few other players, senior 
players, who you know their first port of call might be for one of us to go and have a 
chat and have a coffee with a guy and try and assess what’s going on and maybe just 
have a quiet word in an ear or whatever, and I think that’s a good way of dealing with 
it. (Player 2) 
Of further example from this case study investigation, and recalling the management team’s 
use of a pre-season forum to identify goals, aspirations, and approach for the coming season, 
situations were subtly engineered whereby influential performers could also make “public” 
contributions to the program and its direction: 
A lot of our team leaders on the tables for instance were or are perceived as, our more 
senior players to help get things out of the young kids [who had made the transition 
from the Academy] for instance.  That was part of . . .  [the senior players’] role, they 
would say: “come on now, you’ve been here two months, three months, what are your 
thoughts on this, you must have an opinion.”  Whereas if it was in a big group . . . [the 
young players] might not say anything, or might not get the chance, so we use that as 
a method of pulling out what will be our values and objectives . . . . We were [also] 
smart in a sense of mixing up . . . groups, making sure that the balance of [senior 
players in] the groups, come the end of the forum, would be best suited to summarise 
the outcomes of the initial five or six subjects. (AK) 
In short, selecting and structuring groups around senior players with an expertise in the topic 
under consideration facilitated the development of a shared and accepted message. 
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 Recognising that the motivation and well-being of every player was invariably linked 
to whether or not they were in the team - and that group-wide acceptance of and adherence to 
new principles diminished as the number of unhappy players increased - another manager 
discussed the importance of optimising the experience of non-selected players: 
[Player X] has played over a hundred games for [country] and . . . I’ve left him out of 
games: “I’m not going to play you in this game” . . . for whatever reason; and he’s 
turned round to me and he said: “do you know, because you told me [I don’t have an 
issue]; if you’d just left me out [of the team and not told me] there would have been 
an issue” . . . . And [so he] then he keeps on top of the . . . younger players . . . [and 
keeps] sharing his experiences of football to help them [via] cascade learning. (F4) 
As suggested here, optimising the perceptions of non-selected players (especially those with 
significant social power) meant that training and performance standards of the whole squad 
could be subtly enhanced (via the interactional effects of these individuals’ sustained effort), 
valuable peer learning encouraged, and counterproductive and destructive actions minimised.  
This point was echoed in the perceptions of another PM: 
Normally what you find is the players that play have all the respect and the players 
that aren’t playing . . . just get left, the sessions haven’t got as much preparation, the 
manager’s maybe not out watching them.  I always make sure that I prepared the 
training equally if not better for the group that weren’t playing, and was always there 
and made sure they get something out of it . . . . I was very conscious . . . [that] 
players pick up on [lower standard training sessions] . . . . So I was conscious that I 
will still be the same, still promote them to be better and give them good work so 
when they came off they would go: “well that was a good session, I really enjoyed 
that, and I was working and if I’m not in the team he’s still talking to me and he’s still 
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giving me what I need to be a professional.”  It’s sometimes difficult to complain 
[emphasis added]. (F1)  
As conveyed in Chapter 6, a focus on supporting every performer rather just those who were 
currently in the team/squad was a also particular success factor in the Leeds Carnegie change 
programme, with individuals’ adherence to performance-elevating behaviours facilitated by: 
placing immediate emphasis on non-selected players after a squad was announced; providing 
an understanding of the reasoning behind non-selection; creating and administering tailored 
development programmes; ensuring playing time in other competitions; and consistently 
acknowledging these players’ contribution (both internally and externally through the media). 
PDs also discussed the importance of subtly shaping psychosocial contexts.  As these 
figures did not hold the same capacity to recruit and replace performers, internal competition 
was driven through alternative means; such as tactful decisions on when and who to provide 
exposure and public reward: 
I used to sit and write a weekly . . . email . . . to all my . . . staff and athletes.  I had 
one for staff and I had one for the team and the one for the team was almost a blog . . . 
[and] it was about pushing a message: “this guy’s had some fantastic news, this 
athlete who has been training in [country], and do you know what he did last week, oh 
I’m so excited for that guy” . . . . So this [other] bloke who’s reading it thinks: 
“bloody hell, that was a bit of serious training.” (PD4) 
Rather than verbally negotiate and challenge staff and performer perceptions and behaviours, 
this particular approach saw management instead subtly shape these individuals expectations 
by publicly highlighting the exemplary standards of others who were competing for selection; 
thereby making such standards the new “norm” (which would have to met by others if they 
wanted to optimise their chances of making the team).  This focus on manipulating adherence 
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to high performing principles was further reinforced by another PD who described covertly 
playing staff/performers off against each other: 
You had to have in your head a vision of this is how it could be and, when you saw it, 
to say to other people: “look at that, that’s the dog’s whatsits!  I am so pleased that 
we’ve just taken these kids to the World Youth and they did this.  We’ve just sent 
these kids to the European Youth and they’ve exceeded the medal target but they’ve 
done the process and it was absolutely A1” . . . . I did a lot of it verbally . . . . on the 
phone . . . and in conversations with people.  I’d go on a visit to [training centre] and 
I’d go: “you should see what they’ve done at [training centre], that’s really good.” 
(PD7) 
Interestingly, a unique approach for publicly yet subtly exposing performers who were not 
adhering to high performing principles was described by one PM: 
Every now and then we’d have a trademark [i.e., team-specific behavioural standards] 
review and . . . we’d do things as harsh as get the group to line up in where you think 
you stand on the ‘trademark line.’  So our best player and our captain . . . would 
naturally walk to the front, or the boys would push them to the front, and then they 
had to line up basically one to twenty-five.  A really interesting one, the same two or 
three guys were at the back all the time and would immediately walk to the back, they 
knew.  They’d walk to the back for a mixture of reasons, one because he was really 
poor in discipline off the field . . . [other] guys weren’t tough enough, didn’t work 
hard enough, and they knew they were at the back of the line.  Really interesting, and 
this wasn’t a conscious decision, but our bottom three or even four trademark players, 
at the end of year one of doing the trademark programme, left the club. (RL2) 
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A further mechanism in establishing and sustaining a high performing culture was the 
optimisation of performers’ holistic life experience.  For example, in the Leeds Carnegie case 
study, management arranged visits to local hospitals, young offenders’ prisons, and coal pits 
to “ground” the players and promote reflection on the choices they made in the performance 
environment.  Players’ time away from the Club was also optimised wherever possible for the 
same purposes, reflecting a management agenda to ensure regular refreshment and 
regeneration of the players: 
I knew that they were giving them a lot of time off when they can . . . . [The players] 
say it just created that unity because all of a sudden the coaches are not just thinking 
of winning all the time, they are thinking of the players being at home and outside 
rugby and keeping their wives happy and stuff which is important.  I suppose you 
want your wife to be happy for you to be happy, and for the boys that are married and 
for the boys that are not just to get away and refresh really.  (Player 6) 
This focus on creating conditions which would then support performers’ commitment to the 
high performing standards when in the team environment was also echoed by one PM: 
What we . . . always do on a Friday . . . [is] have a meeting and it will be a case of: 
“right the week ahead, this is the training structure for the week, this is your time off, 
this is when you’re in, this is what we are doing,” so that they can plan their week.  
Christmas I put the full month up, so this is when they can see families, this is when 
we’ve got the games and they all really appreciated it.  Again one or two said – “that’s 
never happened before, I’ve been in football for fifteen/twenty years as a pro and I’ve 
never see that happen before.”  [It is a] massive [help], here and at home, you know it 
keeps the home side of it right . . . [for example], the [player’s partner] knows she can 
go to the hairdresser’s then because he’s going to pick the kids up from school and 
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she won’t be panicking - “shit who’s going to get the kids from school.”   Little things 
but it’s massive . . . . It [makes it] . . . a nice environment to come into. (F4) 
A final interesting approach in psychosocial engineering was described by a PD who 
revealed how a tailored shared language was used to increase the likelihood of support staff 
and performers consistently engaging in behaviours which would lead to the attainment of 
peak performance and without the need for repeated overt appeals for change: 
I was very particular in how we phrased things so you don’t say ‘top eight’ you say 
‘top eight to medal’ because otherwise someone will say – “well I’m in the top eight 
so you should fund me.”  “No, no, no this is a medal winning programme.  This is 
medals, medals, medals and that is what it is focused on.  Now getting to top eight is 
an essential step to getting to medals but it’s a step; it’s not an end in itself.” (PD7) 
7.3.5. Shaping the Operational Environment 
 With high performing cultures portrayed as those in which individuals made day-to-
day and moment-to-moment decisions which support the continued search for and attainment 
of peak performance (cf. Chapter 1), the relevance and impact of shaping the processes which 
support staff and performers engaged with on a daily and weekly basis was revealed by the 
participants of this thesis.  For example, engineering training in a way which subtly facilitated 
and reinforced alignment with specific behavioural standards was considered important: 
 [We looked] at. . . how could we replicate effort within [training] games that were 
also going to enhance the skill and be productive . . .We can give them the technical 
bits, we can give them the fancy plays, but we had to put some emphasis on . . . their 
effort . . . . Not just give them to a conditioner and let them run a hundred meters . . . 
but play “effort games” [i.e., effort-facilitating drills] . . . .  So it wasn’t just talking 
about it and then doing it on a game day, we had to drive it in during training. (RL2) 
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Intriguingly, and pointing to the role and significance of dark side leadership skills (cf. 
Chapter 8), another manager also revealed how training content could also be used as a covert 
way to facilitate the removal of players who did not (or would not) fit with the manager’s 
approach: 
The older players who had been there a long time . . . trained a certain way [and were 
resistant to my changes].  I knew that but I didn’t fight them [and] they all moved 
themselves out within . . . six months or a year . . . because of the [higher] standards 
[of] the new younger guys coming in . . . . I never once said [to the older, resistant 
players]: “you’ve got to go” . . . . [All I said was:] “this is the way we’re playing” . . . . 
And there wasn’t a ripple from any media [as] they just kind of went themselves. (F2) 
As such, rather than confront the choices of these influential yet resistant players (i.e., not to 
engage with the new manager’s program), this manager instead altered the context in which 
these players operated and exposed their inability to match the standards of younger players 
and a new style of play; thereby allowing these players to make the “independent” (and less 
disruptive) choice to leave.  Importantly, due to the power which these senior players carried, 
successful engagement with this agenda also required this manager to “play politics” when 
asked about such players by the media: “oh he’s doing great . . . he’s fantastic.”  Interestingly, 
another PM described how those with particular potential to disrupt or derail the programme 
were subtly nullified through the use of peer (rather than management) review: 
 [Each] player would . . . leave the room and have to fill a sheet in . . . [which 
required]: three words [on] how you think the group would describe you; three words 
how you want to be described; and then what you think you need to stop doing, start 
doing, and keep doing . . . . Basically the player would [then] come in and the [rest of 
the] group would directly deliver the feedback to them [on the group’s perception] . . . 
. This became pretty uncomfortable for some people . . . what it did [was] it [exposed] 
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some of the [players] . . . . I could actually say some of it was like the bullies being 
bullied; the guys that weren’t particularly ‘good’ at [team] culture had a squirming 
time. (RL2) 
Additionally, the same manager also noted how peer review processes were shaped in a way 
which would ensure the accuracy and therefore robustness of shared perceptions: 
What we found that initially there was a lot of humour surrounded this so we took the 
humour out of it and we said just little things like the guy that’s delivering, whether 
he’s a junior player delivering to a senior player or you’re on a level or you’re in the 
same position or you’re fighting for a spot, you deliver with eye contact and you tell 
him exactly what your group said . . . . It’s done in a very straight and honest way 
without humour surrounding it, because humour sometimes broke the seriousness of 
it. (RL2) 
 Another notable covert mechanism in manipulating psychosocial contexts was the use 
of objective evidence to “persuasively” justify new methods and practices.  Indeed, rather 
than basing action on subjective opinion alone, objective performance data was often subtly 
used to encourage (but not demand) players to consistently engage in optimal behaviours: 
[Drinking alcohol] is one of those habits that [the players] know is not conducive but 
[we] actually started to show the scientific aspects of it . . . . “Let’s demonstrate to 
you why [it’s not conducive]” . . . . and we almost cleaned it up [i.e., drinking] before 
the season started: The players realised [from performance data]: “hang on, I am 
getting stronger, I am getting fitter, I can last, and I can do things in a different way”. 
(AK) 
Significantly, this view was corroborated by one of the Leeds players who noted that while 
some players detested training with heart rate monitors, this monitoring was nonetheless a 
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“small way of getting the best out of people because they won’t slack off [as] they can tell 
how hard you are working” (Player 2).  Additionally, during the competitive season, technical 
and tactical proficiencies were governed by analysis of match statistics against individual and 
team KPIs.  Deployed as part of a pragmatic and evidence-based approach to performance 
development, its worth in protecting against potential player detraction was highly valuable: 
They will show us the last game: “Look boys you hit eighty-five [percent tackle 
success rate] there, this week you hit eighty-eight and you just lost; next week if we 
hit ninety we’ll be there” . . . . And then you can break that down individually . . . . if 
you can give positive information in that sort of way it’s easier for boys to digest and 
jump on board with the message that we are going in the right direction.  (Player 2) 
Finally, a PD also revealed how coach performance was subtly improved through exposing 
these individuals to novel environments (as well as overtly discussing their shortcomings): 
We started sending coaches to . . . events around the world and not always with their 
own athlete, and they were having to coach other people’s athletes . . . so we were 
trying to build a bit of a team thing . . . . The other secret to that, although they didn’t 
quite realise it at the time, was that they were now being exposed to [sport] at a [high 
competition level].  They were actually now getting a chance to watch the [leading 
nation], to watch the [leading nation] . . . rather than what they’d heard from this Head 
Coach who’d travelled for twenty years and what they read in a book . . . . They were 
coming back saying: “shit, I see what you were saying . . . this is amazing!” (PD2) 
7.4. Discussion 
 While a range of devices were found across the conducted analyses in Chapters 4 to 6 
(e.g., working through the media, streamlining governance, using critical “tipping points”), 
this chapter has described a unique and highly impactful mechanism which underpinned all 
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participant accounts of elite sport performance team culture change best practice.  Explicitly, 
to circumvent the significant and incessant challenges of power, politics, and self-interest, 
managers focused on driving and sustaining change through subtly shaping the environments 
in which support staff and performers made performance-impacting decisions.  As described 
above, this approach centred on the covert engineering of performance systems and structures 
alongside physical, psychosocial, and operational contexts.  In this manner, and rather than 
constantly negotiate action and decisions (which could consume all of the manager’s time 
and energy), circumstances were created whereby support staff and performers would (a) 
make their own choices regarding the uptake of performance-optimising or –impairing 
behaviour, but (b) be more likely to consistently make choices which reflected the former and 
ultimately support enduring optimal performance. 
 Interestingly, a key principle in the application of many of these mechanisms was an 
appreciation of the impact of what change-targets perceived to be the “social norm”.  Indeed, 
situations were regularly engineered which challenged individuals to reconsider what they 
viewed as standard or acceptable behaviour within the group.  For example, take the views of 
one PM whose whole programme was based on harnessing the power of group consensus: 
Weight of numbers was very important and that’s when we decided to have the clear 
out . . . . So getting the balance . . . [in terms of] the “good culture” players to the “bad 
culture” players we needed more and more and more in the good box.  [For] the ones 
that sat on the fence, hopefully the weight of numbers would [then] pull them into the 
good box rather than the opposite way round, and it had been the opposite way round.  
So we’ve got to a point where we are at today where gradually the weight of numbers 
is very, very predominantly on the positive side and we have very little in terms of 
culture problems. (RL2) 
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Significantly, the use of mechanisms which prompted a reconfiguration of prior internalised 
values, beliefs, and standards through changing member perceptions on what was “normal” 
was also recognised as impactful by performers; particularly when paired with the influence 
of key cultural architects: 
There have been a few things that they have asked us to buy from our own money and 
as NB said: “ideally I’d like to buy [heart rate monitors] and give them to you but we 
haven’t got the cash” . . . His thoughts were: “you’re looking for a hundred quid to 
buy one of these things, we want you to do it, it’s a hundred quid I know, but if you 
want to pay it off over whatever” – they let the boys do that . . . . It came down to: 
“you haven’t got to do it guys”, but when 95 percent of the squad have done it I think 
most people tend to fall under pressure and do it.  It would be a very arsey character 
not to do that because of the team environment more than anything.  I don’t think that 
actually happened, that no one bought one, and if they hadn’t have I doubt they would 
have been forced to buy one . . . . I think everyone realised that it was a step to 
professionalism, that it would benefit us as a squad, give us some valuable data that 
we’ve never had before.   Obviously [Head of Performance] informed us that top level 
teams are doing it so it was something that we should do . . . and it was a hundred 
quid, they weren’t exactly asking for thousands of pounds. (Player 2) 
Providing a particularly effective metaphor for this process, PD7 described culture change in 
this light as a process of “shepherding”; one where change-targets were subtly guided toward 
an endless series of ‘gates’ - through the lure of reward/removal of threats -  with ‘strays’ or 
‘rogues’ faced with following the herd or being cut loose from the group.  While the quotes 
presented above convey how PDs primarily used such mechanisms at a system and structural 
level and PMs at the psychosocial and operational level (reflecting the variations in their roles 
and distance from the “front line”), this approach of adjusting the perceived social norms was 
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evident across all managers’ practices.  In short, rather than engaging in action and discourse 
focused purely on generating agreement over what was right, optimal impact was also largely 
conferred by covertly engineering what was perceived to be normal (Zou et al., 2009). 
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CHAPTER 8 
OPERATING THE MODELS OF ELITE SPORT PERFORMANCE TEAM 
CULTURE CHANGE: CRUCIAL LEADERSHIP STYLES AND MANAGEMENT 
SKILLS 
8.1. Introduction 
Extending on Chapter 7, the purpose of this chapter is to further illuminate how the 
models of elite sport performance team culture change are best operated.  Specifically, focus 
centres on crucial leadership styles and management skills by which the frameworks 
developed in Chapters 4 and 5 were managed to enable a consistent search for and attainment 
of peak performance.  Interestingly, with PMs and PDs asked to describe “any personal 
attributes and skills that [they] believed [sic] were important for carrying out the changes” in 
an open-ended question (cf. Appendix A), the responses to which were discussed in a largely 
prompt-free conversation, the extent to which interviewees provided a clear lack of data on 
current popular leadership approaches, for example transformational leadership (cf. Arthur, 
Hardy, & Woodman, 2012; Callow et al., 2009), was striking.  As such, with information 
acquired on what managers viewed to be particularly important (rather than all) attributes and 
skills for culture change delivery, this chapter therefore describes the most crucial leadership 
styles (distributed leadership and dark side leadership) and management skills (micropolitics, 
complexity adapting behaviour, and context-specific expertise) which were implicated across 
all interviewee accounts.  Similar to Chapter 7, themes are taken from the analyses of data 
which were considered but not used in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. These findings provide critical 
initial insights on how the frameworks developed by this thesis are best operated (i.e., Figures 
4.1 and 5.1). 
8.2. Leadership Styles 
8.2.1. Distributed Leadership 
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Reflecting the extensive and demanding nature of managerial roles, all interviewees 
reported that culture optimisation could not be led and governed by the manager alone.  In 
conjunction with processes to enhance support staff and performer ownership, these groups, 
or rather key members of these groups, were therefore permitted scope to actively manage 
aspects of the program: 
Nowadays it takes a big man to try and do everything, there is so much!  You’ve got 
the media, you’ve got players, you’ve got the directors and chairman, you’ve got 
sponsors, you’ve got fans . . . . You’ve got so much pulling at you as a manager . . . I 
tried to do a lot myself and I perhaps should have delegated a lot more . . . . You 
applaud people like Alex Ferguson, people who have had longevity in the game 
because it can be tiring . . . . Having spoken to people, to Alex Ferguson . . . they do 
delegate and they do let people go and do things and have confidence in them that 
they are carrying out what you are preaching. (F3) 
Unsurprisingly due to the scale of the environment, establishing and using a distributed/team-
based model of management was also particularly pertinent for PDs: 
I introduced the concept of performance management as the way to make those 
changes because I couldn’t rely on coaches . . . because coaches were all doing their 
own little thing . . . and it just wouldn’t work.  So I had to have some central means of 
people looking down so I got in a system of senior performance managers and 
performance managers and tried to make these guys monitor the athletes as to what 
they were doing . . . . Because how many people do they say you can manage, ten or 
fifteen?  And that’s about it, so it was ten or fifteen.  You handle those ten/fifteen, and 
you [senior performance managers] handle those ten/fifteen, and you [performance 
managers] handle those ten/fifteen. (PD7) 
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Importantly, as well as spreading the workload, such an approach for leading the performance 
department was also valuable for optimising the process and outcome of PD decision making: 
There was a group of [performance management] staff and we had good banter 
between us and we were quite happy to say [for example]: “no I don’t think you need 
to do that with juniors, you need to look at this.”  So we weren’t afraid to share our 
ideas or bounce ideas off each other.  Sometimes I’d say: “don’t be an idiot, that 
won’t work and whatever.”  Then [at other times]: “God that sounds great, what do 
you think of that?”  So I think the important thing is if there’s at least a group of you, 
two, three, four people that you can really bounce ideas and share ideas you’ll make 
something work.  If you are trying to do it just on your own it will probably fall apart.  
I think that was important, there was always at least three of us making key decisions 
or sharing ideas of ‘what do you think’ and I think that helps a lot. (PD2) 
As well as distributing leadership amongst support staff and thereby focusing on “nailing the 
big things” (F4) rather than smaller issues, PMs also revealed the need for a similar approach 
with performers; encouraging those with greatest social power in particular: 
[I would] speak to the senior players: “is this getting done, is that getting done? . . . 
Small things like wearing flip flops in the shower [for foot hygiene], are people doing 
that?”  Well that’s something a manager [and] the coaching staff can’t monitor that all 
the time . . . . Senior players have got to manage that dressing room . . . If you’ve got 
[senior players] on board . . . then you’ve got a better chance of performing. (F3) 
8.2.2. Dark Side Leadership 
8.2.2.1. Demonstrating and Retaining Ultimate Authority 
Common across PD and PM perceptions, the use of dark side attributes (i.e., socially 
undesirable personality traits: Hogan & Hogan, 2001; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) was often a 
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contextually apt and highly effective approach for driving and sustaining change.  Indeed, 
while the previous section described the importance of distributing leadership, one PM 
summarised that optimal culture change relied on “the art of delegating and not abdicating” 
(F4); which was considered especially important with respect to the challenges which could 
arise from the necessary yet dangerous two-way power-share process (i.e., if power was too 
devolved): 
[Performers] have got to feel involved, there’s no doubt about it.  They have got to 
feel empowered and involved . . . . [But] the lunatics don’t run the asylum, they might 
think they do . . . . You’ve still to maintain that but it is your drive and ultimately you 
are the leader . . . . [So] you’ve got to empower people . . . but keep the reins on. (F4) 
Notably, two PMs who largely withheld from such dark side activities in their first jobs 
reflected that acts of dominance over transformational behaviours (e.g., individual 
consideration or intellectual stimulation: Callow et al., 2009) would have notably enhanced 
their chances of success: 
Sometimes you don’t want [players] to question everything.  You just want them to 
do what we want them to do because we are the ones that have spent the hours 
looking at film and deciding the best way. . . . So I think there might have been times 
where we really encouraged their participation . . . but we probably just needed to tell 
them: “this is the way we are doing it, end of.” (RL2) 
As shown by a quote in Chapter 4 from a PM who fined a player for drinking the night before 
training, autocratic behaviour was often central to ensuring the robustness of new behavioural 
standards and, significantly, the manager’s ultimate control of the team environment: 
You must have certain principles and certain rules . . . . The best way to describe it is 
your rules, especially the higher you go, it has to be an elastic band and the bigger 
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players will stretch you and stretch you but it must never break because once it breaks 
the discipline and all has gone . . . [and] you’re not a manager and  . . . leader. (F1) 
In cases where such principles and rules were clearly abused, the danger of which was always 
present due to the high-ego, high-status nature of the playing squad, another manager (who’s 
“one rule . . . is I win, I will always win”) revealed the need to engage in practices which 
would prevent public contests from triggering detrimental shifts in social functioning: 
There was one player who has a [tarnished] history . . . . I give him enough rope and 
then when he refuses to be in the starting eleven, I don’t bite on it: “the team need you 
if you are going to go on the bench” . . . . [Player responded]: “do you know what, I 
think it’s best if I don’t travel [at all]”.  “So you’re refusing to travel?”  And I just 
balled him.  That was because . . . his agent was trying to get him moved [to another 
team] so he wanted to be disruptive, and that was the time he got plated, end of. (F4) 
Highlighting the lengths to which some managers went to in order to ensure program control, 
another interviewee also reported spying on players outside of the performance department: 
I find out what [the players] are doing off the pitch.  I went to some places in [city] 
where [player X] was drinking and said to the guy, “if you let [player X] back in here 
there’s trouble; I’ll ban all the players from coming in here.”  And he tells me when 
he’s been in . . . I’ve gone and done that kind of stuff. (F2). 
While normally delivered in a more discreet fashion due to the heightened complexity in top-
management and support staff structures, demonstrating and retaining ultimate authority was 
also applied by PDs; for example, in streamlining governance: 
I created the world class management group . . .  So instead of me having to go to the 
disciplines or even to the Board to get things approved I got the Board to create this 
group that was the governing body of the world class programmes . . . . Wow, that 
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was a transformation . . . . So [this group now decides:] these are the athletes who are 
getting approved, we are approving that you can spend this money on that, that and 
that . . . . [I also addressed] . . . international [selection] panels . . . [as] selection until 
then had been the domain of the discipline committee . . . [where] there were about 
twenty-six people in the room selecting a team . . . and we were in there for about 
three or four hours! . . . I thought this is just like a minefield because everybody in the 
room had a view and there weren’t any set criteria! . . . So international panels: a 
representative from the discipline committee in each discipline, the PD on both 
panels, the head coach on both panels, and the programme manager or whatever level 
that on both panels, and coming up with a selection policy on an annual basis and put 
it out for consultation . . . . That really allowed us to move on in both disciplines and 
cut out so much noise. (PD5) 
8.2.2.2. Performance-Focused Ruthlessness 
 Beyond the need to demonstrate and retain ultimate authority, possessing and using a 
performance-focused ruthlessness to protect the defining principles of the manager’s system 
was also found to be a crucial mode of leading and managing successful change: 
You have to be prepared to . . . to face [performers] down . . . . For example, [high 
profile performer], [n] times world champion, gold medal favourite . . . going into 
[Olympics] . . . and didn’t [win] . . . . When you look at that race . . . you can very 
quickly say [high profile performer’s] career is on the downturn.  Now that’s a pretty 
bold thing to say, this is a [n] times world champion [and] . . . and he’s troublesome, 
he’s a very, very strong willed man and . . . did cause quite a lot of noise in a negative 
direction . . . Now I’ve got to really believe what I’m thinking because I’ve basically 
got to tell a [n] times world champion that their career is over . . . unless they change. 
. . . [But] I can’t change him so I am going to have to face him down and I’m going to 
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have to be prepared when he . . . disrupts my next team meeting . . . to say: “seriously 
mate if you don’t want to do this that’s not a problem, there’s the door, leave”; and 
maybe [other] people will walk behind him and maybe they won’t.  To me that’s the 
only way.  It sounds a bit crude but it’s the only way. (PD4) 
As well as performers, interviewees also revealed the importance of, when required, adopting 
a similar approach with support staff; even if it was against their innate preferences: 
There have been a lot of casualties in [discipline] . . . . I’m really not proud of this but 
I’ve had about seven coaches in [discipline] that technically had it but just couldn’t fit 
into the culture, or wouldn’t fit into the culture and wouldn’t fit into the culture of 
giving the athletes ownership.  It [was] about them, it [was] about the coach rather 
than being about the athlete. (PD5) 
Indeed, the need for such an approach was further echoed by another PD: 
We had a physiotherapist who . . . phoned me up before . . . [Olympic Games] camp 
and said he couldn’t come for some poxy reason . . . . [After further issues, I had to 
say:] “Sorry, you’re not committed, you’re gone”; and it’s as simple as that.  He had 
some personal problems, which is fine, but we’re not prepared to bring that into the 
programme.  We actually had a couple of others as well who fell by the wayside 
because I didn’t feel they were as equally committed as the coaches and athletes and 
there’s no place for it  . . . . Ultimately . . . I made some decisions that made me quite 
unpopular but I never came in to sport to be popular anyway, I came in to drive things 
forward and win medals and the bottom line for me is the support staff who didn’t buy 
into that it wouldn’t make one bit of difference to me whether you went or not. (PD3) 
For PMs, the importance of possessing and using such behaviour was evidently reinforced by 
the pressure to deliver immediate and enduring results: 
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A [football] manager only needs 11 players on the pitch, or 14 [including substitutes], 
that are going to work for that period on the Saturday [i.e., match day].  Don’t give a 
shit about [non-selected players]: “I feel sorry for you, but in this moment in time: 
sorry lads, you don’t count.  I can start working with you on Monday.” (F2) 
As the reader may have noted, this quote – on face value – appears to contradict the approach 
used by the management of Leeds Carnegie in which the motivation/well-being of all players 
was continually monitored and addressed, including at competitive matches (cf. Chapter 6).  
However, accounting for this apparent disparity, it is important to acknowledge the cultural 
differences between football, in which management typically prioritise the starting team, and 
rugby, in which management typically prioritise the squad.  Additionally, detailed inspection 
of this quote also reveals that the manager was still focused on supporting those who were not 
selected for matches but to a lesser degree in the immediate lead-up to a competitive game. 
Further reflecting the magnitude of the culture change task and the impracticality of 
micro-managing all group members’ day-to-day perceptions and expectations, another PM 
reflected upon the need to take a more uncompromising approach in future jobs: 
One of the things I’ll take into my next [job] is I’ll maybe talk less to [non-selected 
players] . . . . because . . . they also have to understand it’s their job, they are a 
professional, and this is how it is.  You will not play every week, you may be on the 
[substitutes] bench and you cannot keep coming crying . . . “why am I not playing?” 
Especially if the team’s winning . . . . If you are unhappy you can go, simple. (F1) 
While the above quotes describe how performance-focused ruthlessness supported decision 
making with ongoing issues, arguably the most impactful application was found in its pairing 
with more prophetic judgments: 
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I never quite did it but someone said: [remove a player] a year early rather than a year 
late.  I think [Sir Alex Ferguson] does . . . he goes a year early rather than a year late.  
No matter how big a personality you are, how talented you are . . . . [You need to be] 
close enough to care but detached enough to make tough decisions. (RU2) 
Clearly, this particular deployment of performance-focused ruthlessness was of course rarely 
an option for Olympic PDs with respect to their inability to simply recruit/replace performers. 
8.3. Management Skills 
8.3.1. Micropolitical Abilities 
 As culture change was a contested and resource-governed task (in that managers 
circumvented varied and conflicting personal interests while working under constraints such 
as funding), micropolitical abilities were key to optimal delivery.  Defined as the use of 
formal and informal power to further or protect ones’ interests (cf. Potrac & Jones, 2009, p. 
255), framing interactions within a manipulated reality and undertaking significant face work 
was central for acquiring program-facilitating time, space, and support from key stakeholders.  
One PD provided a particularly effective example of such processes in action when 
attempting to create and establish a new athlete support package: 
I’d got three people who were running [n] programmes but had very different ideas 
[on athlete support packages] . . . . The challenge I had was that I was . . . looking to 
take the best bits out of all [n] programmes . . . . [However] I didn’t want to take all of 
one . . . and none of the others because I needed to get [complete] buy-in . . . To make 
that process happen . . . I utilised a group of consultants . . . . [I briefed them] about 
the piece of work that I wanted and briefed them about the outcomes that I was 
looking for but I had to ensure that it wasn’t seen to be a [PD] . . . stamped all over it . 
. . . It needed to be a piece of work where the perception was that [the external 
consultants] independently came in . . . had separate conversations . . . with members 
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of staff, external coaches, athletes . . . and administrators . . . . They produced a final 
report for us so that . . . ninety-five percent of what I wanted to achieve at the start of 
the exercise we managed to achieve, and there was . . . an acceptance on my part that . 
. . a small amount of it that was immoveable. (PD1) 
Highlighting the lengths which managers (in particularly PDs) had to go to in order to avoid 
the inevitable and often performance-irrelevant politics which surrounded (and plagued) the 
performance department, the ability to politick was therefore a key success factor.  Indeed, 
another PD discussed how the power of significant others could also be used to help smooth 
the introduction and establishment of new, contextually controversial systems: 
We’d moved to a very subjective [Olympic] selection process because I knew who the 
best players were and I wanted them to be at the Olympics . . . . But that unfortunately 
[found agreement with only] a tiny minority of players, all the rest want [the original, 
one-off competition selection system as] it gives them the best chance . . . . So we had 
to get around that, we had to explain what we are doing, we had to explain [that] UK 
Sport were extremely anxious about the selection system in place that might 
jeopardise funding going forward if we weren’t going to be able to achieve on the 
world stage because [of original selection system] . . . . [So] I got a guy from UK 
Sport . . . who’d come up and say “this is the selection system . . . I’m going to go 
through the whole thing with you . . . . I want you to ask the questions now . . . . 
Ultimately there is a big degree of subjectivity” . . . And you’d get two, three guys 
stand up and go "I think that’s shit, I don’t like that" . . . and [we discussed it] . . . . In 
the time I was there . . . plenty of them were unhappy [when not selected] . . . but 
there was not one athlete made an appeal. (PD3) 
Significantly, as well as using the power of UK Sport to shape performer opinion, this quote 
also alludes to the importance of achieving “multiple hits” through the same political action; 
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specifically, in the example above, conveying overt alignment with UK Sport’s clear outcome 
orientation.  Indeed, upward politicking was particularly crucial for role survival: 
My last Chief Executive left [n] months ago and . . . one of the things that we did 
[which] wasn’t received well within the governing body . . . was to say [to UK Sport] 
that there is actually now a real risk of somebody new coming in half-way through the 
Olympic cycle and throwing everything upside down.  So actually the process we 
went through there was to manage that externally with the assistance of UK Sport by 
being very up-front and very open and saying – “this is an incredible risk to us.”  Not 
keeping it to ourselves and seeing how things go but actually almost making a pre-
emptive strike. (PD1) 
 Further emphasising commonalities across the PM and PD culture change approach, 
PMs’ engagement in activities which protected against the occurrence and impact of external 
“noise” in the performance department was also acknowledged: 
There’s an education aspect of [managing above] . . . they’ve got to know where you 
are going and how you are going to get there . . . . But . . . you might simplify your 
communication with them . . . because they haven’t got a ******* clue what’s 
happening on the field . . . . When you communicate with them you are a filter, you 
let them know what you want them to know! (RL1) 
Significantly, another PM reflected on how their political shortcomings may have contributed 
to their eventual sacking: 
To [upgrade] all three [training] pitches would cost something like sixty-five 
thousand. . . . It was decided [by the Directors] to do one pitch . . . . Yet they built one 
of the corners up in the main stand as a media centre and . . . another restaurant for 
match days and they spent a million on that . . . . I don’t see the logic in it . . . and I 
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made my feelings known and that probably, I’m not saying that cost me, but maybe 
an area where I kept banging on about was something that didn’t help. (F3) 
In similar vein, one PD recognised that disagreements with top management required a more 
tactful approach than the “up front” conversations which could (at times) be held with 
support staff and performers: 
I think I get to the areas of negotiation which is not compromise because you 
wouldn’t get on in this business if you compromise.  It’s negotiation of your point of 
view isn’t it and a bit of negotiation here and there pays dividends later on.  If you go 
in confrontational, head-on, you might actually get [what you want] . . . that time but 
the chances are you are going to pay for it later on. (PD5) 
Due to the detrimental introspection and rumination which negative media coverage 
could prompt in both internal and external stakeholder groups, managers also noted the need 
for political sensitivity in interviews and press conferences; particularly in the early phases of 
a program when the previous incumbent had achieved notable success: 
It was just really about ensuring that I gave respect to the previous [management] . . . . 
presenting that that cycle had come to an end and . . . I’m a different man with a 
different way of working, with a different identity, different methods and whose 
methods I think the players will ultimately enjoy and it will bring success. (F1) 
Internally, similar micropolitical activities were also evident in managers’ interactions with 
performers, particularly in “selling” new standards and ways of working: 
We used other teams [to generate KPIs] . . . because there was evidence from premier 
rugby . . . of the KPIs and stats which [sic] the very best were doing . . . . So it was 
never trying to force the things on them it was more trying to provide them with 
whatever information, experiences [to promote shared beliefs]. (RU1) 
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Additionally, particular caution had to be taken when appointing staff in support areas which 
had previously not existed (and therefore had not placed demands on performers): 
Another coach [I appointed] was [from nation] with some really, really key skills in 
strength and conditioning.  So it was kind of done that way round . . . . It would have 
probably not worked actually just bringing a [solely] strength and conditioning coach 
in; wouldn’t have done it [for the performers] you know. (PD5) 
When directive leadership was required, another manager also noted the utility of pairing 
such action with overt recognition of others’ opinions; particularly cultural architects: 
I would say [to the senior players’ group] . . . “I really don’t agree with you this time 
and this is what I’m doing and that’s my prerogative as the head coach, but I have 
listened to your reasons” . . . . I think as long as you could give them what they 
thought was a sound, reasoned argument they would then happily support it. (RL2) 
However, and in conjunction with earlier descriptions of conscious manipulation, another 
interviewee noted the need to engage in dark side strategies when these cultural architects did 
not have the knowledge or skills to effectively contribute to decision making processes: 
When you take over as a manager . . . focus on three of the better, older players and . . 
. get them on your side: “You’ll be doing this, you’re captain, you’re that”, and that 
seems to work.  I do it at every club I go to.  And then, through them, instead of 
having speeches all the time, ‘we’ll fight them on the beaches’ type speeches: “I’ve 
got a problem with [performer X], what am I going to do lads, what do you think?” . . 
. And they’ll go: “get rid of him” . . . . I was going to do it anyway but it keeps them 
[onside]; they think they’re doing it.  Then they kind of spread it round the dressing 
room, “the gaffer’s got it under control, he knows what he’s doing.” (F2) 
8.3.2. Complexity Adapting Behaviour 
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 Inherent across the analyses of all studies in this thesis, optimal culture change was 
also dependent on complexity adapting behaviour (Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 2000); as 
manifested in the action-guiding multi-stakeholder perceptions and actions elements of the 
models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 (cf. arrowed lines directed to the PM/PD in Figures 4.1 
and 5.1).  Referring to the ability to embrace and adjust to environmental complexity, this 
attribute ensured that designed and deployed systems, structures, and processes were 
continually aligned with key stakeholder perceptions and the needs of the team: 
We effectively spend . . . a solid five weeks [reviewing the performance programme] . 
. . . we spend three weeks on reviewing . . . [the] disciplines, A to Z, everything you 
can ever imagine, no stone unturned, take a little bit of a rain check, and then “ok, 
what did we learn from that?”  A solid two weeks in planning, taking the lessons from 
what it is we have done into the planning phase . . . . [It’s] two-hundred-and-fifty days 
to go to the Games and we’ve . . . made some changes but not significant.  It is the 
fine margins now really, we did start with a good plan right at the beginning but you 
do have to adjust it because there are injuries and illnesses and you didn’t qualify 
what you thought you were going to qualify, or you did, and you need to adapt. (PD5) 
Of further example, one PM also highlighted the need to continually monitor and modify the 
team’s cultural architects to ensure similar sensitivity to system evolution: 
 We changed the [player] leadership group . . . in that first year and it changed again 
in the second year; it became smaller and the people who had finished up at the top of 
their trademarks [i.e., performer-generated behavioural standards] the year before 
quite naturally got put into [it] . . . . If you are not trademarking and you are not in the 
team every week, it’s very difficult for you to be in the leadership group . . . making 
decisions about steering the team. (RL2) 
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Interestingly, interviewees revealed that complexity was also actively injected into systems: 
I want my guys to be proactive; “if you see new things out there from opposition 
bring it back and let’s discuss it, is there a new way of doing [training exercise] or 
whatever . . . . I want you to find out what the opposition are doing all the time, 
absolutely.”  I ask players to do that as well so that we are always at the cutting edge 
of what’s happening. (PD3) 
Notably, injecting complexity was also deemed to be particularly effective at critical points in 
the change process; in the case of Leeds Carnegie, at a pre-season player forum after success 
had been achieved in the management’s first season: 
All the new players . . . had an opinion on [team].  So . . . we got everybody else to do 
their rotation [around different topic areas], and the team that was new players . . . we 
said . . . . “what’s your perception of [team] as an outsider?  What do you think is 
their biggest fear? . . . What do you think the side needs to do?” . . . [Retained players] 
were saying “let’s tread softly”, but [new experienced players] were saying – “no let’s 
go full on”.   What we got then was . . . [the full on] group explained to [the tread 
softly] group why we needed to do it.  We as coaches didn’t even touch it. (AK) 
8.3.3. Context-Specific Expertise 
 Beyond managerial competence (e.g., knowing what processes to introduce or refine), 
knowledge of when and why specific action should be taken and how optimal impact will be 
conferred lay at the heart of peak culture change practice.  Indeed, the complexity inherent in 
elite sport environments dictated the need for such declarative proficiency which ensured that 
a short- and long-term focus on performance was sustained at all times: 
How much change do you make? When do you make that change? When is change 
like that too close to the major competition to then become disruptive? You’re gonna 
Chapter 8 
 
220 
 
get some backlash because . . . the [performers] will definitely have a downturn in 
performance and they’re going to blame that on you. (PD3) 
Similarly, the situation-specific challenge generated by a number of individuals interacting in 
ever-evolving environmental contexts was also manifest in efforts to engage key stakeholders 
in more macro-level decisions aimed at facilitating the vision’s actualisation: 
The process was different for different pieces of work . . . The selling of the idea . . . 
of posts and people was a very different process to the consultancy approach when it 
came to revising . . . the policy of how we supported athletes; in the same way as [it 
was different to] . . . . the process of . . . being a lot more prescriptive about the 
processes that were put in place for bringing people onto and taking people off of the 
World Class programme. (PD1) 
As such, the picture painted by the present sample was one whereby the dynamic, resource-
demanding nature of managing an elite performance department relies on moment-to-moment 
expertise rather than the ability to deliver prescriptive, generic response patterns.  Indeed, one 
PD noted how such a top-down approach is rarely viable: 
In the heat of the battle . . . you’re making decisions on the hoof . . . the reality is you 
aren’t that clear in the middle of it but you use instinct and . . . gut feeling which 
defines you . . . . Certainly communication with the players was massive. (PD3) 
This sensitivity to prevailing conditions yet balanced against well-established long-term plans 
was pivotal for selecting optimally effective responses in the face of continuously shifting 
dynamics.  Indeed, an awareness of timing appeared particularly crucial; as exemplified in 
one PM’s interaction with two influential players recruited by the manager but who had failed 
to win regular spots in his team: 
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“Listen, you two [are] good football players but as lads, you’ve made this training 
area far, far better”, and I know for a fact that’s stuck with [X] . . . I did believe that 
though, I wouldn’t tell a lie, I’d just tell them the truth at the right time. (F2) 
Indeed, expertise in knowing when and when not to engage in certain activities and discourse 
was also supported by the PD sample: 
I think you have to be very honest and open and clear on what you think and what you 
expect of [the BOA] and be pretty damn quick to say . . . “I think that’s very shite” . . 
. . [But] I suppose you have to taper don’t you; so when you are three years out from 
the Games you can be dealing in strategic stuff, telling [the BOA] what you think.  
Three months out from the Games that’s all irrelevant, you’ve got to get on and deal 
with whatever’s there [at the front-line performance]. (PD6) 
Further conveying the importance of contextual sensitivity, another manager pointed to the 
significance of being able to test potential courses of action in real time against concurrent 
agendas and short, intermediate, and long-term goals: 
Win the battles you can win . . . . you have to master that game.  I keep . . . trying to 
help [assistant manager] . . . [as] he wants to jump into everything.  “No, listen, if you 
do that then that’s going to happen, and that’s going to happen . . . and that’s the end 
result.  You don’t want that to be the end result.  That’s what you want . . . so think of 
how that chain reaction has got to go to get to there” . . . . That is I suppose looking at 
the big picture, what’s the relevance of what you’re doing now . . . . for whatever that 
end [goal] is: winning a game of football or keeping a player happy, or keeping the 
Chairman happy, or a supporter happy . . . or sending a message. (F4)  
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 As noted above, effective moment-to-moment decision making was also shaped by an 
appreciation of who management action would impact in specific episodes; particularly 
significant when dealing with publicly broadcast media: 
[When you are successful] people are wondering - “well how are you doing it?” . . . 
And slowly those questions are asked [by the media] and sometimes we didn’t answer 
them directly [to maintain competitive advantage] but there were other times when we 
were very clear about we wanted people to know . . . “this is what we are doing.” 
(RU1) 
Notably the same interviewee noted that leadership styles were also selected on the basis of 
their relevance to the target group, the context of the situation, and locating the specific 
episode against other operating agendas: 
Sometimes we turn round and say: “this isn’t a debate, this is what we are doing”. . . . 
In some other [instances] . . . we are better off taking one step rather than two . . . and 
as we found . . . it didn’t take too long before that other step was taken.  Because by 
doing the first step they [the players] realised it wasn’t . . . as painful as they first 
thought. (RU1) 
 In terms of the systems, structures, and processes used to generate and sustain optimal 
performance, the ability of managers to critically evaluate the benefits of various approaches 
over others for their own specific setting was deemed crucial: 
We spend time now looking round at other sports and picking out examples of best 
practice that we think will make a difference to us.  We don’t do that for doing that’s 
sake, we are not on a mission to just bring in everything athletics, swimming, cycling 
have done, and of course it tends to be the sports that are the in-vogue sports anyway. 
So of course we have gone through a period of time where cycling was the flavour of 
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the month and everything that Dave Brailsford does is seen to be a garden of roses 
when he’d be the first to admit it, that’s not the case.  So we have tried to be smart in 
terms of just picking on areas that we think can make a difference. (PD1) 
Indeed, the direct transfer of supposedly “gold standard” practices was rarely an option: 
This might seem very airy fairy and it isn’t black and white, but I honestly believe 
that it’s about relationships . . . . It really is because if it was just about techniques 
anybody can learn them.  If it was just about processes you could buy your template, 
your Clive Woodward template, and apply it to every situation, but it ain’t!  
Fortunately for us or it would be bloody boring otherwise!  Everybody’s different, 
every group’s different and every situation’s different and it’s selecting the correct 
response and then applying that response.  That is the art. (RL1) 
Accordingly, the critical message espoused by these two final quotes was that optimal culture 
change practice was dependent on delivering a programme which was contextually sensitive 
to the specific team and, of equal significance, which did not bow to any pressure to follow or 
even copy the approaches successfully used by other, normally high profile figures. 
8.4. Discussion 
 Following discussion of a central underpinning mechanism of elite sport performance 
team culture change in Chapter 7, this chapter has illuminated some of the key leadership and 
management attributes required for best practice.  More specifically, these were identified as 
distributed leadership, dark side leadership, micropolitical abilities, complexity adapting 
behaviour, and context-specific expertise.  These findings are significant for two reasons: 
first, and conveying overlap with the principles of contingency theories of leadership 
(Seyranian, 2009; von Krogh, Nonaka, & Rechsteiner, 2012), they point to the importance of 
a manager possessing a range of leadership and management skills which are deployed to 
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meet the specific context and which support pre-determined short, medium, and long-term 
agendas.  Second, they suggest that optimal culture change delivery is dependent on more 
than the possession of managerial or leadership “competence”. 
 Taking the first of these insights, the management interviewees of this thesis revealed 
that the leadership of culture change could not be adequately characterised through one type 
of behavioural repertoire.  Indeed, while current “hot” approaches to leadership continue to 
receive notable exposure in academic literature, such as transformational leadership (Arthur 
et al., 2012), the findings from this thesis suggest that these frameworks are but a small part 
of picture.  More specifically, driven by the extending nature of the PM/PD role and the 
dynamic and contested nature of elite sport performance settings, a spectrum of behavioural 
qualities and expertise-based skill sets were required.  Indeed, as much PM and PD work 
centred on creating and sustaining conditions which could continuously propagate and renew 
desired high performing principles (cf. Chapter 7) as well as directly engaging with overt 
stakeholder interactions, there was a clear need for behaviours and skills which could 
thereby: establish various command centres (i.e., distributed leadership), act as decisive 
protection mechanisms (i.e., dark side leadership), embrace and respond to critical shifts in 
system functioning (i.e., complexity adapting behaviour), enable optimal political positioning 
(i.e., micropolitics), and, arguably most importantly, aid decision making processes which 
were locked into short, intermediate, and long term agendas (i.e., context-specific expertise). 
 Reflecting further on the use dark side attributes, particularly as deployment of such 
traits has sometimes been discouraged by organisational researchers, (e.g., Hogan & Hogan, 
2001; Liu, Liao, & Loi, 2012), utilising dark traits in the right place at the right time appears 
crucial for program success and role survival.  Moreover, it seems that a level of 
Machiavellianism is also needed if a manager is to have peak impact when working through 
manipulated contexts (as per the mechanisms described in Chapter 7).  As such, countering 
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organisational scholars prioritisation of positive employee emotions (e.g., Shin, Tayor, & 
Seo, 2012) alongside sport psychology’s historical focus on socially desirable leader traits 
and recent use of positive psychology as a lens for elite-level enquiry (e.g., Wagstaff et al., 
2013), these findings align with latest coaching and performance management trends which 
point to the pervasiveness of “dark arts” and suggest that elite sport performance team 
settings are not necessarily “nice” places (Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; Potrac & Jones, 2009).  
Agreement is therefore found with Fletcher and Arnold (2011, p. 237) who consider that 
viewing PDs only in terms of socially desirable qualities (e.g., openness, charisma) presents a 
“somewhat simplistic picture.”  Of particular note, the possession of performance-focused 
ruthlessness - in which the emotional investment of stakeholders was sharply overlooked as 
part of a “no compromise” approach – was notable as it revealed that there was often a point 
where control and command decisions were required to maintain a strict focus on 
performance (even against a dependency for two-way interaction and power share processes).  
An insightful reflection by one PD exemplifies this point: 
You are supposed to have to have good people skills.  I don’t quite know what good 
people skills mean; there must be a better expression than that.  It sometimes gets 
described as emotional intelligence or whatever.   But . . . I don’t know that you do 
[need to have a high degree of emotional intelligence]; when you look at a lot of 
successful people they bulldoze . . . . The bulldozer analogy for me is that we are 
going to go that way because it’s right . . . . Does that make people go – “oh that was 
a lovely discussion.”  No not really, if we know the end point of this discussion let’s 
just go to that discussion, let us go to that end point now and anything else, whether 
I’ve said hello and have a nice day to you or not doesn’t really matter, that’s what I 
mean by the bulldozer analogy.  Do people then reflect and go – “he’s a very nice 
guy.”  No, no not necessarily but really this is a very outcome generated thing. (PD4) 
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 Regarding the second key insight, the findings reported in this chapter further point to 
the limits of competency-based models in detailing the full managerial skill set required for 
delivering culture change in elite sport performance teams.  For example, in their inquiry into 
the best practice of Olympic sport PDs, Fletcher and Arnold (2011, p.223) presented four 
areas of competence, namely: operations, people, culture and vision.  Operations entailed 
“financial management, strategic competition and training planning, athlete selection for 
competition, and upholding rules and regulations”; people involved “staff management, lines 
of communication, and feedback mechanisms”; culture was represented by “establishing role 
awareness, and organisational and team atmosphere”; and, finally, vision, or “the team’s 
ultimate aspiration” (p. 228) incorporated “vision development, influences on the vision, and 
sharing the vision”.  While providing much needed insight into the nuances of Olympic team 
management and the required dimensions of proficiency to succeed in the role, the results 
presented in this thesis suggest that factors such as history, tradition, systems, structures and 
interpersonal relationships will all interact to dictate/limit the options and directions available 
to the elite team managers in their efforts to deliver sustained peak performance (Bevir & 
Richards, 2009a; Cilliers, 2000). In short, what is required by elite sport performance team 
management is better described as adaptive expertise (Fazey, Fazey, & Fazey, 2005; Tozer, 
Fazey, & Fazey, 2007) than competence per se. 
 As such, the competency construct limits conceptual understanding of how exactly 
such competencies are differentially blended and applied; a feature which has recently 
become a focus in coaching (Abraham & Collins, 2011) and support science (Martindale & 
Collins, 2007).  Indeed, as shown in this thesis, the relative importance and operationalisation 
of managerial competency varies substantially across contextually distinct phases and 
episodes of the applied culture change challenge.  Significantly, participants also recognised 
the value of expertise over competence in the staff in which they employed: 
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[My employed coaches] had to have ‘Level Four-ness’; they didn’t have to have 
Level Four qualifications.  They had to be coaching so they had to have some athletes 
to show that they could do what they are doing, but they had to have Level Four-ness, 
they had to be creative, dynamic coaches.  That’s a really hard thing to write in a job 
ad.  We’d write - you must be dynamic and driven:  how do you know it when you see 
it? God knows! (PD4) 
In short, and as the names suggest, possessing context-specific expertise demarcates those 
who are ‘experts’ from those who are ‘competent’ (cf. professional judgment and decision 
making in Abraham & Collins, 2011; Martindale & Collins, 2007).  Indeed, the ability to 
make impactful and coherent decisions “on the go” was crucial if culture change practice was 
to deliver instant and enduring success. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
IMPLICATIONS: THE THEORY, PRACTICE, AND TRAINING OF ELITE SPORT 
PERFORMANCE TEAM CULTURE CHANGE 
9.1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, a work programme investigating the CM process of creating 
and sustaining high performing cultures in elite sport performance teams was proposed to 
carry three potentially significant implications.  Specifically, these were bespoke knowledge 
development both of and for elite sport performance team culture change, alongside insight 
through which broader organisational theory and practice may be critically informed.  
Reflecting the specific objectives and planned outcomes of this thesis (cf. Chapter 1), this 
chapter primarily describes the theoretical implications relating to how culture change is 
driven and sustained in elite sport performance teams (the of) and the practical implications 
relating to how such change can be delivered in applied contexts (the for)19.  While not an 
explicit intention of this thesis, discussion in these areas also offers an implicit contrast with 
and point of reference for organisational-based theory and practice.  Finally, implications for 
training and developing culture change skills in elite sport performance team managers are 
reported with reference to a workshop delivered for the Rugby Football Union’s Elite Coach 
Development programme. 
9.2. Theoretical Implications: Initial Understanding Of Elite Sport Performance Team 
Culture Change 
9.2.1. General Implications: Grounding Theory in Context 
 In their broadest sense, and aligning with the work of du Gay & Vikkelsø (2012), both 
of the grounded theory models developed in this thesis point toward the importance of culture 
change frameworks which are built on precise specification and detailed description.  Indeed, 
                                                 
19
 Reflecting the objectives of this thesis (cf. Chapter 1), presented theoretical and applied implications are those 
which are common to culture change in both professional and Olympic sport settings unless otherwise stated. 
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as a tangible applied act, the results depicted processes which were: (a) context-dependent 
(i.e., dependent on the initial and continued adherence of variously motivated internal and 
external stakeholders); (b) context-shaped (i.e., shaped by the needs and interests of variously 
motivated internal and external stakeholders); and (c) context-specific (i.e., specific to events 
of manager takeover at specific teams and against specific contexts). 
 Considering the context-dependency of these models, as culture change is focused on 
optimising pan-individual values, beliefs, expectations and practices (cf. Chapter 1), initial 
success was dependent on harnessing stakeholders’ perceived need for change, or generating 
an expectation that change was necessary or beneficial.  Indeed, as the task required people to 
change, cumulative and key stakeholder agreement (e.g., socially powerful performers) was 
critical for programme success and ensuring that the manager was not a lone voice.  As such, 
if a dysfunctional or suboptimal culture is to be rapidly optimised, change is dependent upon 
support staff and performer acceptance that the current culture is either no longer functional 
for goal attainment, or that a new culture is more appealing and/or potentially rewarding.  As 
reported in Chapters 4 and 5, the incoming manager’s successful negotiation of this “one-
shot” challenge was deemed crucial for facilitating long-term team success and personal role 
survival. 
 As a context-shaped task, culture change was found to be a highly contested process.  
Indeed, only “playing the power card” (“I say, you/we do”) was considered to deliver, in the 
long term, little else but a performer backlash and underperformance of the team.  Alongside 
the significance which internal and external stakeholders placed on performance outcomes, 
the complex, power-ridden, pressurised, and unpredictable settings in which managers 
operated  meant that programmes could not be solely delivered by top-down methods.  In this 
case, awareness of the likely reaction of stakeholders (and influential group members) to 
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events within the change process was critical for generating initial momentum and, of equal 
importance, maintaining the programme’s direction and continued evolution. 
 With reference to context-specificity, the findings of this thesis also revealed that the 
establishment and propagation of new and/or refined values, beliefs, and practices occurred 
relative to the bespoke circumstances (both historical and current) of each team environment.  
In this fashion, previously successful culture change approaches (either those delivered by the 
manager or observed in others’ programmes) offered no guarantee when applied in a different 
setting.  Accordingly, with a host of contextual factors shaping and constraining the decisions 
and actions available to managers (at least if a programme was to remain optimally sensitive 
to, and exploitative of, internal and external stakeholder interests and perceptions), efficient 
and enduring solutions were those which were continually tailored to the unique team 
situation. 
Many theoretical implications arise from these context-related characteristics of elite 
sport performance team culture change.  First, the need to avoid abstraction in the treatment 
of sport-specific change theory appears critical.  Indeed, while the two frameworks developed 
in this thesis share many general features – most specifically, the multi-directional, two-way 
interactions with internal and external stakeholders – these models are also somewhat distinct 
due to the bespoke challenges of professional and Olympic domains.  Rather than developing 
universal but vague models (as may have occurred under a positivist approach), this thesis 
instead reinforces the significance of generating and applying theoretical perspectives which 
embrace the peculiarities of specific settings.  Indeed, although the developed models in this 
thesis are abstract representations – to the extent that they are based on concepts which have 
been raised through data analyses procedures – my pragmatic philosophy ensured that these 
frameworks were taken to a level whereby findings were applicable to the specific 
participants of each individual study only (i.e., no attempt was made to amalgamate PM and 
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PD models).  Contrasting with the intended universality of many organisational CM models, 
the results of this thesis therefore raise concerns over generic approaches to change, both in 
elite sport and business; in short, context must be prioritised. 
9.2.2. Specific Implications: Elite Sport Performance Team Culture Change Theory 
9.2.2.1. The Chronology and Nature of Elite Sport Performance Team Culture Change 
Beyond context-related implications and against the delimitations highlighted earlier, 
the findings of this thesis also offer – as was its key purpose – more specific insights into elite 
sport performance team culture change.  First, the activity was depicted as a “two pronged” 
process involving an initial transition/integration phase (focused on creating conditions which 
promoted efficient and effective delivery), and management of a holistic culture optimisation 
system (focused on two-way interactions with variously-motivated internal/external 
stakeholders).  In this case, best practice was dependent on quickly building foundations 
which encouraged stakeholder support of the manager and their programme.  In this manner, 
optimal culture change was propelled by this finite opening process (or launch vehicle) which 
generated a critical level of momentum (via acquired time, space, and support) for 
establishing and then continually consolidating the new and/or refined values, beliefs, 
expectations, and practices.  Contrasting with the propensity of organisational models to work 
towards a final step, the implication of these findings are that change (at least in elite sport 
performance teams) requires a simultaneous engagement with and blending of its critical 
processes (e.g., setting and aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectation; 
facilitating optimal immediate results) rather than adhering to a bounded series of progressive 
steps culminating in a final act of reinforcement. 
Regarding the main culture optimisation system, this component of both models was 
built on a number of key principles.  Primarily, the non-linear and dynamic features of these 
frameworks are dominant and in stark contrast to planned organisational change models (cf. 
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By, 2005).  Additionally, and contrasting with the leader-centric models in organisational and 
sport psychology research (cf. Chapter 2), the results also suggest that top-down perspectives 
are conceptually inappropriate for elite sport performance team culture change.  Indeed, the 
360-degree nature of these models suggest that scholars need to consider top-down, bottom-
up and sideways influences in culture change research.  Certainly, the two-way, power-share 
based interactions which underpinned both models (and enabled successful change at Leeds 
Carnegie) demonstrated that social complexity needs to be addressed in accounts of middle 
manager-led change.  From this perspective, control was therefore not (evidently) centrally 
held but instead actively shared and (if conditions permitted) highly devolved, resulting in 
models where power flowed up, down, across, and outside the performance department.  The 
implications for elite sport performance team culture change theory are therefore twofold: 
first, targets of change need to be considered as co-creators rather than passive recipients of 
change; second, performance department-level culture change is enacted against wider 
organisational and social contexts; not as an isolated vacuum. 
Indeed, as conveyed in the PM and PD frameworks, protecting against and harnessing 
external stakeholder agency and power was a main tenet of best practice.  In particular, these 
grounded theories pointed to the importance of delivering programmes which were sensitive 
to and exploitative of groups/individuals who could, at any time, trigger critical shifts in 
system functioning and performance (e.g., a Board or funding agency’s withdrawal of 
resources; the media’s agenda to sensationalise a critical/emotive event; new directions of 
external service providers).  As such, conceptualising change as a process in which managers 
aimed to create a “cultural bubble” (and prevent this from popping!) encourages a theoretical 
focus on forces which are both internal and external to the elite sport organisation’s 
performance department. 
9.2.2.2. The Underpinning Mechanism of Elite Sport Performance Team Culture Change 
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Reflecting the power- and political-based challenges of elite sport performance team 
culture change, the findings reported in Chapter 7 also carry notable theoretical implications.  
Specifically, as well as the overt negotiation of support staff and performer perceptions and 
actions, these findings point to the significant impact which more covert agendas can confer.  
Indeed, beyond visible stakeholder interaction (e.g., verbally engaging with groups; publicly 
identifying team values, standards, expectations, and practices), efficient and effective culture 
change was largely delivered “under the radar” by shaping decision making contexts rather 
than decisions themselves (a far less politically charged activity!).  The critical and bespoke 
implication here is that while culture change is a concrete applied process, attention must be 
equally directed to the work which managers do “in the shadows” to facilitate stakeholder 
adherence to principles and standards which promote the continued search for and attainment 
of peak performance (i.e., the principles of a high performing culture) 
9.2.2.3. Leading and Managing Elite Sport Performance Team Culture Change 
Finally, from a leadership and management perspective, a clear implication presented 
by this thesis is that culture change in elite sport performance teams requires a broad skill set.  
Notably, while carrying particular weight in sport psychology, the managers interviewed for 
this thesis provided comparatively little data on the relevance or importance of 
transformational leadership (Callow et al., 2009).  Instead, these figures pointed to the 
primary significance of distributed, dark side, political, adaptive, and expertise-based 
leadership and management skills.  Interestingly, the perceived importance of being able to 
engage in effective micropolitical action mirrors recent trends in coaching literature (cf. 
Potrac & Jones, 2009).  Furthermore, the discovery that dark side attributes (Hogan & Hogan, 
2001; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005) were especially useful also prompts a shift toward 
understanding a leadership style which has, to date, been treated in a primarily negative 
manner in academic or applied literature.  In particular, the timely deployment of a 
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performance-focused ruthlessness implies that, even in highly devolved systems, command 
and control must ultimately be centrally held. 
Due to its dynamic nature, culture change was also found to be a test of professional 
judgement and decision making (cf. Abraham & Collins, 2011; Martindale & Collins, 2007).  
For example, consider a PM faced with initial resistance from socially powerful performers: 
making the right choice between coaxing these performers toward adherence, selecting and 
supporting less experienced performers, or recruiting new performers who epitomise the new 
culture (or some permutation of all three) could significantly shape long-term achievement 
(or a quick-fire sacking).  Similarly, if instant results are delivered, should the manager seek 
to raise expectations through the media in order to acquire more resources from the Board?  
Or downplay the occurrence to buffer the impact of inevitable future mixed or poor results?  
In both cases, a plethora of factors will (or at least should) influence the decision made (e.g., 
short-term needs, intermediate- and long-term goals, who the decision impacts, when optimal 
impact can be conferred, etc.).  As the correctness of such decision-making is never instantly 
accessible, the scale of the culture change challenge is, therefore, escalated even further.  In 
contrast to sport (e.g., Fletcher & Arnold, 2011; Myers, Feltz, Maier, Wolfe & Reckase, 
2006; Santos, Mesquita, Graça, & Rosado, 2010) and organisational work (Edgar & 
Lockwood, 2011; Davis, 2011; Gehring, 2007; Gillard & Price, 2005; Jokinen, 2005) which 
has focused on managerial competence, these results imply that theoretical perspectives are 
instead needed which play close attention to how these competencies are enacted through 
adaptive expertise (Fazey et al., 2005; Tozer et al., 2007) as choices and their outcomes will 
rarely, if ever, be black and white. 
9.3. Applied Implications: Initial Understanding For Elite Sport Performance Team 
Culture Change 
9.3.1. Applied Implications for Elite Sport Performance Team Managers 
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 As this thesis offers the first investigation of culture change in elite sport performance 
teams, a number of practical lessons are indicated for incoming managers.  First, the research 
programme has reinforced claims that a change strategy must be consistently “plugged into” 
the internal and external contexts and structures which surround a specific social group and 
that this interdependency is at all times upheld (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004).  As such, 
no two high performing cultures will look precisely the same (MacPherson & Howard, 2011).  
The leaders of change must therefore find a specific solution for the specific problem in their 
specific context and refrain from deviating for the sake of change alone.  Within this decision 
making process, and akin to the work of Scott et al. (2003), careful consideration must also 
be made on the extent to which the team requires a change in culture (i.e., doing what’s 
already being done but better) or a change of culture (i.e., introducing new principles, 
standards, and practices); although both may often be required.  Regardless, the first step is 
for the manager (plus consultant) to evaluate what changes are required. 
Shifting from content to process, and reflecting their permeation in all aspects of both 
models, the need to adopt a 360-degree perspective, engage with all key internal and external 
stakeholders, and operate power- and political-based agendas is clear.  Initially, this approach 
should be engaged in conjunction with the period of initial evaluation, planning, set-up and 
impact.  More specifically, the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 conveyed that incoming 
managers should initially seek to20: 
• Evaluate the conditions and contexts within and around the performance 
department; 
                                                 
20
 For the precise activities which constitute the initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and 
impact phase in professional and Olympic team environments, please return to the models 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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• Identity, recruit, and harness individuals who can to proactively and 
influentially support and disseminate a new program’s principles and 
standards (e.g., social allies, cultural architects, discipline experts); 
• Generate shared perceptions across multiple levels and multiple stakeholder 
groups; 
• Facilitate “early wins” which accelerate stakeholder acceptance of, and/or 
adherence to, and/or support of the CM programme (e.g., delivering instant 
results, addressing most pressing needs). 
Indeed, whatever the programme’s precise objectives and implementation strategy, managers 
are advised to engage with these processes to generate the psychosocial momentum required 
for optimally efficient and effective change.  However, when “solutions” are identified, this 
does not mean that they should be immediately and uncritically deployed; specifically, if the 
existing culture and social milieu is (perceived to be) unreceptive to required changes in the 
first instance, managers should probably not carry on regardless.  While likely needing paired 
with political impression management (Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2008; Wayne & 
Liden, 1995) and issue selling (Dutton et al., 2001) activities for top management and a focus 
on optimising short-term results (due to the inherent/often illogical assumption that change is 
always needed and beneficial: Sorge & Witteloostuijn, 2004), refraining from action focused 
on long-term development may therefore often be the best option; at least until conditions 
prevail in which the changes will be optimally accepted and embraced by the “front-line”. 
Returning to the need for a 360-degree approach and operation of power and political 
based agendas, implications also arise in regards to the importance of managers focusing on 
supporting activities beyond the performance department.  Certainly, to ensure that a change 
programme is sensitive to, and exploitative of, wider social contexts, it seems imperative that 
managers devote time, energy, and resources into proactively managing the perceptions and 
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expectations of key external stakeholders.  Rather than an unnecessary distraction (albeit it 
often is perceived as such), “managing upwards” therefore needs to be considered as a core 
task of elite sport performance team management.  As described within this thesis, such 
activity is crucial for: (a) ensuring that programmes are at all times plugged into the 
perceptions, expectations, and opinions of those with ultimate power over organisational 
strategy and resource allocation; (b) buying the time, space, and support required to deliver 
innovative changes focused on long-term development; and (c) minimising the impact of 
inevitable “noise” from top-management politics on the performance department.  Indeed, 
failing to continually engage in such action was identified by the participants of this thesis as 
a fundamental CM oversight.  Additionally, regularly managing the perceptions and 
expectations of other key external stakeholder groups on which the programme is dependent 
on and/or shaped by (e.g., external partners, the media) is further advised.  Similar to the 
interactions with top-management structures, such a focus is valuable for establishing and/or 
sustaining a critical level of coherence across the agendas of all groups whose agency could 
trigger potentially major shifts in the functioning/performance of the performance 
department.  Furthermore, proposed benefits also include key protection from performance-
irrelevant pressures and distractions (e.g., negative media coverage) and the opportunity to 
subtly reinforce the evolving team culture through “flanking attacks” (i.e., sending indirect 
messages to specific targets via external stakeholders).  Indeed, reflecting the connectedness 
of all external stakeholders to the performance department, using these groups to “naturally” 
spread ideas through their inevitable social interactions appears highly valuable in that it 
provides managers with an opportunity to simultaneously manage and/or modify the 
perceptions and expectations of a range of stakeholders.  In particular, and grounded in the 
data used in this thesis, working through the media is encouraged:  
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 [Managers] can say something at a meeting which might not hit home but if you hear 
it in the Press or you see it live in an interview after a game, I think that message 
carries a bit more weight. (Leeds Carnegie Player 2) 
Accordingly, acting through internal (e.g., newsletters, blogs) and (where available) external 
outlets (e.g., websites, written press, radio, television) is strongly advised for reinforcing the 
social construction and regulation of team values and principles.  Indeed, this advice mirrors 
developments in organisational literature whereby researchers have begun to explore how 
organisations can actively shape their media portrayal (Zavyalova et al., 2012). 
Driven by the identified two-way relationship between managers and stakeholders, a 
focus on actively promoting a to and fro of power is also encouraged.  Indeed, reflecting the 
varied and often conflicting motivations and interests within and across stakeholder groups, 
best practice is proposed to involve an approach in which power is shared across internal and 
external environments.  In this manner, elite sport performance team managers are therefore 
advised to primarily work from a position of negotiation rather than imposition, or at least be 
seen to work from this position (cf. micropolitical implications below).  As such, engaging in 
open dialogue with stakeholders and proactively deploying formal and informal systems and 
processes by which individual/group interests can be channelled is recommended.  Certainly, 
whether or not these opinions are actually acted upon, not providing chances for stakeholders 
to “have their say” has been identified as another basic CM error.  Accommodating such two-
way relationships thereby allows for unavoidable conflict and challenge to be coherently and 
consistently managed and, critically, a means by which the inevitable “behind the back” and 
“whispered” conversations which prevail in elite sports teams can be minimised or reframed. 
Due to the broad and demanding nature of the elite sport performance team manager 
role, particularly in the need to constantly address multi-stakeholder perceptions, one of the 
most fascinating applied implications from this thesis centres upon optimising performer and 
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support staff decision making via the subtle shaping of environmental contexts.  Recognising 
the anxiety-elevating nature of management turnover, the multiple and varied motivations in 
elite sports teams, and the necessary power share between managers and their support staff 
and performers, instant and enduring success is proposed to be best achieved by manipulating 
contexts in a way which “naturally” promotes, but does not enforce, the consistent uptake of 
performance-optimising behaviours.  Built on the assumption that performance departments 
continually construct, proliferate, and reconstruct team-level values, beliefs, expectations, and 
practices, the value of such engineering lies in its ability to covertly shape “group”-generated 
and -governed beliefs, expectations and practices.  Significantly, beyond working to minimise 
the extent to which managers must attend to two-way power share processes (due to lowering 
levels of disparity within and across group perceptions), this mechanism also acts to minimise 
the need to deploy top-down imposition; meaning that, when required, autocratic behaviours 
can deliver a more significant impact in protecting fundamental cultural principles. 
Indeed, the ability to draw upon dark side attributes (cf. Hogan & Hogan, 2001) has 
been found in this thesis to be vital in driving optimally effective change.  While clearly not 
desirable as a habitual pattern (cf. Hogan & Kaiser, 2005), working to demonstrate and retain 
ultimate control and applying a performance-focused ruthlessness in the right place at the 
right time is promoted.  Providing further reinforcement of the practical-level truths found in 
this study (Giacobbi et al., 2005), this implication also resonates with perceptions of highly 
successful managers; for example, Sir Alex Ferguson (manager of Manchester United FC for 
26 years) has acknowledged that “you can’t ever lose control – not when you are dealing with 
thirty top professionals who are all millionaires . . . . If anyone steps out of my control, that’s 
them dead” (Elberse & Dye, 2012).  As well as distributing leadership to trusted “lieutenants” 
or cultural architects (another means of retaining central control, albeit discretely, by working 
through these individuals) managers are also strongly advised to engage in the micropolitics 
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of change.  Acknowledging the outcome-obsessed climate of contemporary professional and 
Olympic sport settings, such activities appear fundamental for protecting both personal and 
programme credibility. 
9.3.2. Applied Implications for Elite Sport Organisations’ Top Management Structures 
 In association with the applied implications for elite sport performance managers, this 
thesis also provides some important recommendations for the top management structures in 
elite performance sport (i.e., Boards of Directors, UK Sport, BOA).  First, as optimal benefits 
are conferred when performance team cultures are plugged into, sensitive to, and exploitative 
of surrounding organisational and social contexts, it is vital that managers are appointed who 
fit with the history, traditions, strategy, and goals of the organisation.  Considerations should 
therefore be made beyond the manager’s level of previous success; such as their professional 
philosophies and personal values.  Of particular pertinence for professional sport settings, in 
which managerial abilities are often inappropriately conflated with prior abilities as a 
performer (cf. Kelly, 2008), top management structures should also be wary when 
considering potential appointments who have no formal management training or experience.  
While these figures may possess many of the competencies required of a team manager (e.g., 
an understanding of technical and tactical performance factors, the ability to effectively 
engage with the media), the results in this thesis show that optimal culture change delivery 
heavily relies on adaptive expertise (i.e., the ability to make moment-to-moment decisions 
which are coherent with short, intermediate, and long term agendas).  Additionally, the need 
to appoint managers who can embrace and adapt to shifting dynamics and contexts also 
seems to be vital for optimising the likelihood that programmes will deliver instant and 
enduring high performance. 
Reflecting the critical nature of the initial culture change transition/integration phase, 
Boards of Directors are also advised to consider how optimal time, space, and support can be 
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provided to the manager, particularly if the appointment itself does not naturally generate the 
necessary psychosocial momentum via which new or refined values, standards, and practices 
can established.  For example, top management could undertake greater engagement with the 
media to send messages to the support staff, performers, and fans/public to share the load in 
instantly setting and aligning multi-stakeholder perspectives and to present an unified front 
(rather than letting the manager publicly “go it alone” and waiting to see how events unfold; 
indeed, it is somewhat surprising and counterintuitive that those with ultimate responsibility 
for the organisation’s performance are predominantly most vocal when a CM programme is 
perceived to be struggling).  A further and linked implication is the need for top management 
structures to themselves provide time, space, and support to the new manager.  Indeed, top 
management are encouraged to carefully consider their long-term strategies and its level of 
coherence with their short-term decision making over the new manager’s programme.  The 
results of this thesis have shown the significant and often negative impact which top-down 
pressures to conform (i.e., to the best practice of others) and distractions at the strategic and 
political levels of organisational management have on PM and PD efforts to optimise sport 
performance.  Notably, Sam (2012) has recently reflected on the constraints placed on 
sporting organisations by outcome-oriented government funding structures to copy best 
practice rather than develop innovative approaches.  Additionally, with the management  
participants in this thesis reporting that high performing cultures can take many years to 
establish, the wisdom in quickly sacking a manager in the face of mixed initial results is 
questionable; particularly if the manager is “on message” with wider organisational strategy, 
performance (not necessarily outcome) trends suggest that progress is being made against the 
big picture, systems and processes are being applied and developed which enable consistent 
and enduring high performance, and the perceptions of key stakeholders convey belief in the 
likelihood of success being achieved. 
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9.3.3. Applied Implications for Sport Psychologists 
 To support sport psychologists in their provision of culture change-based services for 
managers of elite sport performance teams (and potentially advice for sport organisation’s top 
management: Fletcher & Wagstaff, 2009), a number of practical implications are identified.  
As practitioners will be employed to support delivery of the implications described for elite 
sport performance team managers (cf. section 9.3.1.), these therefore also apply to sport 
psychologists (i.e., those are the processes, mechanisms, leadership styles, and management 
skills on which practitioners should primarily focus their advice).  Accordingly, this section 
therefore considers finer aspects of service provision. 
  Reflecting the nature of the task and results of this thesis, applied sport psychologists 
should primarily support elite sport performance team managers’ awareness of and expertise 
in handling the 360-degree social enactment of culture change.  Specifically, as well as aiding 
managers’ undertaking of the principles presented within the initial evaluation, planning, set-
up, and impact phase and engagement in two-way interactions with the internal and external 
stakeholders involved in the change process, practitioners should also help clients to identify 
means by which a programme (and the manager) can be protected from external stakeholder 
challenge.  Indeed, sport psychologists are advised to work with the manager on two agendas: 
the first, providing advice on the processes, mechanisms, and leadership styles/management 
skills by which high performing cultures may be created and sustained (as detailed above); 
the second, providing advice on processes, mechanisms, and leadership styles/management 
skills by which role survival can be optimised (in effect, helping to buy time to make the 
changes). 
 In this manner, and as the aim is to create high performing cultures and not just high 
performing managers, practitioners should consider the extent to which they focus on 
providing services and resources focused on optimising the manager’s leadership behaviours.  
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Indeed, due to the mediating role of results on performer perception (Callow et al., 2009) and 
the relative stability of personality traits (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000), it seems ill-advised 
to place such intervention at heart of practice.  Instead, optimal effectiveness is proposed to 
arrive from a focus on how the manager can promote members’ generation and regulation of 
compatible beliefs and expectations (though the two agendas described above). 
For meeting this objective, the culture change services of sport psychologists will 
primarily work through decision making support.  Indeed, as highlighted throughout this 
thesis and particularly in Chapter 8, culture change is largely a test of managers’ professional 
judgement and decision making around some key guiding principles rather than the ability to 
map out and then rigidly follow a series of steps.  As such, the impact of sport psychologists 
will likely be optimised through their awareness and understanding of the factors which 
underpin successful culture change and their ability to support decision making processes.  In 
particular, best practice is proposed to arise from assisting the manager in making choices 
which are carefully considered against: 
• The 360-degree enactment of culture change and full range of stakeholders implicated 
in a current and/or future specific moment or phase of the programme; 
• The connectedness within and across internal and external stakeholder groups (i.e., 
sending messages/delivering flanking attacks to multiple targets simultaneously); 
• The power and agency of internal and external individuals/groups (i.e., micropolitical 
action); 
• The programme’s short, intermediate, and long term aims and plans (i.e., to ensure 
nested, coherent, and consistent decision making and action); 
• Any developments which require these short, intermediate, and long term aims and 
plans to be adjusted; and 
• The overt and covert construction of cultural values, standards, and practices. 
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As such, helping managers to assess the declarative underpinnings of various options 
is forwarded as a keystone of optimal support.  As an example, ahead of a planned request to 
obtain additional funding for sport science support, the sport psychologist could help the 
manager to identify means by which relevant powerbrokers can be alerted to this matter and 
its implications before it is explicitly discussed in a Board meeting.  Regarding the media, 
equipping managers with pre-planned responses to the inevitable interrogation of their 
program may also be vital.  If faced with initial mixed/poor results, helping to divert or 
deflect the media agenda (and the focus of top-management, support staff, and performers) 
toward external, unstable, and temporary causes may be vital in keeping a fledgling program 
on track (Weiner, 1985).  Importantly, such decision making support is also grounded in the 
data collected for this thesis: 
I think what would be very useful actually is an independent mentor, an independent 
mentor that you trust . . . . [or] a reflective counsellor who is just there, that’s your 
resource; it’s almost a buddy system.  Who do you go to when you are not sure?  You 
don’t go to your boss.  Rarely do you go to your boss, so where do you go?  I think 
that would be helpful because I didn’t have crisis plan, I didn’t know what to do when 
it started going wrong, like really wrong, not little twiddley bits. (PD4) 
Following this point, it is recommended that, unlike the traditional approach in business to 
contract out CM experts and change agents (Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004), the sport 
psychologist operates as a consultant and decision making tool rather than visible deliverer of 
any formal systems, structures, or processes in the team setting.  Indeed, the importance of 
the manager delivering the programme (as per the need to demonstrate and retain ultimate 
authority: cf. Chapter 8) was reinforced by another participant of this thesis: 
I believe a sport psychologist is good one to one but the best sport psychologist in 
sport by a million miles is Alex Ferguson, by a million miles . . . . I’ve seen [sport 
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psychologists] crumble...in front of groups, literally crumble, not have a clue . . . . I’m 
the sport psychologist around the whole [team] . . . . That’s why [Sir Alex] Ferguson’s 
the best.  Now his ways of doing it you wouldn’t get past the Geneva Convention but 
it works . . . . The sport psychologist at a [sport] club is the [manager]. (F2) 
Finally, and if comprehensive support is to be provided, sport psychologists also need 
to become familiar with the ways in which the external stakeholders/organisations implicated 
in culture change delivery operate.  In this respect, awareness of the organisational structure 
of the sport, the role and function of external partners or funding agencies (such as UK 
Sport), and – particularly when working in professional sport environments – the nature of 
the media’s involvement are crucial.  Indeed, media savvy and contact details of a good PR 
advisor are essential features of the culture change consultant’s armoury.  At the very least, 
practitioners must be able to recognise when such support is needed, and act to encourage the 
manager to seek help before all are sacked! 
9.4. Implications for Management Training: A Workshop-Based Resource 
To further meet the final objective of this thesis (cf. Chapter 1), the aforementioned 
implications were recently packaged and deployed in a workshop-based training resource for 
current and aspirant team managers on the Rugby Football Union’s Elite Coach Development 
programme.  Guided by the implications for applied sport psychologists, it was decided that a 
one-day workshop format would provide the most effective vehicle for intervention.  More 
specifically, by adopting this approach the opportunity to present the theoretical framework 
on which the applied implications were based and then allow participants to put lessons into 
action (rather than a lecture or presentation) was deemed important for enhancing attendees’ 
applied knowledge and abilities (as per my pragmatic research philosophy).  The workshop 
programme is outline presented in Appendix C. 
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As detailed in Appendix C, the training event opened with an introduction to the 
culture change construct and the professional sport-specific model as developed in Chapter 4.  
Employed to familiarise participants with the theory on which the training was to be based, 
this opening presentation provided a definition of culture change, a concise summary of its 
practical relevance and importance, and then “built” the main culture optimisation system (as 
per Figure 4.1); the latter involving a process of progressively identifying: (a) the internal and 
external stakeholders implicated in culture change; (b) the dynamic and contested agency of 
these stakeholders and the need for a two-way interaction and power-share approach; (c) the 
role of context in governing social interactions and managerial decision making and action; 
and (d) the unique function of the media in terms of their ability to interact with all 
implicated stakeholder groups.  After presentation of this background information, three areas 
for action were identified on which the rest of the workshop was focused; more specifically: 
off-field multi-directional management, on-field decision making, and managing the media. 
As this resource was delivered in one day, the choice to focus on these specific areas 
was also shaped by the practicalities of the workshop itself.  Channelling attention onto these 
constituent blocks was therefore considered against perceptions of the “gatekeeper” through 
which the event was organised in terms of their relevance and importance for the participants 
(thereby ensuring that the workshop, as well as the implications it delivered, was grounded in 
the practical concerns of the target population).  Accordingly, the block focused on off-field 
multi-directional management was delivered by myself and focused on the implications from 
this thesis with the on-field decision making and media blocks representing areas of specialist 
expertise which were delivered by area experts (the former by my supervisor, Professor Dave 
Collins, and the latter by Richard Warburton, Chief Press Officer for the UK Government’s 
Home Affairs Department and former Chief Performance Press Officer for UK Athletics).  
More explicitly, shaping on-field decision making was included to meet attendees’ needs for 
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guidance on approaches which
many were “hands on” coaches) and managing the media included as it was a particularly 
critical mechanism of successful change in professional sport environments (cf. Chapter 4).  
Additionally, and recognising the variability across professional rugby teams in terms of their 
media profile and exposure, the media block also acted a general metaphor for 
means of sending messages (e.g.,
In delivering my own block, implications were delivered through a focus on three key 
applied implications from this thesis: specifically, the 
impact phase; the 360-degree
side of system leadership.  In this manner, key messages were delivered across the process, 
mechanisms, and leadership of culture change best practice.  Presenting the themes of the 
initial evaluation, planning, set
change programme, a schematic representation of this checklist “in action” was presented 
(based on collected and analysed data in Chapter 4) to reaffirm its status as a contextually
specific process.  This schematic 
Figure 9.1. 
Schematic of the Enactment of the Initial Evaluation, P
Professional Sport Performance Team Culture C
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Using this schematic as a tool by which to discuss managerial decision making and 
action in opening culture change phases, particular stress was placed on the point that optimal 
programmes were initiated weeks before (rather than at the time of) appointment.  As such, 
discussion was facilitated on the activities and messages which could be deployed to optimise 
the critical integration/transition phase (as underpinned by the 360-degree, multi-directional 
grounded theory framework).  To provide participants with exemplars of best practice, short 
videos were provided showing such activities and messages in action (principally setting and 
aligning multi-stakeholder perceptions and expectations and identifying and harnessing 
social allies and cultural architects), as delivered by current high profile international/non-
UK based club rugby managers and UK-based club football managers (see later comments on 
rationale behind not using English club rugby managers).  Following the illumination of this 
vital opening programme phase, participants were then provided with exemplar quotes from 
Chapter 4 to describe the apparent underpinning mechanism of elite sport performance team 
culture change (i.e., the subtle engineering of environmental contexts) and the usefulness of 
carefully deployed dark side leadership (i.e., demonstrating and retaining ultimate authority21 
and performance-focused ruthlessness).  As such, this presentation therefore provided 
participants with a practical-level awareness of the importance of: (a) adopting a 360-degree 
perspective; (b) actively shaping the conditions in which change is delivered (rather than 
responding to them); (c) considering and deploying layered messages and flanking attacks 
(i.e., working through multiple stakeholder groups); (d) considering how change can be 
facilitated through covert as well as overt agendas (i.e., shaping environmental contexts); (e) 
demonstrating and retaining ultimate control over the performance department; and, 
underpinning all of the above, (f) an appreciation of the relative timing and consequences of 
                                                 
21
 Please note that some themes derived from the analysis in Chapter 4 were rephrased for the workshop to 
optimise understanding and rapport through attaching such constructs to fit participants’ common language. 
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moment-to-moment decisions against short, intermediate, and long terms intentions and 
plans. 
 To marry these learning outcomes and provide participants with further understanding 
on how these principles could be combined, the second section of this block explored the CM 
programme of a recently appointed football manager through his engagement with the media 
(specifically, that being undertaken by Harry Redknapp at English Premiership football team 
Queens Park Rangers).  In support of this video footage, participants were also provided with 
a document which detailed the (hypothesised) nested planning on which this manager’s 
actions and delivered messages were apparently based.  This document is provided in 
Appendix C.  To consolidate the learning outcomes delivered from the first section of this 
block, participants were encouraged to reflect on the declarative underpinnings of the 
manager’s action: i.e., what the manager was doing, who messages were for, and why he was 
doing it, why for them, and why at that particular moment in the change programme.  Once 
participants had rotated around all three topic areas (i.e., off-field multidirectional 
management, on-field decision making, managing the media), the event concluded with a 
hypothetical training scenario.  This exercise is explained in full in Appendix C and required 
participants to put into action the major learning points of the three training blocks. 
As a first culture change resource for elite sport performance team manager training, 
some important implications for future service provision are provided.  First, the use of case-
study based training appears critical; in this way, the real life complexities and challenges of 
culture change are highlighted as well as the context-related features of programme delivery.  
As such, training resources should continue to use concepts derived from this thesis within 
contextually-specific discussions and exercises.  Additionally, and regardless of the extent to 
which clubs receive mass media attention, the utility of including a media element to training 
is supported by its ability to also direct attention to alternative forms of sending messages to 
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target stakeholders.  Furthermore, it is advised that future workshops also consider structuring 
content around examples from environments which participants are less familiar.  In this way, 
facilitators can direct the participants to the declarative underpinnings of managers’ decision 
making and action without the influence of mediating factors (e.g., participants knowing the 
manager, inter-participant competition).  Finally, opportunities to integrate cultural change 
and media management principles alongside an on-field focus on decision making/behaviour 
change was also encouraged as this provides a crucial thread between these features of team 
management and the area on which elite sport ultimately depends: competitive results. 
9.5. Evaluating the Quality and Impact of the Implications 
 Recalling the intention of this thesis to develop valuable applied knowledge under the 
pragmatic research philosophy (cf. Chapter 3), the final section of this chapter considers the 
extent to which the findings and implications have achieved a level of community agreement 
and therefore status as provisional practical-level truths (i.e., those which are functional for 
the context in which research was engaged: Giacobbi et al., 2005).  Reflecting their relevance 
to the topic, this community includes elite sport performance team managers, sport 
psychology academics and consultants, and organisational CM academics and consultants. 
 First, dialogue on the findings and implications of this thesis has been facilitated in 
the organisational CM, sport psychology, and sport coaching communities via the acceptance 
and publication of five articles in peer-reviewed journals plus two co-authored book chapters 
across all of these disciplines (see Appendix B).  In particular, the International Journal of 
Sports Science and Coaching was targeted for publication of a paper based on the Leeds 
Carnegie case study as this outlet publishes its lead articles (of which this case study will be) 
alongside critical open reviews from a number of academic and applied subject area 
specialists.  As such, through this process, a notable level of community agreement has been 
evidenced and, of equal importance, areas in which this initial and provisional knowledge can 
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be extended and refined to optimise both research endeavours and applied practice.  Of 
further note, it is significant that I have also received a number of spontaneous emails from 
both organisational and sport psychology consultants who have offered highly positive 
feedback on the content and implications of these publications, provided insights into their 
own research and applied work in high performance businesses and sport organisations, and 
inquired about opportunities for potential future collaboration. 
 As noted in Chapter 3, further community-based dialogue has been facilitated through 
the acceptance and delivery of three oral presentations at national and regional conferences of 
the British Psychology Society’s Division of Sport and Exercise Psychology (see Appendix 
B).  As well as delivering the findings and implications of the studies described in Chapters 4, 
5, and 6, active efforts have also been made to engage with, and source feedback from, the 
sport psychologists who have observed these presentations. These individuals have provided 
positive feedback on both the theoretical and applied value of the culture change construct 
and my findings.  Notably, I have also received a number of follow-up emails after these 
presentations from individuals to share their perceptions and experiences as related to the 
findings and implications which I presented at these events.  As noted in Chapter 3, one of 
these presentations also led to a request from the editor of the Division of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology’s consultancy-oriented publication (the Sport and Exercise Psychology Review) 
for an invited submission. 
 Significantly, the relevance and importance of the products of the work programme 
undertaken for this thesis has also been reinforced through media coverage.  Specifically, a 
leading journalist for the US-based Boston Globe approached me to discuss the paper which 
was published in the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology and the findings from my linked 
research activities.  While not a member of the sport psychology or organisational CM 
community, the consequent coverage provided by the journalist in this outlet (cf. Appendix 
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B) is a notable marker of the general “stickiness” of the culture change construct and the 
findings from my work to date (i.e., a construct and findings which are understood, 
remembered, and elicit changes to opinion, behaviour, or values: Heath & Heath, 2010). 
 Finally, although arguably most significantly with respect to the adopted pragmatic 
research perspective, initial feedback from current and aspirant elite sport performance team 
managers provides a critical marker of research quality.  As well as acquired responses to and 
insights on the models developed in Chapters 4 and 5 from highly experienced managers (cf. 
data analysis sections), the perceptions of the participants of the workshop provide a valuable 
gauge on the usefulness of the findings and implications of this thesis.  Notably, through the 
Rugby Football Union’s own independent evaluation process, 100% of the 20 attendees 
considered the workshop to be relevant to their current and/or future practice and 90% 
considered it to apply well to their current/future role.  Beyond these encouraging statistics, 
further markers of quality and impact were found in attendees’ short qualitative feedback 
notes on the event’s relevance, applicability, and impact on personal reflection (all critical 
markers of quality under the pragmatic philosophy: Buman et al., 2005; Giacobbi et al., 
2005). For example, one participant highlighted the value of being exposed to culture change 
“stages, processes [and] considerations, both on and off the field”, while another emphasised 
the benefits of “information on [the] management of systems and conflicting needs of 
[internal and external] environments.”  Additionally, one invited participant from a 
professional football club also provided valuable feedback with regards to a similar 
workshop’s potential usefulness for football managers, noting that it was “definitely the sort 
of thing they should touch on more on the FA/UEFA course that we always go on.”  As noted 
in Chapter 3, the action research project of which this workshop was the first step will 
provide the opportunity to modify and refine the initial and fallible knowledge developed by 
this thesis (Bryant, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005). 
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CHAPTER 10: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1. Introduction 
 While the management of change has received major attention in business literature, 
there is a lack of theoretical and applied knowledge on this process as delivered in elite sports 
team organisations; especially within the department responsible for these organisations’ core 
product: on-field performance.  Given the extreme pressures placed on the managers of elite 
sport performance teams to deliver instant and enduring success, as evidenced by the regular 
and often rapid dismissals of such individuals (e.g., League Managers Association, 2010), the 
focus of this thesis was on the development of bespoke understanding on how managers can 
successfully establish and sustain high performing cultures which are robust to the challenges 
of elite sport settings and facilitate the continued pursuit and attainment of peak performance: 
To meet this overall purpose, the objectives of this thesis were sevenfold: 
1. To explore perceptions of culture change across pertinent performance management 
levels in a British elite sport context (specifically professional and Olympic sport 
environments), develop models of best practice, and evaluate their congruence 
with/divergence from current business-based knowledge. 
2. To explore the generality of culture change ‘best practice’ across British professional and 
Olympic sport performance team environments. 
3. To analyse and explain successful elite sport performance team culture change through 
multiple stakeholder perspectives. 
4. To examine the power of an imported theoretical lens for explaining culture change in an 
elite sport performance team. 
5. To identify common mechanisms of elite sport performance team culture change. 
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6. To identify common leadership/management skills for delivering elite sport performance 
team culture change. 
7. To prescribe effective guidance for management seeking to efficiently establish and 
sustain high performing cultures in their team environments. 
As described in Chapter 2, guidance on how to meet these objectives was significantly 
constrained by the methodological limitations of organisational CM literature, the theoretical 
ambivalence of organisational CM research, the unique power-based features of elite sport 
performance teams and the lack of parallel constructs in applied sport psychology.  As such, 
with concern over the appropriateness of directly transferring theory, concepts, and practices 
from organisational literature and sport psychology offering similarly few implications for 
guiding culture change study, it was identified that the thesis needed to employ a philosophy 
(pragmatism) and strategies (grounded theory methodology/case study methodology) which 
allowed for the generation of contextually-specific, theoretically appropriate, and practically 
meaningful knowledge.  The findings obtained from this approach are now summarised. 
10.2. Summary of Findings 
 The study described in Chapter 4 employed grounded theory methodology to develop 
the first model of manager-led culture change best practice in professional sport performance 
teams (Objective 1).  Using qualitative interviews as the data collection method, perceptions 
were acquired from eight managers with varied experiences of working at the highest levels 
of UK professional football, rugby union, and rugby league (i.e., early sackings versus long-
term successes versus a mix of sackings and successes).  Exploring the process of optimal 
change, as supported by participants’ perceptions of previously successful approaches, views 
on best practice, and reflections on key mistakes/lessons, the study consequently developed a 
framework which illuminated the chronology and nature of optimal culture change delivery 
in professional sport performance teams.  Specifically, this model was made up of two co-
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initiated and co-dependent elements: the first, a finite phase of initial evaluation, planning, 
and impact (which laid the foundations/provided the catalyst for efficient and enduring 
change); and the second, an enduring holistic, integrated, and dynamic culture optimisation 
system.  This model was rooted to the power and contested agency of internal (i.e., support 
staff and performers) and external (i.e., the Board, fans, media, other significant influences) 
stakeholders, with successful operation dependent on two-way interaction and power-share 
relationships from which the manager constantly acquired, negotiated, and configured multi-
group interests.  In this manner, the “cultural bubble” which encapsulated the performance 
department was at all times sensitive to, and exploitative of, wider organisational and social 
contexts.  Notably, beyond working to optimise the media’s perception of the manager, the 
model also pointed to the significance of individuals working through this group as a key 
mechanism of change in this environment.  While some of these findings resonated with the 
organisational change literature, the incorporation of power- and political-based dynamics in 
a non-linear and boundless model provided a stark contrast to the previously leader-centric, 
sequential prescriptions from this field (e.g., Kanter et al., 1992; Kotter, 1996; Luecke, 2003; 
Price & Chahal, 2006).  At this stage, however, it was unknown to what extent this specific 
model and its defining components were common to other UK-based elite sport performance 
environments; specifically, Olympic sport performance teams. 
Accordingly, to address this limitation, Chapter 5 reported an investigation of culture 
change best practice as perceived by the PDs of Olympic sport performance teams.  Focused 
on an environment in which these management figures deliver programmes on a larger scale 
(operationally and/or geographically), the study utilised the exact same methodology as that 
deployed for Chapter 4 with the final participant group again being drawn from a variety of 
backgrounds (i.e., individual sports, team sports, individual-plus-team sports) and providing 
a sample which had experienced variable success (short to long term role survival).  Further 
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based on these individuals’ perceptions of successfully delivered approaches, views on best 
practice, and reflections on key mistakes/lessons, a domain-specific model was consequently 
developed which depicted the chronology and nature of optimal culture change practice in 
this performance setting.  Mirroring the findings from Chapter 4, this framework was also 
represented as a general two-pronged process which was underpinned by two fundamental 
components (i.e., initial evaluation, planning, set-up, and impact; management of a holistic, 
integrated, and dynamic culture optimisation system).  Moreover, this model was sensitive 
to, and exploitative of, wider organisational and social contexts via similar two-way 
interaction and power share relationships with key internal (i.e., upper echelon/lower echelon 
support staff, performers) and external (i.e., the governing body Board, UK Sport, BOA, 
external partners media, other significant influences) stakeholders; again portraying a 
process aimed at attaining, negotiating, and configuring the often challenging and conflicting 
perceptions of these powerful groups.  In this manner, this study reinforced the similarities 
and distinctions between elite sport performance team culture change and organisational CM 
frameworks as highlighted in Chapter 4.  Notably, while media scrutiny was markedly less 
for most (but not all) PDs, which therefore required less attention, resources, and effort than 
the case of PMs, management and use of internal (e.g., websites, newsletters, blogs) and 
external (e.g., written press, television, radio) media was a similarly valuable change 
mechanism. 
Notwithstanding these comparisons, subtle yet important differences were also found 
across the PM and PD models; reinforcing the significance of contextually-grounded CM 
study (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012).  These points of demarcation were most notably 
evidenced by the PDs’ greater focus on: 
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• gaining a comprehensive understanding of the performance environment in the first 
instance, rather than rapidly evaluating against ideal types (due to the PD’s relative 
inability to quickly replace performers and the PM’s need to deliver instant results); 
• upward management (due to the heightened complexity both within and across the 
agencies who could exert top-down influence on PDs’ programmes); 
• politically-sensitive discourse/action to ensure continued widespread buy-in (due to 
the PD propensity to manage upwards and deliver change through support staff, 
systems, structures, process/“lead from above”, rather than the PM propensity to 
deliver change with support staff, systems, structures, and processes/“lead from the 
front/behind”); and 
• identifying alternative (i.e., non-results based) means to deliver “visible” change (due 
to the relative infrequency of competition). 
While the focus on manager perceptions was the logical starting point for this thesis, in 
that the focal construct (i.e., culture change) was conceptualised as a manager-led activity, 
the studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5 were limited by the decision not to frame questions 
of the interview guide within specific time blocks, which may have impacted on the accuracy 
of recall and left the interview open to mediation by hindsight and self-preservation biases 
(Nestler et al., 2008; Coolican, 2004).  Additionally, by only interviewing team managers’ 
perspectives, the extent to which the discussed CM approaches were jointly perceived and 
considered impactful (for optimising team functioning and performance) by support 
staff/performers (i.e., the targets of change) and influential external stakeholders (e.g., the 
Board) was uncertain. 
To address these shortcomings, Chapter 6 explored multi-stakeholder perspectives as 
part of a case study on a successfully delivered change programme at English Rugby Union’s 
Leeds Carnegie between 2008 and 2010.  Adopting a 360-degree approach – as suggested by 
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the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 – perceptions of team management, support staff, 
performers, and the CEO were acquired through the same interview guide as used in Chapters 
4 and 5 but this time paired with a visual depiction of the programme’s key phases/events to 
contextualise questioning (as initially designed by the team management then refined by each 
participant to fit their subjective experiences).  Sustaining an iterative approach to knowledge 
development (as per the principles of the pragmatic research philosophy: Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005), this chapter also advanced understanding of the complex and 
contested nature of the grounded theory models.  Specifically, decentred theory was used as 
an interpretative lens to corroborate and extend developing results, provide an alternative 
account of culture change best practice, and aid methodological decisions (i.e., data analysis 
procedures) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
From this approach, findings revealed that change was delivered endogenously rather 
than imposed by the management team, as underpinned by the programme-leaders’ principle 
of support staff/performer ownership.  Focused on supporting group-generated and regulated 
values, standards, and practices, the success of the programme, support staff and performers 
were provided with clearly delineated roles and liberated to take the lead on many aspects of 
team functioning and performance.  Beyond the success factors of this specific case, findings 
aligned with the two-pronged models presented in Chapters 4 and 5 in that the management 
team’s initial activities (which mirrored the processes detailed in the professional sport based 
culture framework developed in Chapter 4) provided the starting point and catalyst for the 
integrated, holistic, and dynamic change process (which was also built on similar two-way 
interaction and power-share relationships with internal and external stakeholders).  From the 
“decentred perspective”, the dynamic, contested, and power-based interactions suggested by 
this framework were evident in the results.  Moreover, and extending the results of Chapters 
4 and 5, the findings also revealed that programme success was facilitated by the deployment 
Chapter 10 
 
259 
 
of systems, structures, and processes which actively promoted a to and fro of power between 
team management and their support staff/players and CEO; thereby affording these groups 
opportunities to have their interests and opinions met, negotiated, or at least discussed.  From 
its facilitation of these results (as per its focus on developing contextually-specific knowledge 
through multi-stakeholder perspectives, emphasis on the radical contingency of individuals, 
and consideration of power as a construct which flows in all directions), initial support for 
decentred theory’s utility in elite sport team culture change inquiry was therefore provided. 
While Chapters 4, 5, and 6 identified key processes of elite sport performance team 
culture change, they did not provide detailed coverage as to how these processes were best 
delivered.  Accordingly, and in a shift from processes to mechanisms, Chapter 7 described a 
mechanism which appeared to underpin successful change across all levels of management in 
professional and Olympic settings.  Explicitly, to circumvent the contested agency of internal 
stakeholders and minimise the extent to which performance managers engaged with (time and 
energy consuming) two-way interaction and power share processes, best practice was enabled 
by a subtle engineering of environmental contexts.  Via this approach, rather than constantly 
and overtly (i.e., verbally) negotiating values, perceptions and behaviours, managers also 
shaped systems and structures alongside physical, psychosocial, and operational contexts in a 
manner which liberated support staff and performers to make their choice of whether to 
adhere to the high performing principles espoused by the manager/team but also covertly 
guided them to select those choices which would ultimately lead to the pursuit and attainment 
of consistent high performance.  Notably, a key principle behind the success of this type of 
approach was in manipulating what change-targets perceived to be socially “normal” rather 
than “right”. 
Building on this consideration of how the processes of culture change best practice 
were delivered, Chapter 8 illuminated some particularly fundamental leadership styles and 
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management skills on which best practice was dependent.  Similarly based on analysed data 
from Chapters 4, 5, and 6, optimal culture change delivery chiefly required distributed and 
dark side leadership styles, micropolitical abilities, complexity-adapting behaviour, and 
context-specific expertise.  Notably, these results pointed to the significance of a manager 
possessing a range of leadership and management skills (rather than one type of behavioural 
repertoire, such as transformational leadership) which are deployed specifically to the given 
context and considered against short, medium, and long-term agendas.  Indeed, these findings 
revealed a pressing need for attributes which enabled command centres across the staff and 
performers (i.e., distributed leadership), critical protection of the programme and its 
underpinning values (i.e., dark side leadership), political sensitivity (i.e., micropolitics), 
responses to evolving contexts and events (i.e., complexity-adapting behaviour), and decision 
making linked to nested plans (i.e., coherent short, medium, and long term intentions).  As 
well as providing valuable initial insights on the elite sport performance team culture change 
skill set, these results also challenge the orthodoxy of managerial and leadership 
“competence” in academic and applied environments and instead point to the relevance and 
importance of adaptive expertise (Fazey et al., 2005; Tozer et al., 2007). 
 Finally, this thesis has also provided some valuable insights on how the implications 
from the research findings may be packaged and delivered in an applied training resource for 
current and aspirant elite sport performance team managers.  Specifically, and as described in 
Chapter 9, workshop-based training would appear to be best supported through the use of real 
life, case-study based approaches with respect to their ability to maintain the context-specific 
nature of culture change best practice (and therefore simultaneously warn against uncritical 
application of personal or others’ prior successful approaches).  Moreover, the incorporation 
of a media element was highly worthwhile with respect to the importance of working through 
this group in professional sport performance team settings (cf. Chapter 4) and for its ability to 
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elicit reflection on the part of trainees as to more general alternative and covert means of 
sending messages to target stakeholders.  Lastly, locating the applied cases in sports which 
are not the primary interest of participants was also found to useful.  Expressly, this approach 
encouraged participants to critically consider the underpinning rationale behind managers’ 
decision making and action by minimising the interaction of personal interests or detailed 
knowledge (actual or perceived) on the actual outcomes of these decisions and actions. 
10.3. Specific Recommendations: Future Research in Elite Sport Performance Team 
Culture Change 
 Adhering to the pragmatic research philosophy’s principle that knowledge (or ways of 
knowing) is a regenerative process with the products of research, and therefore the outcomes 
of this thesis, essentially instrumental, provisional, and fallible in nature (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Giacobbi et al., 2005; Morgan, 2007), numerous lines of future research are merited. 
 First, as substantive theories such as those reported in Chapters 4 and 5 are intricately 
linked to the contexts in which investigation is based and therefore limited by their specificity 
to particular a time, place, and user (rather than conceptual broadness: Bryant, 2009), there is 
a need to examine the extent to which the results presented in this thesis are theoretically and 
practically applicable to other elite sport performance team environments and, possibly, CM 
programmes delivered by middle managers in organisational settings.  While this thesis has 
developed models of best practice, a worthy contrast and contribution would also be provided 
through detailed exploration of unsuccessful practice.  Importantly, such work would provide 
valuable insights as to the potential for the models developed in this thesis to be raised to a 
more formal level in the future or, of equal importance, the ceiling at which decontextualised 
frameworks begin to lose their applied usefulness. 
Following this point, and adhering to recommendations that “application is essential 
for substantiation of [a theory or model’s] worth” (Pryor, Humphreys, Taneja, & Toombs, 
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2011, p. 209), the intended action-research study emanating from the workshop described in 
Chapter 9 also takes initial priority.  Importantly, steps have already been taken to begin the 
process of examining the impact of this intervention as perceived by a sample of attendees, 
primarily via a series of interviews aimed to promote reflection on and improvements to these 
individuals’ practice (Tinning, 1992).  Importantly, such work will provide opportunities for 
researchers to reflect on the practical utility of the offered guidance and invaluable insight on 
some of the “real-time” challenges faced by those aiming to optimise team culture. 
 Indeed, while this thesis is characterised by many strengths, particularly in the level of 
access acquired to high level (and often elusive) research participants and a focus on precise 
specification rather than general abstraction (du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012), the work programme 
was limited by the lack of real-time inquiry (albeit the studies conducted in this thesis were 
the logical starting points for opening study in this bespoke area).  Now that initial models of 
best practice have been developed, alongside understanding of their critical success factors, 
mechanisms, and supporting leadership and management attributes, attention should begin to 
shift toward tracking culture change programmes in real time; an approach which has been 
relatively ignored in organisational studies.  In undertaking such an approach, two avenues 
for advancing knowledge seem warranted: the first, an action-research approach whereby the 
researcher/consultant assumes an active role in supporting the manager’s delivery of change; 
consequently “taking action and creating knowledge or theory about that action” (Coughlan 
and Coghlan, 2002, p. 220); and the second, if practitioner help is not sought but access 
nonetheless granted, ethnographic study could be effectively utilised to observe, record and 
reflect upon an unfolding program of change.  Following ethnographic directives in applied 
sport psychology (Krane & Baird, 2005), culture change may therefore be examined via a 
mix of observation (participant/non-participant), field notes, research logs, reflexive journals, 
focus groups, texts and documents (e.g., media coverage), visual data (e.g., training/match 
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videos), questionnaires, and interviews.  Reflecting the context-specific nature of culture 
change delivery, this method of investigation will logically offer the most accurate depiction 
of the nuances behind a programme’s initiation, evolution, regulation and in some cases, 
termination.  Significantly, through this triangulation of methods and outcome markers (i.e., 
perceptions, processes, and performance: Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b), action-research and 
ethnography avenues would also enhance confidence in determining the extent to which team 
culture had actually been changed or not and, therefore, substantiate the primary perception-
based findings from this thesis.  
From the findings of this thesis, it is also vital that such inquiry, where possible, seeks 
to examine multi-stakeholder perspectives.  Indeed, this approach is invaluable for enhancing 
the completeness of management action, triangulating the effectiveness of this action, and 
illuminating the socially complex and dynamic nature of elite sport performance team culture 
change.  Moreover, to develop greater understanding in how two way interactions and power-
share relationships and best managed, studies should continue to recruit stakeholder groups 
examined in this thesis (i.e., team managers, support staff, performers, Board members) and 
also extend focus to consider the perceptions of other key individuals/groups, such as the 
media in professional/high profile sports and UK Sport in Olympic sport.  Importantly, work 
of this nature should also seek to illuminate pertinent interactions which occur exclusively 
between non-performance team management groups (i.e., without or beyond the involvement 
of the performance team management).  Indeed, although the models presented in Chapters 4 
and 5 revolved around the performance team manager (reflecting my focus on team manager-
led change), some of the data collected for this thesis logically alluded to the role and impact 
of “extra-manager” interactions.  As such, future research should explore the extent to which 
similar to and fro relationships prevail within and across non-performance team management 
groups and consider how the values, practices, and standards of the performance team are 
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continually constructed and reinforced by those on the periphery of the system.  As indicated 
by the two frameworks developed in this thesis, working through the media would appear to 
provide a particular valuable means by which such constructions can be framed by team 
managers.  In this manner, study which traces a manager’s action, their linked messages to 
the media, the consequent interpretation and interaction of stakeholders, and the impact of 
this interpretation and interaction back onto the performance department represents a highly 
intriguing approach (especially for unearthing the critical success factors behind the proposed 
use of layered messages and flanking attacks).  To optimise the theoretical and applied 
contribution of all forms of multi-stakeholder work, researchers should continue to carefully 
consider the role and benefits of client confidentiality against the purposes of inquiry. 
As well as continuing to explore the processes of optimal culture change delivery, as 
perceived by multiple stakeholders where possible, future research should also continue to 
explore how these processes are best delivered.  Specifically, and as guided by the findings of 
this thesis, further consideration of the identified key underpinning mechanism of successful 
change (i.e., the subtle shaping of environmental contexts) is warranted, particularly in the 
early phases of a manager’s tenure when attempting to efficiently and effectively optimise the 
values, standards, and practices ingrained by the prior regime.  Additionally, as indicated by 
its relevance and importance to PMs and PDs of high profile sports and as noted above, 
analysis on how change-managers interact with the media to support the social construction 
of their desired values, beliefs and expectations in group members will likely provide a 
valuable contribution to the literature (cf. McGannon, Hoffman, Metz & Schinke, 2011).  
Moreover, comprehensive work on the leadership and management attributes required for 
elite sport performance team culture change is also needed, particularly the extent to which 
dark side leadership (a previously sensitive subject in academic and applied spheres) is 
implicated in optimal program delivery.  Indeed, sport policy researchers (cf. Goodwin & 
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Grix, 2011; Grix, 2010) have recently argued for a modified decentred theory which 
embraces individual agency and contingent beliefs but also the role of hierarchical control 
mechanisms; in other words, an approach which accounts for bottom-up and top-down 
influence.  Accordingly, with demonstrating and retaining ultimate authority a key 
leadership theme identified in this thesis, in-depth investigation of how this power is 
demonstrated and retained to optimally interact with the clear power of internal and external 
stakeholders is merited. 
In terms of the application of pre-existing theoretical frameworks to help corroborate 
and extend the results of this thesis, the support provided in Chapter 6 for decentred theory’s 
utility justifies a more complete examination of this perspective’s value for continued culture 
change inquiry in elite sport performance teams.  As noted above, such investigation should 
carefully consider the theory’s ability to account for instances of top-down imposition and 
integrate these findings with developments in sport policy (cf. Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Grix, 
2010).  Beyond decentred theory, future research should also examine the extent to which a 
range of other paradigms can accurately account for culture change in elite performance team 
environments, such as stakeholder theory (Kihl et al., 2010) and network theory (Rowley, 
1997).  However, reflecting its recent application by business scholars to explain manager-led 
change processes (Theodoridis & Bennison, 2009) and identification by sports researchers as 
a parsimonious approach for explaining the incessant planning, acting and monitoring of 
coaching (Bowes & Jones, 2006), one approach worthy of particular attention is complexity 
theory.  Indeed, with CM widely regarded as a highly dynamic and nonlinear process (Graetz 
& Smith, 2010; Smith, 2004) which takes place in uncontrolled internal and external 
environments (By, 2005; Higgs and Rowland, 2010), alongside the discovery of complexity 
adapting behaviour as a defining feature of leading and managing elite sport performance 
team culture change (cf. Chapter 8), such inquiry is warranted. 
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As described by Anderson (1999), complexity in organisational research is considered 
a structural variable characterising both the environment and organisation itself.  In this case, 
Cilliers (2000) has highlighted that organisations are complex systems in that they consist of 
a large number of dynamically interacting elements (e.g., people, processes, history, context) 
whose interactions are nonlinear and produce emergent patterns of behaviour (Smith, 2004).  
As such, the behaviour of the system (i.e., organisational functioning/performance) cannot be 
predicted from the inspection of its components but, instead, by the nature of the interaction 
of these elements (e.g., history, change processes, manager-staff relationships).  Moreover, 
history and environmental context shapes the nature of these interactions, unpredictable 
events are expected, apparently minor events may have large consequences (and vice-versa), 
and control is distributed throughout.  Notably, all of these features have been implicated in 
the findings presented in this thesis. 
As such, future research of elite sport performance team culture change may benefit 
from a qualitative exploration of how complexity is managed during programme delivery.  In 
this manner, direction can be taken from Theodoridis and Bennison (2009) who have applied 
complexity theory to qualitatively explore retail business location strategy.  In this particular 
study, interviewed managers were found to hold different perceptions and understandings of 
complexity which were manifested in their contrasting strategic decision making processes; 
specifically, some remained fixed on predetermined company policy (complexity absorbing) 
and others embraced spontaneous opportunities presented by dynamic internal and external 
environments (complexity adapting).  Notably, this study also revealed that understanding 
complexity was a time dependent task, with the allocation of time to environmental scanning 
determined by the manager’s motivation to deal with it.  Recalling that time is an increasingly 
rare commodity for elite sport performance team managers, how complexity is approached in 
these pressurised environments may hold some power in explaining differential success and 
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survival.  Indeed, the value of using complexity theory as an interpretive lens is reinforced by 
the discovery in this thesis that culture change success in Olympic sport performance teams 
was facilitated through the effective management of the political complexity which pervaded 
within and across various internal and external environments (e.g., streamlining governance). 
 Finally, in conjunction with research-generated knowledge, another body of work also 
must consider pertinent professional issues for sport psychologists supporting culture change 
in elite sport performance teams.  Specifically, what ethical concerns arise when advising on 
dark side practices (especially those which expose certain support staff members and 
performers)?  How should sport psychologists’ support evolve over time?  How are culture 
change-specific decision making skills best enhanced in elite team managers?  And what, 
therefore, are the implications for the training and continued professional development of 
applied practitioners?  To meet these needs, personal accounts and critical reflections on elite 
team culture change consultancy will offer valuable contributions in the continued evolution 
of practice and the bodies responsible overseeing and advancing professional sport 
psychology. 
10.4. General Recommendations: A Forewarning for Research in the “Twilight Zone” 
In concluding this thesis, it is important to reconsider the wider context in which this 
research programme was located and the implications it carries for broader sport psychology 
research.  Through bringing the change management construct to the elite sport performance 
team domain, defining its focus (i.e., the establishment and maintenance of a high performing 
cultures), and providing initial knowledge on its delivery, this thesis has made a significant 
and novel contribution to sport psychology literature.  Indeed, with the discipline’s new focus 
on the organisational systems and structures surrounding teams and consideration of socially 
aggregate constructs, this thesis has illuminated one vital area of the “twilight zone” (i.e., the 
gap generated by sport management’s roots in off-field administration/policy areas and sport 
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psychology’s roots in on-field sport performance) outlined by Fletcher and Wagstaff (2009).  
Clearly, the agenda of this thesis was positioned closer to the “sport performance end” of this 
continuum in that it centred on a process which aimed to enhance the day-to-day functioning 
of the on-field performance team rather than the off-field organisation, or both; the latter of 
which has been recently been attempted by other researchers working at the organisation end 
of the continuum (Wagstaff et al., 2012a; Wagstaff et al., 2013).  As this “all-in” approach to 
studying elite sport organisations (i.e., not distinguishing between administration and 
performance) is receiving notable exposure in high impact journals (e.g., Wagstaff et al., 
2012a; Wagstaff et al., 2013), the results of this research provide a timely warning over the 
directions in which this organisational agenda may be taking sport psychology.  More 
specifically, it appears that the findings from much conducted work in this novel area are 
suffering from a similar “lost specification” to that which has plagued organisational CM (du 
Gay & Vikkelsø, 2012).  To exemplify this concern, take the specific case of the 
organisational stressor construct. 
In a recent issue of the Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, Arnold and Fletcher 
(2012) presented a synthesis and resultant taxonomy of the organisational stressors faced by 
sport performers which, the authors’ assert, “provides the most accurate, comprehensive, and 
parsimonious classification of organisational stressors to date . . . . [which is also] valid, 
generalisable, and applicable to a large number of sport performers of various ages, genders, 
nationalities, sports, and standards” (p. 397).  While the scale of their meta-interpretation was 
impressive, Arnold and Fletcher’s claims of the accuracy, validity, and power of their results 
are, it would seem, less so.  Specifically, while these authors note that organisational stressors 
have been previously defined as “environmental demands . . . associated primarily and 
directly with the organisation within which an individual is operating” (Fletcher, Hanton, & 
Mellalieu, 2006, p. 329), Arnold and Fletcher extend this definition to: “any environmental 
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demands . . . primarily associated with the organisation within which a performer was 
operating, but often related in some secondary sense with competitive or personal aspects of 
performers’ lives” [emphasis added] (p. 398).  This extension is supported with reference to 
Fletcher et al.’s (2012, p. 11) call for “innovative investigative approaches that develop less 
biased and more encompassing taxonomic classifications of . . . organisational stressors”.  
While Fletcher et al. do call for a more complete understanding of organisational stressors, it 
is difficult to see how this equates to broadening the construct’s definition to “secondary” 
stimuli.  As “meta interpretation is ‘an interpretation’ rather than ‘the interpretation’ of . . . 
multiple truths” (Weed, 2008, p. 17), this definition is of course not “wrong” (Arnold and 
Fletcher do explicitly state that their synthesis and taxonomy “represents our interpretation”, 
p. 419).  When considering this decision against Arnold and Fletcher’s “comprehensive” 
results, however, it is questionable. 
Significantly, Arnold and Fletcher (2012) are not the first to apply an overly liberal 
interpretation to the classification of organisational stress.  As one example, consider Arnold 
and Fletcher’s report of one performer’s concerns with whales as an environmental hazard in 
ocean sailing (a theme taken from Weston, Thelwell, Bond, & Hutchings, 2009).  This is, of 
course, a particular example; however, to illustrate the point, how did the original authors or 
Arnold and Fletcher interpret this as an organisational stressor?  Reflecting the principles of 
an interpretivist paradigm (which underpinned the authors’ meta-interpretation method), the 
performer should have expressed some organisational issue (e.g., selection of a “dangerous” 
location or the absence of any special measures to address this) in their original statement.  If 
stress is a transactional phenomenon and based on individual interpretation (as Arnold and 
Fletcher state), then researchers should offer a clear indication of their line of reasoning when 
grouping such self-reported concern into an “organisational” category.  Arnold and Fletcher 
continuing this trend of “broader” classification is, therefore, a useful if unintentional 
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highlight which suggests the need for a more critical consideration of some studies completed 
to date. 
Given their even broader operational definition, Arnold and Fletcher (2012) perhaps 
predictably generated an unparalleled pool of stressors including a host of “new” themes.  
More ominously, however, many elements and themes seem to have tenuous links to sports 
organisations (even in a secondary sense) or, in some cases, no discernible link at all.  For 
example, take the “organisational” stressors of: spectators, the media, upsets due to foreign 
cuisine, unfamiliar weather conditions and, as noted earlier, the threat of hitting whales.  
Notably, a number of stressors categorised by Arnold and Fletcher as “organisational” mirror 
those interpreted by other researchers as “competitive” or “personal” (e.g., Arnold and 
Fletcher placed parental expectations as an organisational stressor while McKay, Niven, 
Lavallee, and White, 2008, categorised a similar theme as a competitive source of strain).  By 
employing an all-inclusive definition and not exploring contextual differences, Arnold and 
Fletcher therefore reduce a diverse array of stimuli to a conceptually unsuitable construct; or 
more colloquially, fit numerous square pegs into a widened round hole.  Indeed, while all of 
these factors may have some relationship or even genesis in organisational constructs (e.g., 
the organisation overlooking or ignoring these factors), this needs to flow explicitly from the 
methodology employed (the context applied) and the way in which data are interpreted.  In its 
simplest terms, just because a sports organisation could act to address a particular issue but 
doesn’t, does not necessarily make this an organisational stressor. 
Of final note, while the orientation of Arnold and Fletcher’s (2012) study necessitated 
a comparison of findings with organisational-based knowledge, the authors’ integration of all 
stressor categories with this domain (including those more related to sports leadership, team, 
and performance issues) makes an implicit assumption that business and sport organisations 
are parallel environments.  Of course, as sport performers tend to operate within some kind of 
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organisational structure, these individuals may be considered employees or members of that 
organisation.  However, while prior work has shown similarities between principles in sport 
psychology and business (Fletcher, 2010) and that aspects of knowledge transfer may be 
fitting at an holistic organisation-level (Wagstaff et al., 2012b), the direct and uncritical 
application of business-based constructs for sport performance issues is not; a view supported 
by recent theorising (e.g., Cruickshank & Collins 2012a; Cruickshank & Collins, 2012b) and 
justified in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
While the organisational stressor construct is clearly a specific case, work in this area 
nonetheless (and importantly) draws attention to wider issues over the direction of continued 
study in the sport management-sport psychology twilight zone.  Specifically, while adopting 
a holistic organisational perspective has generated new knowledge in sport psychology, there 
appears to be some confusion over what performance issues organisational sport psychology 
does, and does not, account for.  By exaggerating the role of organisations to the extent that 
they can provide an explanation of every phenomenon which occurs within their boundaries 
(as in organisational stressor inquiry), this approach is at odds with the reported significance 
of contextual specificity in the theoretical and applied implications of this thesis.  Indeed, by 
taking a step away from the site of sport performance (i.e., pitch, track, etc), organisational-
wide investigation inevitably sacrifices a level of specificity and peculiarity on which optimal 
recommendations for specialist sub-units (e.g., performance departments) are dependent.  In 
the case of Arnold and Fletcher’s stressor taxonomy, any stressor could be organisational 
simply because an organisation doesn’t address it.  Similarly, further evidence of a propensity 
to generalise over contextualise is found in recent guidance for elite sport organisations to 
enhance the emotion-based abilities of all its members (including performers; Wagstaff et al., 
2012a) and the elucidation of elite team managers’ general competencies (Fletcher & Arnold, 
2011).  Although the findings from such works are clearly not “wrong”, the question for sport 
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psychology as an applied discipline is what tangible difference are these advances making to 
actual sporting performance?  From a practitioner’s perspective, the answer at present would 
seem to be somewhat uncertain.  Paired with the benefits found in this thesis from prioritising 
rather than controlling for the unique contextual features of elite sport performance teams, it 
therefore is vital that the scope and limits of organisational sport psychology are re-evaluated 
to protect against a further and detrimental blurring of the boundaries between organisational 
and performance factors.  In the meantime, future research of manager-led culture change in 
elite sport performance teams should continue to operate and profit from a contextually-
grounded, practically-oriented approach. 
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A.1. Participant Information Sheet/Consent Form (PM and PD Studies) 
 
Culture Change In Elite Sport 
 
Managers and performance directors in elite sport face a significant challenge when 
coming into a new club or governing body. The pressure to achieve success is intense and 
changing nothing is normally not an option. This research therefore aims to look at these 
figures and the process of changing the culture of a club or governing body in order to 
achieve performance success. 
 
As a result of this pressure, the life-expectancy in these positions is getting shorter and we 
will be looking to publish articles in academic journals which offer guidance and raise 
awareness of the challenges faced by managers and performance directors in elite sport. 
 
In order for us to be able to do this, we require approximately 2 hours to interview you 
about your experience of delivering changes in elite sport. For your information, 
discussion will focus on the 7 questions found on the attached sheet. If applicable, you 
will also be encouraged to compare and contrast your experiences across different clubs 
or governing bodies, which you will be asked to specify at the start of the interview (up to 
a maximum of three clubs/governing bodies). 
 
The interviews will be recorded by two dictaphones and all recorded information will be 
kept confidential by the researcher and transferred immediately onto a secure computer. 
We will also discuss how you will be described in our articles in order to ensure that you 
remain anonymous. 
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any question or 
withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
If you wish to know the findings of the research please indicate your contact details here:  
 
………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Participant Declaration (to be signed on day of interview): 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above 
research. I have had the opportunity to consider this information, ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 
Signed ……………………………………………..  Date: …………… 
Print    …………………………………………….. 
 
Signed (Researcher)………………………………..  Date: …………… 
Print........................................................................... 
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A.2. Participant Information Sheet/Consent Form (Leeds Carnegie Case Study) 
 
Culture Change In Elite Sport 
 
Management in elite sport face a significant challenge when coming into a new club. The 
pressure to achieve success is intense and changing nothing is normally not an option. 
Accordingly, we are currently conducting a number of studies in British professional 
team sports. This particular project aims to look at the culture changes which have 
occurred at Leeds Carnegie RUFC over the last two seasons, from both the management 
and the player perspective. 
 
In order to get an accurate and comprehensive picture of your views, we would like 
approximately 2 hours of your time to interview you about your perceptions and 
experiences of the changes which have taken place at Leeds Carnegie RUFC since June 
2008. Our aim is to explore the full story of the successful progress shown by the club 
over this period. 
 
The interviews will be recorded by two dictaphones and all recorded information will be 
kept confidential by the researcher and transferred immediately onto a secure computer. 
The Club and managers will be identified by name, as it would be almost impossible to 
disguise this. If you are a player, however, we will discuss how you will be described in 
our articles in order to ensure that you remain anonymous. 
 
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any question or 
withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
If you wish to know the findings of the research please indicate your contact details here:  
 
………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Participant Declaration (to be signed on day of interview): 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above 
research. I have had the opportunity to consider this information, ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
Signed ……………………………………………..  Date: …………… 
 
Print.......................................................................... 
 
 
Signed (Researcher)………………………………..  Date: …………… 
 
Print.......................................................................... 
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A.3. Interview Guide 
 
Interview Questions 
 
 
1. Can you tell me what you were trying to achieve through the culture changes you 
have carried out? 
 
 
2. Can you tell me about any important steps taken before initiating the changes? 
 
 
3. Could you tell me what you feel the key processes or actions were for initiating the 
changes? 
 
 
4.  Could you tell me about any processes or actions that you believe were important for 
driving through the changes? 
 
 
5. Can you tell me about any personal attributes and skills that you believe were 
important for carrying out the changes? 
 
 
6. Could you tell me if you think any processes or actions were important for evaluating 
the impact of the changes? 
 
 
7. How would you reflect on the processes and actions you have employed to create 
changes?
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B.1. Research Programme Outputs 
Peer-Review Journal Publications 
Cruickshank, A. & Collins, D. (2012). Culture change in elite sport performance teams: 
Examining and advancing effectiveness in the new era. Journal of Applied Sport 
Psychology, 24, 338-355. 
Cruickshank, A., & Collins, D. (2012). Change management: The case of the elite sport 
performance team. Journal of Change Management, 12, 209-229. 
Collins, D., & Cruickshank, A. (2012). ‘Multidirectional management’: Exploring the 
challenges of performance in the World Class Programme environment. Reflective 
Practice, 13, 455-469 
Cruickshank, A., Collins, D., & Minten, S. (in press). Culture change in a professional sports 
team: Shaping environmental contexts and regulating power. International Journal of 
Sports Science and Coaching. 
Cruickshank, A., & Collins, D. (in press). Culture change in elite sport performance teams: 
An important and unique construct. Sport & Exercise Psychology Review. 
 
Book Chapters 
Collins, D., & Cruickshank, A. (2013). Preparing Team GB for London 2012. In V. Girginov 
(Ed.), Handbook of London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Volume 1: Making 
the Games (pp. 114-130). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Collins, D., Trower, J., & Cruickshank, A. (in press). Coaching high performance athletes 
and the high performance team. In P. Sotiriadou & V. De Bosscher (Eds.), Managing 
high performance sport. Routledge. 
 
Conference Presentations 
Cruickshank, A., & Collins, D. (2012, October). Culture change in professional teams: 
Delivering an organisational construct in performance environments. Paper presented 
at the Sport and Exercise Psychology in Action Conference of the British 
Psychological Society, Portsmouth. 
Cruickshank, A., & Collins, D. (2012, April). Knock-knock. Who’s there? UK Sport, a Board 
of Directors, support staff, performers and the mass media: Delivering culture change 
in British Olympic teams. Paper presented at the Division of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology Biennial Conference of the British Psychological Society, London. 
Cruickshank, A., & Collins, D. (2010, December). How many psychologists does it take to 
change a sports team? How the sport psychologist might facilitate culture change in 
an elite performance environment. Paper presented at the Division of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology Biennial Conference of the British Psychological Society, 
London. 
 
Media Coverage 
Neyfakh, L. (2012). How to change a culture. The Boston Globe. Retrieved from 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/09/22/how-change-
culture/HitMpC95xPFidEjEl2cx9J/story.html
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C.1. Workshop Programme Outline 
WORKSHOP: CREATING SUCCESS CULTURES IN ELITE TEAMS 
Programme & Outcome 
 
09:00-09:30: Arrival 
 
09:30-09:40: Introduction, background information and session structure (DC) 
 
09:40-10:00: Introduction to the model – the overall structure (AC) 
 
10:05-12:20: 2 x 65 minute block rotation – 5 minute comfort/coffee break: 
• Block 1: On-field decision making (DC) 
o Influences on decision making – fast action and slow deliberation 
o Shaping decisions via psycho-motor, psycho-behavioural, psycho-
social/organisational, and structural/political means 
o Integration with other management/media links 
• Block 2: Off-field multi-directional management (AC) 
o The set-up: pre-job recce, harnessing allies and self-protection 
o Working from multiple angles: deploying “flanking attacks” 
o Dark leadership: working in the shadows and B
3
 management 
 
12:20-13:00: Lunch 
 
13:00-13:50: 
• Block 3: Managing and using the media (RW) 
o Managing the relationship with regional and national outlets 
o Using controlled outlets: internal and social media 
o Framing and using media opportunities to send your message 
 
14:00: Introduction to the afternoon (DC) 
 
14:10-15:10: Applying the Tools (DC/AC/RW): 
• Hypothetical case study training scenario 
• Delivering change across nested phases 
• Handling on-spot interviews 
 
15:10-15:30: Groups report back 
 
15:30-15:45: Feedback on spot interviews (DC/RW) 
 
15:45-16:00: Evaluation, follow-up and close (DC/AC/RW) 
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C.2. Harry Redknapp Case Study Example 
What he’s doing: 
- Working on multiple levels with multiple stakeholders 
- Setting up the changes: proactively creating conditions rather than reactively responding to them 
- Deploying flanking attacks (hitting same target with the same message through different means) 
- Changing contexts as well as changing people 
- Using B
3
 management 
- Making in-the-moment decisions against a short, medium, and long-term plan 
SEASON 2012/2013 
Nov-Dec 2012: 
Short-term Results & Transfer Window Set-Up 
January 2013: 
Modify Squad & Generate Momentum 
Feb-May 2012: 
Keep Momentum 
Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 1 Goal 2 Goal 3 Goal 1 
Set/align expectations Identify/harness 
allies/architects 
Deliver instant 
results 
Recruit/ 
sell players 
Manage 
expectations 
Generate 
momentum 
Optimise/Sustain 
confidence 
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
 
Players 
 
Deliver 
private and 
public kick 
up the arse 
(timed with 
key 
moments) 
 
- (Mainly) 
work ethic/ 
commitment 
based team 
selection   
Fans 
 
Generate 
‘rational 
optimism’ 
(set against 
scale of 
challenge 
and timed 
with key 
moments) 
Board 
 
Reinforce 
need to 
recruit/sell 
in January 
(timed with 
key 
moments) 
Media 
 
Keep them 
onside; use 
to send 
messages 
to players, 
fans, and 
Board 
- Appoint trusted 
staff 
 
- Optimise well-being 
and perceptions of 
significant players 
(i.e., senior players, 
star players, etc) 
- Training 
focus on 
tactics/shape 
 
- Focus on 
preparation 
.......... ............ ........... ........... 
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C.3. Hypothetical Case Study Training Scenario 
CULTURE CHANGE WORKSHOP 
APPLYING THE TOOLS: HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY 
 
 
Stop the press! It’s June 2013 and a management role at Twickenham Tigers has become 
available, a mid-table Championship club with a past history of periodic bobbing between 
first and second tiers.  Having been in the Championship for the past four seasons, the 
previous head coach (who had been in charge for five years and held popularity with 
players, staff, fans and media alike) has just left to take up a role at a Premiership club. 
 
The TTs have an average home gate of 3,000 (reaching up to 6,000 for big matches) and are 
owned by a locally-based entrepreneur who used to attend matches as a kid.  Having 
bought the club 6 months ago after the prior owner of 20 years ran into financial problems, 
this handover had been met with much optimism by the fans; encouraged by a promise of 
greater investment in the team.  Indeed, many stories in the media had circulated on the 
new owner’s 5-year plan to establish the club as a mid-to-top end Premiership side who 
frequently qualify for the Heineken Cup.  With no experience of running a professional club, 
however, more than a little scepticism surrounded these goals in the rugby community.  
Additionally, the decision of two of the TT’s better players to sign for a team who finished 
one place below them in the season gone had also tempered the fans initial buoyancy. 
 
On the field, the TTs were well known for their solid yet unspectacular style of play, based 
on discipline, work ethic and grinding out results.  During the past four years, however, the 
academy had begun to produce players who could play in a more creative, expansive, and 
dynamic system.  In fact, coinciding with their most consistent league finishes in modern 
times (comfortably 6
th
/5
th
/6
th
/4
th
), six graduates had recently established themselves in the 
first XV and another four as replacements (albeit to the disgruntlement of some senior 
players who had now started to fall down the pecking order).  Additionally, after the former 
captain (a “fans’ favourite” who had been at the club for 10 years) retired due to injury mid-
way during the last season, the most talented academy graduate was named captain (at the 
age of 23) based on his often inspirational fly-half performances in the past two seasons.  
The retired captain, who held notable power in all corners of the playing and support staff, 
had also been appointed by the previous management as a forwards coach.  As a vociferous 
supporter of the club’s values and traditions, his coaching philosophy inevitably matched 
the “substance over style” culture on which the club had been based for the last 20 years. 
 
After much success in your current job at a top-end National League 1 club, where you had 
overseen a youthful side with a reputation for its adventurous approach, you apply for, are 
offered, and then accept the TT’s role – congratulations!!! You are hired by the Board with a 
specific remit to deliver a top-2 finish within the next two years and a more entertaining 
“product”: in other words, a successful team built on a culture of “substance and style”.  
Having just secured a deal with a higher-profile main sponsor, the Board have committed to 
fund salaries which are competitive with the top Championship teams until 2015 at least. 
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Initial Evaluation, Planning,
- Evaluating fit with the club and Board
- Evaluating the performance department
- Setting and aligning multi
- Identifying and harnessing social 
- Withholding initial action in sub
DELIVERING THE CULTURE CHANGE: YOUR TASK
 
Using the model, techniques, and tools discussed in the morning session, your group’s task 
is to develop an effective and efficient culture change strategy.  This strategy should outline
and explain your decision making and actions:
• 3 weeks before your appointment...
• in your first 3 hours in the job...
• in your first 3 days in the job...
• in your first 3 weeks in the job...
• in your first 3 months in the job...
 
For each of the above phases,
• what you are going to do;
• where you are going to do it;
• who you are going to do it with;
• how you are going to do it;
• and WHY this way over the alternatives
 
Oh yes, by the way - there will be calls for a spokesman to talk to the media on came
at ANY time, make sure you are all “on message” and ready to speak.
 
YOUR TIME STARTS NOW 
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 Set-Up & Impact: 
 
 
-stakeholder perceptions and expectations
allies and cultural architects
-optimal conditions 
- Delivering instant results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 think about: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- GOOD LUCK!! 
 
 
 
 
 
ra. So, 
 
